Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV05030, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV05030 Hearing Date: September 29, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. vs. De La Lallana, et. al., Case No. 22STCV05030
Tentative Ruling
re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Discharge and
Dismissal
Plaintiff
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) moves for an order discharging and dismissing
it with prejudice from this interpleader action, enjoining Defendants from
further litigation regarding the disputed funds, and awarding Chase reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs incurred in
bringing this action. The motion is
granted in part.
Any person, firm, corporation, association,
or other entity against whom double or
multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more
persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability,
may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and
litigate their several claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).) “The
purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double
vexation. [Citation.] ‘The right to the remedy by interpleader is founded,
however, not on the consideration that a [person] may be subjected to double liability,
but on the fact that he is threatened with double vexation in respect to one
liability.’ [Citations.]” (Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Rees (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 307, 315 (Farmers).) “An
interpleader action, however, may not be maintained ‘upon the mere pretext or
suspicion of double vexation; [the plaintiff] must allege facts showing a
reasonable probability of double vexation’ [citation], or a ‘valid threat of
double vexation’ [citation].” (Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 608.)
“‘In an
interpleader action, the court
initially determines the right of the plaintiff to interplead the
funds; if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is entered which
requires the defendants to interplead and litigate their claims to the funds.’
[Citation.] Then, in the second phase of an interpleader proceeding, the trial
court also has ‘the power under [Code of Civil Procedure] section
386 to adjudicate the issues raised by the interpleader action including:
the alleged existence of conflicting claims regarding the interpleaded funds;
plaintiffs’ alleged position as a disinterested mere stakeholder; and
ultimately the disposition of the interpleaded funds after deducting plaintiffs’
attorney fees.’ [Citations.]” (Farmers,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 315.)
“After any such complaint or
cross-complaint in interpleader has been filed, the court in which it is filed
may enter its order restraining all parties to the action from instituting or
further prosecuting any other proceeding in any court in this state affecting
the rights and obligations as between the parties to the interpleader until
further order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 386, subd. (f).)
The parties have stipulated that
Chase should be discharged from this action, and that Chase’s discharge will
not affect Chase’s liability for breach of contract in the ongoing action Care
Plus Medical Group, Inc., et al. v. Law Offices of Michael E. Reznick, et al. (22STCV14601)
(Care Plus).
Defendants Ailene Bundalian Rivera;
Noblequest Health Foundation, Inc.; Care Plus Medical Group, Inc.; DA & AR
Hospice Care, Inc.; Simi Valley Congregate Living, Inc.; Toluca Congregate
Living, Inc.; and Seersoft, Inc. (collectively, Respondents) contest the scope
of Chase’s requested injunction and Chase’s request for an award of attorney’s
fees and costs.
Chase’s
requested order would provide that all Defendants in this interpleader action
“are restrained and enjoined from instituting or further litigating any other
action or proceeding on behalf of themselves or any other person or entity
against Chase or any of its affiliates, related to the Funds,” and that “Chase
and each of its affiliates shall be discharged from any and all liability to
the Interpleader Defendants, and each of them, with respect to the Funds.”
Respondents argue that the
injunction is worded too broadly and violates the parties’ stipulation that
Chase’s discharge from this action will not affect its liability in Care Plus.
In Care
Plus, Respondents have alleged a claim against Chase for breach of
contract, arising from allegations that Chase allowed unauthorized parties to
access and transfer the disputed Funds. Care Plus can reasonably be
understood to be an action “related to the Funds,” falling within the scope of
the requested injunctive relief. Chase
does not dispute that the injunction should not affect its liability in Care
Plus. However, the possibility that the injunction, as worded, will affect Respondent’s
claim against Chase in that action supports a finding that Respondents “would
be damaged if the preliminary injunction issued,” and thus that the order
should be more narrowly worded. (Department of
Education v. Superior Court (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 977, 979.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section
386.6, subd. (a), “A party to an action who follows the procedure set forth in
Section 386 or 386.5 may insert in his motion, petition, complaint, or cross
complaint a request for allowance of his costs and reasonable attorney fees
incurred in such action. In ordering the discharge of such party, the court
may, in its discretion, award such party his costs and reasonable attorney fees
from the amount in dispute which has been deposited with the court. At the time
of final judgment in the action the court may make such further provision for
assumption of such costs and attorney fees by one or more of the adverse
claimants as may appear proper.”
Section 386.6 provides the court
discretion to deny an award of attorney’s fees to the interpleading party. In Wertheim, LLC v. Omidvar
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 921, the trial court denied the interpleader plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that “the trial
court could reasonably find it proper that the party that necessitated the
interpleader action pay for it.” (Id. at 925.) In Wertheim, “[a]t the time the interpleader action was initiated and
funds deposited, [defendant] had a colorable claim on the funds in the form of
a judgment confirming a $672,122 arbitration award. Had [interpleader
plaintiff] paid the judgment or posted a bond during the pendency of its appeal
there would have been no interpleader action.” (Ibid.; see Messerall
v. Fulwider (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1333 [“considering the fact that
[interpleader plaintiff] wrongfully forced [defendant] to take legal action
against him, the denial of fees was proper.”].)
Respondents argue that the Court
should deny an award of attorney’s fees and costs to Chase because Chase’s wrongful
acts necessitated the filing of this motion.
The Court finds that it is
premature to conclude that Chase is responsible for the dispute regarding the
accounts that are the subject of this interpleader action. Pursuant to Section 386.6(a) “[a]t the time
of final judgment . . . the court [] make such further provision for assumption
of such costs and attorney fees by one or more of the adverse claimants as may
appear proper.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 386.6, subd. (a).) At the conclusion of the Care Plus
action, the Court will determine which party or parties are responsible for
some or all of Chase’s fees.