Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 22STCV07996 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV07996, Date: 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07996 Hearing Date: March 17, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Cornwell vs. City of Compton, et. al., Case No. 22STCV07996

Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order

Defendant City of Compton (Defendant) moves for a protective order barring Plaintiff Craig J. Cornwell (Plaintiff) from conducting discovery into matters discussed in City Council closed sessions. The motion is granted in part.

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (b).)

“For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation]. Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) asserts claims against Defendant for breach of contract, promissory fraud, and promissory estoppel. Plaintiff alleges that he was appointed City Manager of Defendant on July 8, 2019, under a two-year employment agreement, ratified by Compton City Council (the City Council) on July 23, 2019. (FAC ¶¶ 14-15.) Around January 2021, the City Council began holding closed session discussions regarding the extension of Plaintiff’s employment. (FAC ¶ 26.) On February 23, 2021, during a closed session, Plaintiff presented proposed terms for the extension; later at that meeting, the City Council voted to present Plaintiff with a counteroffer for the extension. (FAC ¶ 29.) Plaintiff accepted the counteroffer. (FAC ¶ 31.)

On March 16, 2021, the City Council held a closed session meeting with its Chief Deputy City Attorney, who reduced the agreed-upon counteroffer to a writing and presented it to the City Council for review. (FAC ¶ 32.) Plaintiff’s Employment Agreement appeared on the City Council’s agenda for ratification for its meeting on April 6, 2021, but the item was withdrawn due to campaigning for the city’s election. (FAC ¶ 33.) The City Council continued to delay ratification of the employment agreement over the next few months, though various councilmembers assured Plaintiff that they would eventually ratify it. (FAC ¶¶ 33-39.) On June 22, 2021, the City Council voted on ratification of Plaintiff’s employment agreement, but the vote failed to pass. (FAC ¶ 40.)

On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff served on Defendant the Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Requests for Admission (Set One). (Yoo Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A, Ex. B.) The Request for Admissions seek information related to the City Council’s closed session meetings on September 22, 2020; January 16, 2021; February 2, 2021; February 16, 2021; and February 23, 2021. (Yoo Decl., Ex. B.)

Defendant moves for a protective order barring discovery into information and documents related to the City Council’s closed session meetings, pursuant to the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government Code section 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act).

“ ‘The Brown Act was adopted to ensure the public's right to attend the meetings of public agencies. (§ 54950.)’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the Brown Act requires that the legislative bodies of local agencies, including city councils, hold their meetings open to the public except as expressly authorized by the Act. [Citations.] The Act authorizes closed sessions to be held with regard to certain matters. [Citations.]” (Kleitman v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 324, 331.)

The Brown Act bars the disclosure of “confidential information that has been acquired by being present in a closed session authorized by Section 54956.7, 54956.8, 54956.86, 54956.87, 54956.9, 54957, 54957.6, 54957.8, or 54957.10.” (Govt. Code § 54963, subd. (a).) “The Brown Act does not expressly provide that the proceedings of a closed session are confidential. However, confidentiality may be strongly inferred from the various provisions of the Act pertaining to the recording of closed sessions.” (Kleitman, 74 Cal.App.4th at 332.) “[T]he Brown Act provides for disclosure of the proceedings which took place during a closed session in only two situations: (1) in camera review by the trial court of the minute book when it is alleged that a violation of the Brown Act has occurred during a closed session (§ 54957.2, subd. (a)); and (2) in camera review and disclosure of the tape recording of a closed session where there exists a prior judgment that the legislative body held unlawful closed sessions, a court order to make tape recordings, and a factual showing that another violation has occurred (§ 54960, subd. (c)).” (Id. at 333.) A trial court is authorized by the Act to compel disclosure of closed session proceedings in only those two situations. (Id. at 335.)

Plaintiff argues that the matters discussed in the February 23 meeting were not confidential, because they did not fall within any of the categories authorized for discussion during closed sessions. (Govt. Code § 54963, subd. (a).) Defendant argues that the February 23 meeting falls within the scope of the personnel exception provided by Section 54957.

The personnel exception provides, “this chapter shall not be construed to prevent the legislative body of a local agency from holding closed sessions during a regular or special meeting to consider the appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, discipline, or dismissal of a public employee or to hear complaints or charges brought against the employee by another person or employee unless the employee requests a public session.” (Gov. Code, § 54957, subd. (b)(1).) “The purposes of the personnel exception are (1) to protect employees from public embarrassment and (2) to permit free and candid discussions of personnel matters by a local governmental body. This exception should be narrowly construed.” (Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.)

Important here, Section 54957 provides that “Closed sessions held pursuant to this subdivision shall not include discussion or action on proposed compensation except for a reduction of compensation that results from the imposition of discipline.” (Gov. Code, § 54957, subd. (b)(4).) “Salaries and other terms of compensation constitute municipal budgetary matters of substantial public interest warranting open discussion and eventual electoral public ratification. . . . It is difficult to imagine a more critical time for public scrutiny of its governmental decision-making process than when the latter is determining how it shall spend public funds.” (San Diego Union v. City Council (1983) 196 Cal.Rptr. 45, 49-50.)

While Plaintiff’s discovery seeks information regarding multiple of the City Council’s closed session meetings, from September 22, 2020, through February 23, 2021, Plaintiff’s arguments in the Opposition are only directed towards the February 23, 2021 meeting. As an initial matter, the Court finds that the personnel exception applies to all closed sessions at issue except the one on February 23, 2021.

With respect to the February 23 meeting, Plaintiff allegedly proposed specific terms for the extension of his employment, including the term of employment, salary increases, benefits, and severance. (FAC ¶ 27.) The City Council’s counteroffer likewise proposed specific salary increases, benefits, and severance. (FAC ¶ 29.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the February 23 meeting falls outside of the scope of the personnel exception due to the discussions of Plaintiff’s proposed compensation; the provision plainly precludes “discussion or action on proposed compensation except for a reduction of compensation that results from the imposition of discipline.” (Gov. Code § 54957, subd. (b)(4).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has unclean hands because he also participated in the discussion of salary. However, Plaintiff’s discussion of his proposed salary at the February 23 meeting was not wrongful. (See Civ. Code, § 3517 [“No one can take advantage of his own wrong.”].) Plaintiff did not violate any provision of the Brown Act, as the penalty for unlawful meetings apply only to “Each member of a legislative body who attends a meeting of that legislative body where action is taken in violation of any provision of this chapter.” (Gov. Code § 54959.) Furthermore, the suggestion that the City Council is not responsible for the content of discussions held during its own closed session meetings is without merit.

Defendant also argues that the February 23 meeting is a closed session under Gov. Code § 54957.6, referred to as the “Labor Negotiations Exception.” (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 77 (2002).) That section provides, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a legislative body of a local agency may hold closed sessions with the local agency's designated representatives regarding the salaries, salary schedules, or compensation paid in the form of fringe benefits of its represented and unrepresented employees, and, for represented employees, any other matter within the statutorily provided scope of representation.” (Gov. Code § 54957.6, subd. (a).) “The governing body of a local agency such as a county board of supervisors may conduct its ‘meet and confer’ session, that is, its labor negotiations, either itself, or through its ‘designated representative.’ Section 54957.6 is pertinent when it selects the latter option.” (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 77 (2002).) Here, Plaintiff clearly was not a designated representative of a local agency, and so this section is inapplicable.

Finally, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that information from the February 23 meeting is not discoverable because a contract could not have been formed during the closed session as a matter of law. That issue is not proper for determination here. (See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at 175 [“We could not properly rule at this time on either the validity of this asserted affirmative defense, or on the evidence which may be relevant to it, if proper; in any case, whether the defense is a valid one or not, the parties are entitled to undertake discovery with reference to the matters potentially involved”].)