Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 22STCV09282 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV09282, Date: 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09282 Hearing Date: September 27, 2022 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Rozenberg vs. Vallandingham, et. al., Case No. 22STCV09828

Tentative Ruling re: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint

Defendants Jeffrey Vallandingham, Slava Cojocari, and Arcadia Adult Health Care Center, LLC (collectively, Defendants) demur to the Complaint of Plaintiff Aleksandra Rozenberg (Plaintiff). The demurrer is sustained with ten (10) days leave to amend.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

Defendant Arcadia Adult Health Center LLC (Arcadia), an adult day care, is alleged to have been Plaintiff’s former employer. (Comp. ¶ 1.) Defendant Jeffrey Vallandingham is Arcadia’s owner/operator, and Defendant Slava Cojocari was one of Plaintiff’s managers. (Comp. ¶ 2.) The Complaint asserts eleven causes of action arising in part out of allegations of workplace discrimination against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s wrongful termination by Arcadia.

A special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 (Khoury).) A demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine to what he or she is required to respond. For example, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to state against which party each cause of action is asserted if there are multiple defendants, a complaint is uncertain. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; see Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial Ch. 6-E ¶¶ 7:85 (The Rutter Group) (Uncertainty).)

The Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint is uncertain. First, a number of Plaintiff’s claims combine multiple causes of action into one. The first cause of action for “Breach of Express and Implied Contract” alleges Arcadia’s breach of two separate agreements, an oral agreement and an implied-in-fact agreement. (Comp. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for “Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of [FEHA]” asserts multiple, distinct FEHA claims, including for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, constructive discharge (Comp. ¶ 52), and failure to prevent discrimination. (Comp. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for “Intentional Misrepresentation [Fraud], Negligent Misrepresentation, and Concealment” similarly asserts three causes of action under one claim. (Comp. ¶ 76.) Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for Labor Code violations also combines separate statutory bases for liability under one cause of action. (Labor Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5.)

Other causes of action are pled with such lack of specificity that a defendant cannot reasonably determine what he or she is required to respond to. For instance, Plaintiff alleges under the third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy that Defendants’ termination violated “policies [ ] stated in [FEHA], the Labor Code, the Business & Professions Code, Health & Safety Code, the California Constitution, and other criminal and common and case law.” (Comp. ¶ 40.) This appears to simply list every other cause of action asserted by Plaintiff as the policy underlying the wrongful termination claim. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for “Violation of California Constitution” alleges generally that Arcadia’s conduct violated Article I, Sections 1-4, 8 of the California Constitution, “an independent prohibition against discrimination in employment and interference with freedom of speech, religion and association.” (Comp. ¶ 47.) The tenth cause of action for “Violation of Civil Rights” similarly alleges that Arcadia’s unspecified conduct violated innumerable rights of Plaintiff, including Plaintiff’s “exercise or enjoyment of any rights secured by the Constitution or Laws of the United States or the State of California.” (Comp. ¶ 82.) Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for violation of the UCL (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) simply alleges that all of Defendants’ alleged acts “constitute unfair business practices.” (Comp. ¶ 64.)

In addition, several causes of action merely recite the statutory elements of the claim without alleging any facts specific to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action alleges that Arcadia violated provisions of the Labor Code requiring meal periods and rest periods, and also unlawfully prohibited Plaintiff from inspecting her personnel and wage records. (Comp. ¶¶ 69-71.) The Court agrees with Defendants that these claims are not sufficiently pled. The Complaint has not stated any facts in support of the alleged violations; it is only alleged that “Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to allow Plaintiff to take rest breaks,” and that “Defendant knowingly and willfully refused to allow Plaintiff to inspect her personnel and wage records.” (Comp. ¶¶ 69, 71.) These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Labor Code sections 512 and 1198.5. (Compare Varsam v. Laboratory Corp. of America (S.D. Cal. 2015) 120 F.Supp.3d 1173, 1179 [finding allegations sufficient to support claim for meal and rest period violations where they “go beyond a ‘formulaic recitation’ of elements, and provide sufficient factual detail to state a claim”].