Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV11879, Date: 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV11879 Hearing Date: October 31, 2022 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Corona,
et. al. vs. CNC Properties, LLC, et. al., Case
No. 22STCV11879
Tentative
Ruling re: Defendant’s Demurrer to First
Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike
Defendant CNC Properties LLC (Defendant) demurs to and moves
to strike the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Linda Corona, Nefectaly
Morales, Maria Aguilar, and Jake Luker (collectively, Plaintiffs). The demurer
is sustained. The motion to strike is moot.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a
demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594,
601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a
general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane
Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner
v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the
complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic
evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a
plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson
(1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the
complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute
any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574,
578.)
Plaintiffs are tenants of the residential property located
at 1316 Linwood Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90017 (the Property). (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs’
tenancy began in June 2011. (FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs Maria Aguilar and Jake Luker
vacated the Property on December 8, 2019, while Plaintiffs Lidia Corona and
Nefectaly Morales are still tenants. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege that the
Property is owned by Defendant 1316 Linwood LLC, and managed/maintained by
demurring Defendant CNC Properties. (FAC ¶ 6.)
The Property was cited for multiple violations of the
California County Code by the Los Angeles Housing & Community Investment
Department (LAHCID) in October 2019, November 2019, and January 2020. (FAC ¶
6.) Plaintiffs allege the existence of numerous habitability violations at the
Property, including cockroach infestation, rodent infestation, damaged walls, lead
paint, mold, termite infestation, and leaks. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 16.) The Property was
cited for these issues on five separate occasions from April 2022 to July 2022
by the Los Angeles Public Health Department (LAPHD). (FAC ¶ 10.) The Property
was also cited on four occasions from May 2022 to August 2022 by the Los
Angeles Building and Safety Department (LADBS) for issues related to
maintenance and sanitation. (FAC ¶¶ 11-12.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not remedy a majority
of the cited violations within 35 days of the notices. (FAC ¶¶ 8-12.) Rather
than correct the issues, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs “by abusing the
right of entry into their unit, and/or entering Plaintiffs’ home repeatedly and
for prolonged periods of time without making any repairs, and threating to
evict Plaintiffs on multiple occasions. Defendants and/or their agents are
frequently dismissive and insulting in response to requests for repairs and threaten
to evict Plaintiffs for repairs.” (FAC
¶ 23.)
Plaintiffs’
FAC asserts seven causes of action against Defendant, for: (1) Breach of
Implied Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of Statutory Warranty of
Habitability; (3) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (4) Negligence;
(5) Nuisance; (6) Unlawful, Fraudulent, and Unfair Business Acts and Practice;
and (7) Harassment of Tenants (Civ. Code §§ 1940.2, 1942.5)
.
First, Second, and Third Contract Causes of Action
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ first,
second, and third causes of action fail because Defendant was not a party to
the lease agreement.
The common law warranty of habitability is implied by law in
residential leases in California. (See Green v.
Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 631.)
An action for breach of the warranty of habitability is based on contract. (Fairchild
v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 925.)
The
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is likewise a term implied in the lease,
which “insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the
landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant's right
to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Nativi
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 291–292.)
Because Defendant was not the landlord of the Property
and was not party to the lease with Plaintiffs, the Court sustains the demurrer
as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and third contract-based claims against
Defendant. (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 929 [“Since the suit for breach of the implied warranty is
essentially a contractual one, the trial court correctly ruled the agents could
not be held liable on the breach of warranty because an agent is ordinarily not
liable on the contract when he acts on behalf of a disclosed principal”].)
The
demurrer to the first, second and third cause of action is sustained without
leave to amend.
Fourth Cause of Action
for Negligence
The lack of an alleged contractual relationship
between Defendant and Plaintiffs does not preclude Plaintiffs’ tort claims: “because
the tenant's remedies against the landlord are not limited to breach of the
warranty of habitability and he may also plead tort actions, it necessarily
follows that the agent may also be held liable on any properly pleaded tort
causes of action.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 929-30.)
The relevant criteria for determining whether a defendant
stands in such a position as to owe an affirmative duty to a plaintiff are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm.” (Ibid.) Rental agents of a landlord owe a duty
of ordinary care to tenants where “the transaction between the rental agent and
the landowner was clearly intended to affect the tenants, and because harm
would be foreseeable to the tenants if the rental agent did not properly
perform his duty.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiffs fail to set forth allegations
regarding Defendant CNC specifically and instead refer throughout the First
Amended Complaint to “Defendant” collectively.
Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained but Plaintiffs will be given ten
(10) days leave to amend to allege facts specific to moving Defendants.
Fifth Cause of Action for Nuisance
Nuisance
is defined by Civil Code § 3479 as “[a]nything which is injurious to health,
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property.” “The essence of a¿private¿nuisance¿is an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land and . . . without, it, the fact of¿personal¿injury, or of
interference with some¿purely personal right, is not enough for such a
nuisance.” (Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.¿(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d
116, 124–125.) To be actionable, the invasion must substantially and
unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their
property. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13
Cal.4th 893, 938.)
Defendant demurs on the basis that Plaintiffs’ nuisance
claim is duplicative of the cause of action for negligence. The Court agrees.
“Where negligence and
nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the
nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC
Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) “The torts of negligence and nuisance ... frequently
are, coexisting and practically inseparable.... A nuisance in many, if not in
most, instances, especially with respect to buildings or premises, presupposes
negligence.” (Ibid.)
The court in El
Escorial Owners' Assn. sustained the defendant’s demurrer to the
plaintiff’s cause of action for nuisance where the plaintiff’s complaint
incorporated the same set of facts for both the negligence and nuisance causes
of action, and “neither alleged facts to describe the nuisance nor [showed] how
this cause of action differed from the [negligence] cause of action.” (Id. at
1349.) Here, similarly, the FAC incorporates all factual allegations into the
fifth cause of action, then generally alleges that the conditions at the
Property constituted a nuisance. (FAC ¶¶ 55-58.) Because Plaintiffs’ “negligence
and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care,”
the nuisance claim is the same as the negligence claim. Accordingly, the
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action
for nuisance.
Sixth
Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200;
Seventh
Cause of Action for Harassment of Tenants (Civ. Code §§ 1940.2, 1942.5)
California’s Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or
practices. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) “An ‘unlawful
business activity’ includes ‘anything that can properly be called a business
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” (People v. McKale (1979)
25 Cal.3d 626, 632 [quoting Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972)
7 Cal.3d 94, 113].) “Virtually any law or regulation—federal or state,
statutory or common law, can serve as a predicate for a Business and
Professions Code section 17200 ‘unlawful’ violation. [Citation.]” (Paulus v.
Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 681 [internal quotations
omitted].)
Civ. Code § 1940.2 makes certain conduct unlawful when done
by a landlord “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling,”
including theft, extortion, and threats of force or menacing conduct. (Civ.
Code § 1940.2, subd. (a).) Civ. Code § 1942.5 prohibits retaliation by a lessor
against a lessee for the lessee’s complaint about the tenability of the
dwelling made to an appropriate agency. (Civ. Code § 1942.5, subd. (a).)
Defendant demurs to the sixth cause of action on the basis
that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent
business acts or practices,” and demurs to the seventh cause of action on the
basis that Defendant is not a landlord and so cannot be held liable under
sections 1940.2 and 1942.5.
Plaintiffs have failed to present
any argument in support of their sixth and seventh causes of action, and so the
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to those claims.
Motion to Strike
Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike is moot.