Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 22STCV15318, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV15318, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15318 Hearing Date: October 24, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Cornejo, et. al. vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et. al., Case No. 22STCV15318

Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant) moves for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs Ana Cornejo and Pedro Betancourt’s (collectively, Plaintiffs) Complaint. The motion is granted with ten (10) days leave to amend.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)

Like a general demurrer, “ordinarily, a [motion for judgment on the pleadings] does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the [motion] will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether properly pled factual allegations—assumed to be true and liberally construed—are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Com’n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116.)

Plaintiffs bring this lemon-law action in connection with their purchase of a used 2018 Honda Accord on October 24, 2020. (Comp. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs allege two causes of action against Defendant, for Breach of Implied Warranty and Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ authorized service and repair facilities failed to conform the Vehicle to Defendant’s “New Vehicle Limited Warranty.” (Comp. ¶¶ 8-10.)

Breach of Express Warranty

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs, as purchasers of a used vehicle with an unexpired manufacturer’s express warranty, lack standing under the Song-Beverly Act pursuant to Rodriguez v. FCA US (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 509.

Under the Song-Beverly Act, “[i]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle ... or promptly make restitution to the buyer....” (Civ. Code § 1793.2, subd. (d).)

Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) provides, in relevant part, “ ‘New motor vehicle’ means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. . . . ‘New motor vehicle’ includes … a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty.”

The issue in Rodriguez was “whether a used car purchased from a retail seller unaffiliated with the manufacturer qualifies as a ‘new motor vehicle’ simply because there is some balance remaining on the manufacturer's warranty.” (Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 223.) The plaintiffs had argued that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” in section 1793.22(e)(2) applied to their vehicle, which was purchased used with balance remaining on an express warranty from the manufacturer. (Id. at 219.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, and concluded that "the phrase ‘other motor vehicles sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty’ refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.”

The Supreme Court granted petition for review of Rodriguez on July 13, 2022, and denied requests for depublication of the opinion. “Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal [in Rodriguez] . . . may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 . . ., to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (Rodriguez v. FCA US (Cal. 2022) 512 P.3d 654; see Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, subd. (e).)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Rodriguez precludes Plaintiffs’ claims under the facts pled. Plaintiffs allege that the Vehicle was purchased used, and that Defendant breached the “New Vehicle Limited Warranty” accompanying the Vehicle. (Comp. ¶¶ 5, 8.) In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant issued a Certified Pre-Owned warranty to Plaintiff at the time of sale, constituting a “new warranty [issued by the manufacturer] along with the sale of the used good.” (Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 218; Barry Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Defendant disputes that a certified preowned vehicle qualifies as a “new motor vehicle” under Song-Beverly, and also cites a provision in the sales contract which states that the Vehicle is sold “AS IS – NO WARRANTY.” (RJN, Ex. D.) These issues are not appropriate for consideration here; Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim in the Complaint is not based on the purported CPO warranty, and so the cause of action fails regardless. (Comp. ¶ 8.)

Breach of Implied Warranty

Pursuant to Civil Code § 1792, every sale of consumer goods shall be accompanied by the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. “Merchantability” means that the goods “[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,” and are “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (Civ. Code § 1791.1, subd. (a).)

“[I]n the sale of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any role in the sale of the used car to plaintiff.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398.) In Nunez, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff’s claim for implied warranty failed because he “presented no evidence that defendant was ‘a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods’ (§ 1795.5), or in any way acted as such.” (Id. at 399.) “Distributor” is defined by the Act as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal relationship that stands between the manufacturer and the retail seller in purchases, consignments, or contracts for sale of consumer goods.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (e).)

Here, Defendant did not act as the distributor or retailer of the Vehicle, and the Complaint does not allege that Defendant issued a new warranty along with the sale of the Vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that the Vehicle was purchased used. (Comp. ¶ 5.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim against Defendant also fails.