Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV17964, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17964 Hearing Date: August 31, 2023 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Doukoure vs. Los
Angeles Community College District, et. al., Case No. 22STCV17964
Tentative Ruling
re: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint;
Motion to Strike
Defendants Los Angeles Community
College District and Los Angeles Trade Technical College (collectively,
Defendants) demur to the fourth and fifth causes of action in the Complaint of
Plaintiff Fatoumata Doukoure (Plaintiff), and move to strike portions of the
Complaint. The demurrer is sustained. The motion to strike is granted in part.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a
court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a
complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts
in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s
allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any
other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or
the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110
Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint,
liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of
action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
Defendant Los Angeles Community
College District (LACCD) is the community college district serving Los Angeles.
Defendant Los Angeles Trade Technical College (LATTC) is one of the nine
colleges comprising LACCD. (Comp. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has been employed as an
instructor at LATTC’s Department of Cosmetology since 2018. (Comp. ¶¶ 13-14.) Beginning
in Spring 2019 semester, Plaintiff was frequently subjected to racist verbal
abuse and threats from a student, Ariane Douglas (Douglas), during classroom
lessons. (Comp. ¶ 17.) Douglas’s behavior led Plaintiff to invoke the college’s
rules and suspend Douglas from attending her classes. (Comp. ¶ 17.)
Lidia Ley (Ley), the chair of
LATTC’s Cosmetology Department, allegedly reprimanded Plaintiff for her
handling of the incident, undermined Plaintiff in the classroom, and “on
several occasions stated that Plaintiff’s background as an African was different
and thus Plaintiff does not understand how to run an American classroom.”
(Comp. ¶ 18.) Ley’s approach emboldened Douglas to return to classes and
continue her misconduct. When Plaintiff went to Ley to address Douglas’s
behavior, including Douglas turning in another student’s work as her own, Ley
blamed Plaintiff for suspending Douglas and doubted Plaintiff’s claims. (Comp.
¶ 20.)
Plaintiff later obtained a
restraining order against Douglas. (Comp. ¶ 21.) In addition, on December 13,
2019, Plaintiff reported the case via an “Appendix O (Non-Collegiality Incident
Report Form)” to Dean Ann Hamilton and Plaintiff’s union, the American
Federation of Teachers College Faculty Guild (AFT 1521). (Comp. ¶¶ 4, 22.) Dean
Hamilton was required to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint within 20 days, but
she failed, refused, or neglected to respond within that time. (Comp. ¶ 22.)
In the semesters following
Plaintiff’s filing of the Appendix O, Plaintiff’s assigned work hours were
significantly cut by Defendants. (Comp. ¶ 24.) On April 8, 2020, during a Zoom
faculty meeting to discuss teaching assignments, Dean Hamilton and Ley
allegedly attacked, harassed, and bullied Plaintiff for failing to follow their
teaching directions, ridiculed Plaintiff as being “different,” reiterated that
Plaintiff was West African, and claimed that Plaintiff allowed her culture and
Islamic religion to influence her “hard-stance” on students. (Comp. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff attempted to contact Dean Hamilton following the meeting to address
the situation, but her calls and emails went unanswered. (Comp. ¶ 25.) From
Fall 2020 through Fall 2022, Plaintiff continued to follow up with Dean
Hamilton regarding her Appendix O, but Plaintiff has still not received a final
response. (Comp. ¶ 26.)
Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress (IIED)
“The elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991)
54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)
Outrageous conduct “must be so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197,
209.) In order for conduct to be outrageous, there must be (1) a specific
intent to injure, or (2) a reckless disregard of the substantial certainty of a
severe emotional injury. (Id. at p. 210 [“Absent an intent to injure,
such inaction is not the kind of ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ that gives
rise to liability under the ‘intentional infliction of emotional
distress’ tort”]; Christensen v. Superior
Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903 [“substantially certain to
cause extreme emotional distress”].) “Severe
emotional distress means, then, emotional distress of such substantial quantity
or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be
expected to endure it.” (Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 772,
787–788.)
It is the specific intent to harm or
the reckless disregard of a substantial certainty of severe injury that
distinguishes intentional infliction of emotional
distress from negligent infliction of emotional
distress. (Christensen v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
p. 904.) “The conduct must be such that it would cause an average member of the
community to immediately react in outrage.” (Gormon v. TRW, Inc.
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1172.)
Plaintiff’s
fourth cause of action for IIED is based on allegations that Defendants
“engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct towards Plaintiff including
reduction in Plaintiff’s work hours because of Plaintiff’s race, color and
national origin…” (Comp. ¶ 66.) Specifically, after Plaintiff filed her Appendix
O complaint, “Defendants illegally and unlawfully proceeded to reduce
Plaintiff’s work hours without justification because of Plaintiff’s complaints
and reports of events, [and caused] conditions and practices including
harassment, retaliation, [and] supervisors yelling at Plaintiff without
justification…” (Comp. ¶ 67.) Defendants’ conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer
severe mental and emotional distress resulting in physical symptoms. (Comp. ¶
68.)
Defendants show that Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to dismiss
Plaintiff’s IIED claim during the meet and confer process. (Toy Decl. ¶ 7, Ex.
2.) Furthermore, the Court agrees with Defendants that the alleged misconduct
is not sufficiently “extreme or outrageous” to support a claim for IIED. (C.f. McCoy
v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 283, 295 [finding facts
supporting FEHA retaliation claim insufficient to support IIED].) The demurrer
is therefore sustained as to the fourth cause of action.
Fifth Cause of Action for
Failure to Prevent Discrimination (FEHA)
Under Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k), it is an unlawful
employment practice “[f]or an employer, labor organization, employment agency,
apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment,
to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.”
Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s claim for Failure to
Prevent Race Based Discrimination on the basis that it is duplicative of
Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Failure to Prevent Retaliation,
Discrimination, and Harassment. The Court agrees. Both claims allege
Defendants’ failure to prevent discrimination in violation of Gov. Code §
12940(k) under identical factual allegations. (Comp. ¶¶ 57-61, 75.)
Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained as to the fifth cause of action.
Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike
“Los Angeles Trade-Technical College” as a named party, allegations related to
recovery of attorney’s fees (Comp. ¶¶ 42, 52, 62, 77), and allegations seeking
recovery of punitive damages pursuant to the fourth cause of action for IIED.
(Comp. ¶ 70, Prayer 10.)
First, Defendants represent
that Los Angeles Trade-Technical College (LATTC) is not a separate legal entity
from Los Angeles Community College District and so has been erroneously named
as a separate defendant. In support, Defendants request a screenshot of LATTC’s
website for judicial notice, describing LATTC as “one of the nine public
community colleges in the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD).”
(RJN, Ex. 1.) Because Plaintiff has not opposed this portion of the motion to
strike, the motion is granted as to LATTC.
“[A]s a
general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are
authorized by statute or agreement.” (People
ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) The Complaint alleges, “Plaintiff has retained
attorneys to prosecute Plaintiff’s claims under the FEHA. Plaintiff is
therefore entitled to recovery reasonable attorneys fees and costs pursuant to
Govt. Code § 12965(b)…” (Comp. ¶ 42.) Government Code § 12965, subd. (b)
provides, “In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion,
may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney s fees and costs,
including expert witness fees…” Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA are sufficient to
plead entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees under this section. Accordingly,
the motion to strike is denied as to the attorney’s fees allegations. (Comp. ¶¶
42, 52, 62, 77.)
Because
the demurrer is sustained as to the fourth cause of action, the motion is moot
with respect to the punitive damages allegations.