Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV22993, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV22993 Hearing Date: October 17, 2022 Dept: 30
Dept.
30
Calendar
No.
Kwasha
vs. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, et. al., Case No. 22STCV22993
Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to
Strike
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) demurs to and moves to strike the Complaint of
Plaintiff Linda Kwasha (Plaintiff). The demurrer is sustained and the motion to
strike is denied as moot.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a
demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594,
601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a
general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner
v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the
Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be
judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The Court may
not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations
plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion
Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is
properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc.
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
Plaintiff alleges that in July 2008, Plaintiff entered into
a written agreement to rent a safe deposit box from Washington Mutual Bank at
its branch located in Studio City, California. Plaintiff stored $240,000 worth
of jewelry in the safe. Washington Mutual was purchased by Chase on September
25, 2008. (Comp. ¶ 6.)
On September 8, 2021, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Michelle
Raigoza, the manager of the Studio City branch, regarding the status of the
box. Raigoza told Plaintiff that there was no safe deposit box at the branch
under Plaintiff’s name or social security number. (Comp. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff arranged to visit the bank in person on September
13, 2021. On that date, Plaintiff drove to the bank accompanied by her
significant other, Gato Grossman. (Comp. ¶ 12.) Raigoza called Plaintiff’s cell
phone while Plaintiff was on her way to the bank with Grossman, and Plaintiff
answered the call via her car speakerphone. Raigoza told Plaintiff that “on
December 27, 2010, the plaintiff had come into the Studio City Branch, claimed
she had lost her keys to the Safe Deposit Box, had the box drilled open, was
given the contents of the Safe Deposit Box, and closed the account." (Ibid.)
Raigoza continued to insist that Plaintiff had closed the box even after
Plaintiff denied Raigoza’s account. (Comp. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that these
statements caused her significant stress and anxiety. (Comp. ¶¶ 18-19.)
On May 5, 2022, Chase informed Plaintiff that Chase found
her safe deposit box; there were two boxes at the branch with the safe number,
suggesting that the customer with the other box with Plaintiff’s number had
been the one that had their box drilled open and the contents removed. (Comp. ¶
245) On May 6, Chase’s employees accessed the safe deposit box containing
Plaintiff’s jewelry, removed the jewelry, and sent it to a storage facility in
Texas. (Comp. ¶ 26.) On May 23, 2022, Chase returned the diamond jewelry to
Plaintiff. (Comp. ¶ 27.)
First Cause of Action for
Defamation
“The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication
that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural
tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (See Wong v. Tai Jing
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)
“If a
defamatory meaning appears from the language itself without the necessity of
explanation or the pleading of extrinsic facts, there is libel per se.” (Palm
Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
“Where the words or
other matters which are the subject of a defamation action are of ambiguous
meaning, or innocent on their face and defamatory only in the light of
extrinsic circumstances, the plaintiff must plead and prove that as used, the
words had a particular meaning, or ‘innuendo,’ which makes them defamatory.
[Citations.] Where the language at issue is ambiguous, the plaintiff must also
allege the extrinsic circumstances which show the third person reasonably
understood it in its derogatory sense (the ‘inducement’). [Citations.]” (Smith
v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 646.) “An innuendo, however, cannot
ascribe a meaning to assertedly defamatory matter other or broader than the
words themselves naturally bear; it cannot add to, enlarge, or change the sense
of the published words. (Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council
(1943) 23 Cal.2d 146, 159–160.) “The question whether a statement is reasonably
susceptible to a defamatory interpretation is a question of law for the trial
court.” (Maldonando, 72 Cal.App.4th. at 647.)
“The charge may be
that the plaintiff has been guilty of an act of dishonesty, or that plaintiff
has some particular defect of character.” (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th
ed. 2022) Torts § 640.) False accusations of crime are defamatory per se. (See Weinberg
v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1136 [discussing libel]; 5 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2022) Torts § 639.)
Raigoza’s
alleged statements that Plaintiff previously removed the contents of the safe
deposit box and closed the account are insufficient to support a cause of
action for defamation. The statements were not defamatory per se; Raigoza did
not accuse Plaintiff of any crime, and no defamatory meaning appears from the
language itself.
Plaintiff
has also not “allege[d] the extrinsic circumstances
which show the third person reasonably understood it in its derogatory sense.” (Maldonando,
72 Cal.App.4th. at 646.) The
allegations only show that Plaintiff called Raigoza regarding the contents of
the box, and that Raigoza informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff had already removed
the contents and closed the box. Though Raigoza’s statements were ultimately
incorrect, they were not reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained as to the first
cause of action.
Second Cause of Action
for Breach of Contract
Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of contract
alleges that Chase breached the Rental Agreement entered into for the safety
deposit box by refusing to return Plaintiff’s jewelry on September 13, 2021,
and by falsely claiming that Plaintiff had already removed the jewelry from the
box. (Comp. ¶ 23.) Under this cause of action, Plaintiff requests damages for
interest on the value of the jewelry, from the date that Plaintiff requested
the jewelry until the date that the jewelry was returned to her. (Comp. ¶ 27.)
“A person
who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by
calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a
particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day,
except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from
paying the debt.” (Civ. Code § 3287.)
The Court agrees with Chase that Plaintiff has failed to
allege damages under this cause of action. Plaintiff’s request for interest on
the value of jewelry, standing alone, is insufficient to show grounds for
recovery for the alleged breach of contract. (See Estate
of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 990
[finding plaintiff not entitled to interest under section 3287 where plaintiff
“did not have a claim of damages”].) Because Plaintiff has not pled
damages, the demurrer is sustained as to the second cause of action.
Third
Cause of Action for Negligence
Plaintiff’s third cause of action
for negligence and fourth cause of action for conversion are similarly based on
Chase’s alleged refusal to return Plaintiff’s jewelry. (Comp. ¶ 29, 32.) Chase argues that these claims are barred by the
economic loss rule.
“Economic loss consists of damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of
profits—without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property
[Citations].” (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th
979, 988 (Robinson Helicopter).) “[T]he economic loss rule provides: where a purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated”
because the product was not received, “his remedy is said to be in contract
alone, for he has suffered only ‘economic’ losses.” (Ibid.) Under the
economic loss rule, a purchaser may only recover in contract for purely economic
loss “due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above
and beyond a broken contractual promise.” (Ibid.) “Quite simply, the
economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from
dissolving one into the other.” (Ibid.)
“In actions for
negligence in California, recovery of purely economic loss is foreclosed in the
absence of (1) personal injury, (2) physical damage to property, (3) a ‘special
relationship’ existing between the parties, or (4) some other common law
exception to the rule.” (Kalitta Air, LLC v. Cent. Tex. Airborne Sys., Inc.
(9th Cir. 2008) 315 Fed.Appx. 603, 605.)
The Court agrees with Chase that Plaintiff’s negligence and
conversion causes of action are barred by the economic loss rule. Plaintiff has
not alleged any personal injury or physical damage to property; the Complaint
alleges that Plaintiff’s jewelry was returned to her. (Comp. ¶ 27.) Though Plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress resulting
from Chase’s initial failure to return the jewelry, “emotional distress damages are not ‘available in every case in which
there is an independent cause of action founded upon negligence.’ [Citation.]
Such damages have generally been allowed where
the defendant's conduct caused physical injury. . .. But in the absence of
physical injury, the courts have never allowed recovery of damages for emotional
distress arising solely from property damage or economic injury to the plaintiff.” (Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
1220, 1228.) Here, Plaintiff’s alleged damages for emotional distress do not arise
from physical injury or the threat of physical injury, and so Plaintiff has not
pled any loss beyond “purely economic losses that may be
recovered in a contract action.” (Robinson Helicopter, 45 Cal.4th at
988.) Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained as to the third and fourth causes
of action.
The
motion to strike is denied as moot.