Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV30154, Date: 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV30154 Hearing Date: January 10, 2023 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Bernal vs. Lurline
Gardens Limited Housing, et. al.,
Case No. 22STCV30154
Tentative Ruling
re: Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint;
Motion to Strike
Defendant Lurline Gardens Limited
Housing (Defendant) demurs to the second, sixth, seventh, and tenth causes of
action in the Complaint of Plaintiff Jennifer Barraza Bernal (Plaintiff), and
moves to strike portions of the Complaint. The Court sustains the demurrer as
to the second, sixth, and tenth causes of action with ten (10) days leave to
amend and, overrules the demurrer as to the seventh cause of action, and denies
the motion to strike.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a
court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a
complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co.
v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s
allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any
other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or
the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110
Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint,
liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of
action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
Plaintiff brings claims against
Defendant, her landlord, based on alleged habitability violations and deficient
conditions at a residential property located in Chatsworth, California. (Comp.
¶ 1.) The alleged issues include major cockroach and bedbug infestations, mold
contamination, dysfunctional plumbing and electrical systems, sewage exposure,
and improper ventilation. (Comp. ¶¶ 25, 55.) Plaintiff alleges that she
notified Defendant of the conditions, and that Defendant failed to take action
to correct them. (Comp. ¶¶ 36-38.)
Defendant demurs to the second
cause of action for Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability; the sixth
cause of action for Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; the seventh cause of
action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and the tenth cause of
action for Breach of Contract.
Contract-Based Causes of Action
Defendant demurs to the causes of
action for Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Covenant of
Quiet Enjoyment, and Breach of Contract on the basis that Plaintiff has not
sufficiently pled the underlying contract. The Court agrees.
“A written contract may be pleaded
either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract
attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal
effect. In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must
‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it
requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement,
and avoidance of legal conclusions.’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)
The common law
warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases in California.
(See Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 631.) An action for breach of the
warranty of habitability is based on contract. (Fairchild v. Park (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 919, 925.) The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is
likewise a term implied in the lease, which “insulates
the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone
claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant's right to use and enjoy the
premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Nativi v. Deutsche
Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 291–292.)
Here, Plaintiff has neither pled
the relevant terms of the parties’ lease agreement nor attached a copy of the
lease to the Complaint. Regarding the lease agreement, it is only alleged that
“[t]he Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a contract, a written or oral
lease agreement, in or around 2011,” and that “[t]he Plaintiffs . . . were in
compliance with the requirements of their lease agreement, and did all of the
significant things the contract required them to do.” (Comp. ¶¶ 159-160.) Because Plaintiff has not
sufficiently pled the contract between her and Defendant, the contract-based
claims necessarily fail. Thus, the demurrer is sustained as to the second,
sixth, and tenth causes of action.
Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress (IIED)
“The elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Christensen
v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)
Outrageous conduct “must be so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”
(Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209.) In order
for conduct to be outrageous, there must be (1) a specific intent to injure, or
(2) a reckless disregard of the substantial certainty of a severe emotional
injury. (Id. at 210 [“Absent an intent to injure, such inaction is not
the kind of ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ that gives rise to liability under
the ‘intentional infliction
of emotional distress’
tort”]; Christensen v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
903 [“substantially certain to cause extreme emotional distress”].)
It is the specific intent to harm or
the reckless disregard of a substantial certainty of severe injury that
distinguishes intentional infliction of emotional
distress from negligent infliction of emotional
distress. (Christensen v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
904.) “The conduct must be such that it would cause an average member of the
community to immediately react in outrage.” (Gormon v. TRW, Inc.
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1172.)
Plaintiff’s IIED claim is based on
the allegations that Defendant failed to or delayed in remedying, among other
things, a cockroach infestation, major bedbug infestations, mold infestations,
dysfunctional plumbing, electrical outages, and ventilation. (Comp. ¶¶ 25-33,
139.) It is alleged that Defendant failed to act despite receiving numerous
complaints from tenants and government notices of the violations. (Comp. ¶¶
34-38.) Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered emotional and mental distress
as a result of Defendant’s failure to correct the conditions on the property.
(Comp. ¶¶ 40, 140.)
The
alleged facts show “a reckless disregard of the substantial certainty of a
severe emotional injury” (Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 210), and
so are sufficient to state a cause of action for IIED for purposes of pleading.
Whether the alleged conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” as to cause severe
mental distress is a question of fact not resolvable here. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903,
911, 921 [finding tenant’s IIED claim against landlord sufficiently pled based
on alleged “dilapidated and unsafe condition of the rented premises”]; Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298-99 [whether landlord’s
alleged acts of turning off utilities and failing to allow tenant to return to
property were so extreme and outrageous to support IIED claim was a factual
issue not resolvable on demurrer].) The demurrer is therefore overruled
as to the seventh cause of action.
Motion to Strike
Defendant
moves to strike the allegations in the Complaint relating to punitive damages.
(Comp. ¶¶ 14, 17, 42-45, 50, 51, 78, 79, 97, 106, 124, 157; Prayer 4, 9.)
A plaintiff may recover punitive
damages in an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising out of contract where the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” exists
when the defendant intends to cause injury to the plaintiff, or the defendant
engages in despicable conduct with willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression”
exists when the defendant in conscious disregard of a person's rights engages
in despicable conduct subjecting that person to cruel and unjust hardship. (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)
The
allegations that Defendant had knowledge of and continually failed to remedy
the myriad health and safety issues at the property are sufficient to show
grounds for recovery of punitive damages. (Comp. ¶¶ 25-38.) Given that
Defendant’s alleged conduct is sufficiently outrageous to state a cause of
action for IIED, “[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that the alleged
behavior was not so ‘vile,’ ‘base,’ or ‘contemptible’ that it would not be ‘looked
down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’ ” (Angie M. v. Superior
Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [denying motion to strike punitive
damages in connection with IIED claim].) Accordingly, the motion to strike is
denied.