Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case 22STCV31045 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV31045, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV31045 Hearing Date: February 15, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Lechner vs. Meade, et. al., Case No. 22STCV31045

Tentative Ruling re: Defendants Demurrer to Complaint

Defendants Jodeen V. Meade and Avison Young – Southern California LTD (collectively, Defendants) demur to the Complaint of Plaintiff Christopher Lechner dba Global Point Relocation Solutions. The demurrer is sustained, with ten (10) days leave to amend as to the first cause of action and overruled as to the second cause of action.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

Plaintiff’s claims concern a dispute over an allegedly unpaid real estate commission. Plaintiff and each Defendant are real estate brokers licensed by the California Department of Real Estate. (Comp. ¶¶ 9-11.) Defendant Jodeen V. Meade (Meade) allegedly worked as a sales agent for Defendant Avison Young – Southern California LTD (Avison). (Comp. ¶ 13.) In March 2022, Meade, as an agent for Avison, served as a real estate broker for the company Mullen Technologies (Mullen) to find a replacement for Mullen as sublessee at a property in Bellflower, California. (Comp. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff learned of the sublease and advised Meade that he had a client that was interested. (Comp. ¶ 15.) On March 29, 2022, Meade sent Plaintiff a letter with proposed lease terms, that also “stated that a commission was to be paid under a separate agreement with [Avison] by Mullen Technologies.” (Comp. ¶ 16.)

On April 11, 2022, Meade emailed Plaintiff a draft of a proposed lease for Plaintiff’s client. (Comp. ¶ 17.) The sublease agreement did not contain terms regarding the broker commission; when Plaintiff emailed Meade to ask about the commission, Meade responded that “[t]here is a procuring broker fee of 2.5%,” and told Plaintiff, “You are welcome to send me a commission agreement reflecting the 2.5% procuring broker fee or use this email as confirmation.” (Comp. ¶¶ 17-20.) Plaintiff accepted the email as confirmation of the commission agreement. (Comp. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that Meade and Avison did not pay him any commission, and that, based on the amount of the sublease rent, he is due $49,611.39. (Comp. ¶ 24.) The Complaint asserts two causes of action against Defendants for Breach of Contract and Quantum Meruit.

First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

“A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)

Though the Complaint refers to exhibits that purportedly show the proposed lease and the emails sent from Meade to Plaintiff (Comp. ¶¶ 16, 21), there are no exhibits attached to the Complaint. The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to plead the contract at issue; while Plaintiff has alleged the terms of the commission agreement from the April 11, 2022 emails sent by Meade, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the underlying lease that the commission agreement is dependent on. Accordingly, the demurer is sustained as to the first cause of action.

Second Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit

“Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’ To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract, but it must show the circumstances were such that ‘the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.’” (Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344, citations omitted)

“The only essential allegations of a common count are ‘(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.’” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants became indebted to Plaintiff as a procuring broker, that Plaintiff performed as agreed in providing Defendants the client for the sublease, and that Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff $49,611.39 owed for that service. (Comp. ¶¶ 29-31.) These allegations are sufficient to state a common count cause of action for Quantum Meruit against Defendants. The demurrer is overruled as to the second cause of action.