Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 22STCV38135, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV38135, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV38135 Hearing Date: October 27, 2023 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

C.L. vs. Doe 1, et. al., Case No. 22STCV38135

Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (Defendant) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiff C.L. (Plaintiff). The motion is denied.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)

Like a general demurrer, “ordinarily, a [motion for judgment on the pleadings] does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the [motion] will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether properly pled factual allegations—assumed to be true and liberally construed—are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Com’n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116.)

Plaintiff alleges that, in 1974, when she was approximately 12 years old, she was sexually abused by a teacher while attending Paul Revere Charter Middle School. (SAC ¶ 33.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Defendant, for Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision.

Plaintiff brings her claims pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, which “establishes a liberalized statute of limitations for actions to recover damages caused by childhood sexual assault brought against direct perpetrators of the abuse, as well as third party defendants directly or vicariously responsible for the abuse.” (X.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1025.) “[I]n 2019, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 . . . which amended section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revive time-barred claims for three years, and eliminate the shortened limitations period for claims against public agencies.” (Ibid.) AB 218 also retroactively eliminated the claim presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims made against public entities. (Gov. Code § 905, subd. (m).)

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that AB 218’s retroactive elimination of the claims presentation requirement is unconstitutional under article XVI, § 6 of the California Constitution (the gift clause). Defendant argues that, in eliminating the claims presentation requirement, the Legislature changed a substantive element of childhood sexual abuse claims under Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, and so violated the gift clause by creating liability where none previously existed.

In relevant part, article XVI, § 6 provides as follows:

The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any county, city and county, city, township or other political corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that may be hereafter established, in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever…

“The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (In re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 594.) “An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this section, and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid consideration.” (Conlin v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 22; see Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.)

The parties dispute whether AB 218 serves a “public purpose,” such that the gift clause would not apply. “It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom. [Citations.] The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746.) “The courts may infer the public purpose from other legislation or the manner in which the legislation is enacted.” (Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604.)

Here, the Legislature could have reasonably concluded, for a number of reasons, that the elimination of the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual abuse claims serves a public purpose. The Legislature’s Assembly Floor analysis of AB 218 states that the bill is intended “to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse”; “AB 218 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the arbitrary time limits upon victims to pursue a case,” and “confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children.” (RJN, Ex. 12 [89].) Additionally, Plaintiff suggests that AB 218’s purposes include encouraging positive internal change in public institutions regarding abuse, reducing societal costs of abuse, and increasing public trust and transparency by holding institutions accountable. Each of these rationales show a “reasonable basis” for the Legislature’s determinations.

Defendant argues that AB 218 does not serve a public purpose because it only offers damages for a small group of plaintiffs. No authority supports Defendant’s contention that the class of childhood sexual abuse victims is too small to be the subject of a “public purpose,” and the argument appears meritless on its face. Furthermore, AB 218’s purposes are not limited to victims of past abuse; the bill was also intended to deter future abuse (“to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse”). (RJN, Ex. 12.) Defendant’s arguments fail to refute the reasonableness of the various rationales offered by the Legislature for AB 218, and so “its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts.” (County of Alameda, 5 Cal.3d at 746.) Accordingly, the motion is denied.