Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV38143, Date: 2023-08-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV38143    Hearing Date: August 9, 2023    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Santiago vs. Plaza de Leon Apartment, LP, et. al., Case No. 22STCV38143

Tentative Ruling re:  Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to Strike

Defendant Plaza De Leon Apartment, LP (Defendant) demurs to the Complaint of Plaintiff Mary Elizabeth Santiago (Plaintiff), and moves to strike portions of the Complaint. The demurrer is overruled. The motion to strike is granted in part.  Defendant is ordered to answer within ten (10) days of today’s date.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

Plaintiff is a tenant of an apartment owned and managed by Defendant, located at 630 S. Alvarado St., Los Angeles, CA. (Comp. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff first entered into a lease agreement for the apartment with Defendant’s predecessors-in-interest in 2007. (Comp. ¶ 7.) Since taking possession, Plaintiff has allegedly experienced numerous substandard conditions and habitability violations in the apartment, including cockroaches, bed bugs, defective electrical wiring, lack of heating and ventilation, leaky pipes and plumbing, and improper sewage and garbage disposal. (Comp. ¶¶ 9-11.) Plaintiff has made numerous complaints to Defendant’s agents regarding the conditions, but Defendant failed to remedy them, and told Plaintiff to vacate if she could not live in the conditions. (Comp. ¶ 13.)

In October 2022, Plaintiff made a complaint to the Los Angeles Department of Health. After Defendant learned of Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant threatened to evict Plaintiff. (Comp. ¶ 15.) The Los Angeles County Department of Health Inspectors visited Plaintiff’s unit and found multiple defects and uninhabitable conditions. (Comp. ¶ 16.) Defendant has not complied with the agency’s notices and orders to remedy the substandard conditions. (Comp. ¶ 17.)

The Complaint asserts five causes of action against Defendant, for (1) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Nuisance; (4) Violation of Civ. Code §§ 1941.1, et seq.; and (5) Negligence. Plaintiff seeks recovery of punitive damages pursuant to the first through fourth causes of action. (Comp. ¶¶ 29, 46, 56, 64; Prayer 2.)

Though Defendant purports to demur to each of Plaintiff’s claims on the basis that “[t]he court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (a)), Defendant’s demurer does not present any argument regarding the lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the demurer is directed entirely towards Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, and so is redundant with Defendant’s concurrently filed motion to strike. The Court will disregard the demurrer and treat this motion as only a motion to strike.

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising out of contract where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” exists when the defendant intends to cause injury to the plaintiff or the defendant engages in despicable conduct with willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” exists when the defendant in conscious disregard of a person's rights engages in despicable conduct subjecting that person to cruel and unjust hardship. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

            To succeed on a motion to strike punitive damages, it must be said as a matter of law that the alleged behavior was not so vile, base, or contemptible that it would not be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-29.) “In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)

            Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud to support recovery of punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was aware of the substandard conditions, did not remedy them, and even told Plaintiff to vacate if she did not want to live with the conditions. (Comp. ¶ 14.) Defendant also allegedly threatened to evict Plaintiff after learning of her complaints to the Department of Health. (Comp. ¶ 15.) Contrary to Defendant’s argument, these allegations clearly show more than negligent conduct.

            Defendant argues that punitive damages are unavailable due to the contractual relationship between the parties. Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is based on contract, and so cannot support recovery of punitive damages. (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 904.) However, Plaintiff may recover punitive damages pursuant to her tort claims for breach of warranty of habitability and nuisance. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919 [“[i]t is hornbook law that an act that constitutes a breach of contract may also be tortious.”].)

            Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for “Violation of Civil Code 1941.1, et seq.” alleges that Defendant breached unspecified statutory duties by failing to correct the substandard conditions in Plaintiff’s unit. (Comp. ¶ 60.) Because the Complaint fails to explain which statutory duty underlies the fourth cause of action, the claim does not support recovery of punitive damages. (See Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252 [“[w]here a statute creates new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law, the express statutory remedy is deemed to be the exclusive remedy available for statutory violations, unless it is inadequate.”].)

Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted as to the allegations related to punitive damages under the second and fourth causes of action (Paragraphs 46 and 64), and is otherwise denied.