Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 22STCV40119, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV40119 Hearing Date: January 12, 2024 Dept: 30
Calendar
No.
Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. Bijou, et.
al.,
Case No. 22STCV40119
Tentative Ruling re:
Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint
Cross-Defendant State Compensation
Insurance Fund (SCIF) demurs to the Cross-Complaint of Caesar James Bijou dba
Bijou’s Construction (Bijou). The demurrer is sustained with ten (10) days
leave to amend.
In reviewing
the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank);
C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.
(1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies
only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is
tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For
purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by
drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling
on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or
matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic
evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a
plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A
demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed,
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
In the underlying
action, Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (CAB) alleges that Bijou
failed to pay a premium of $72,583.12 on a workers’ compensation insurance
policy (the Policy). (Comp. ¶ 14.) The policy was issued by SCIF and later
assigned to CAB for collection purposes. (Comp. ¶¶ 1-4.)
Bijou’s
Cross-Complaint alleges that SCIF “miscalculated the premiums charged to Bijou
by, among other things, charging premiums in relation to persons who were not
employees of Bijou, and by mischaracterizing the categories of work for some of
Bijou’s employees such that the premiums owing in relation to those employees
were overstated.” (Cross-Complaint (CC) ¶ 6.) Bijou further alleges that he
paid overstated premiums of at least $12,679.34 to SCIF, due to SCIF’s
miscalculations. (Ibid.) The Cross-Complaint asserts a single cause of
action against SCIF for Breach of Contract.
The Court finds that Bijou had
failed to plead his breach of contract claim with sufficient specificity. Bijou
has not pled the relevant terms of the Policy, nor attached a copy of the
Policy to the Cross-Complaint. (See McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) In action for breach of contract, “the
plaintiff must plead the existence of a contract, its terms which establish the
obligation in issue, the occurrence of any conditions precedent to enforcement
of the obligation, and the breach of that obligation.” (FPI Development, Inc.
v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 383.) Regarding the Policy’s terms,
Bijou alleges only that he “agreed to pay premiums as calculated pursuant to
the terms of the policy,” and that he “performed all duties required of him
pursuant to the written policy, including payment of the required premium
amounts.” (CC ¶ 5.) This is insufficient to plead SCIF’s breach of the Policy.