Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV00662, Date: 2023-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV00662    Hearing Date: August 11, 2023    Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Park vs. Woo, et. al., Case No. 23STCV00662

 

Tentative Ruling re:  Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default

 

Defendants Candice Woo and Kevin Woo (collectively, Defendants) move to set aside the default entered against them on March 30, 2023. The motion is denied.

 

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b): “the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” To obtain discretionary relief under section 473, subdivision (b), the party moving for relief on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” must show specific facts demonstrating that one of these conditions was met. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.)

“Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. [Citations.] In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’ [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 695.)

Plaintiff Chang Jin Park aka Charles Park (Plaintiff) served the summons and complaint on Defendants via substitute service on February 8, 2023. Defendants’ response was due by March 20, 2023. On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default as to Defendants, which was entered by the Court that day.

            Defense counsel states that she was retained on March 28, 2023, and that she “attempted to file an answer shortly after receiving the file, only to learn that Plaintiff’s counsel filed a request for default on March 30, 2023.” (Harwell Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Yet defense counsel did not contact Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the default until May 9, 2023, over a month after counsel was retained and default was entered. (Harwell Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A.) Defense counsel provides no explanation for this delay.

These circumstances are inapposite to those in Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, cited by Defendants. There, the plaintiff immediately threatened entry of default after the response deadline expired, then requested entry of default only two business days later. (Id. at 131.) After default was entered, the defendant found an attorney by the end of the week and filed a motion to set aside the default a week later. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in not setting aside the default, citing factors including the “unreasonably short” deadline given by plaintiff’s counsel and “the total absence of prejudice to [plaintiff] from any set-aside, given the relatively short time between respondent seeking the default and [defendant] asking to be relieved from it.” (Id. at 138-39.) Here, in contrast, Defendants first contacted Plaintiff regarding the default over a month after it was entered, and did not file the current motion seeking relief until four months after entry. (Kim Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff “rushed” to file the default appears immaterial in light of their own delay in seeking relief.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s counsel breached his obligation to warn opposing counsel of an intent to take a default. (Lasalle, 36 Cal.App.5th at 137.) However, the obligation to warn opposing counsel of default “arises only if opposing counsel's identity is known.” (Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico's FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 213.) Defendants’ counsel did not notify Plaintiff that they had been retained to represent Defendants until the email sent May 9, 2023. (Harwell Decl., Ex. A [14].) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel states that he informed Defendants’ insurance carrier of his intention to request entry of default before filing it. (Kim Decl. ¶ 3.) In these circumstances, it does not appear that Plaintiff’s counsel breached his duty to warn.

Because Defendants have not shown excusable neglect warranting discretionary relief from default, the motion is denied.