Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV07351, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV07351 Hearing Date: August 30, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
Manning vs. General
Motors, LLC, et. al., Case
No. 23STCV07351
Tentative
Ruling re: Defendant’s Demurrer to First
Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike
Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) demurs to the fifth
cause of action in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) of Plaintiff James Manning
(Plaintiff), and moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. The
demurrer is overruled. The unopposed motion to strike is granted. Defendant is ordered to answer within ten
(10) days of today’s date.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a
court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a
complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co.
v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s
allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any
other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or
the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110
Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint,
liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of
action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
On October 30, 2018, Plaintiff allegedly purchased a 2018 Cadillac
XTS (the Vehicle) covered by express and implied warranties from Defendant.
(FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has presented the Vehicle to Defendant’s authorized
service and repair facilities on multiple occasions, including for defects
affecting the infotainment system, suspension system, rear seat trimming, and
battery. (FAC ¶ 11.) Defendant’s repair facilities have allegedly failed to
conform the Vehicle to the applicable warranties after multiple attempts. (FAC
¶ 13.)
Fifth
Cause of Action for Violation of CLRA
The
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) prohibits “unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a
transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or
services to any consumer.” (Civ. Code, § 1770.)
“These deceptive practices
proscribed in the CLRA include the concealment or suppression of material
facts. [Citations.] This is because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression
of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that
is contrary to a representation that was made. [Citations.]” (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255.) “A failure to
disclose a fact can constitute actionable fraud or deceit in four
circumstances: (1) when the defendant is the plaintiff's fiduciary; (2) when
the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably
accessible to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a
material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial
representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not
been disclosed.” (Ibid.) “For a claim of fraudulent omission to be
actionable under the CLRA, ‘the omission must be contrary to a representation
actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was
obliged to disclose.’” (Rutledge v.
Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1173.) A manufacturer has
a duty to disclose a material defect in its product. (Id. at 1174.)
Here,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the CLRA by misrepresenting the
Vehicle as being free from defects, and misrepresenting that any defect that
did occur during the warranty period would be repaired. (FAC ¶ 62; Civ. Code §
1770, subds. (a)(5), (7), (14).) Defendant demurs on the basis that Plaintiff
has not pled fraud with the requisite specificity. Plaintiff argues that claims
under the CLRA are not subject to the requirement of specificity in pleading.
The Court
agrees with Plaintiff that the pleading standard for fraud does not apply to
claims under the CLRA. “[C]auses of action under the CLRA and UCL must be
stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient pleading standard
than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto
Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261.) Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to show the materiality of the undisclosed defects
and Defendant’s duty to disclose those defects. The alleged defects affected
the Vehicle’s infotainment system, suspension system, rear seat trimming,
battery, and “erratic and surging RPMs.” (FAC ¶ 11.) “At
the pleading stage of this case, we cannot determine as a matter of law that
the nondisclosure of [this] information was obviously unimportant.” (Gutierrez, 19
Cal.App.5th at 1262.) The allegations also suffice to show that Plaintiff “suffered
‘any damage’ as that phrase is used in Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a).” (Id. at
1264.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has pled his CLRA claim
with the required reasonable particularity.
In its
Reply, Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not satisfied the notice
requirement imposed by Civil Code § 1782, which requires that a consumer
provide notice to an alleged violator “[t]hirty days or more prior to the
commencement of an action for damages pursuant to this title.” (Civ. Code §
1782, subd. (a).) Defendant’s initial brief did not meaningfully raise this
argument, and so the Court declines to consider it. (See In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 [“Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration
of an issue raised initially in the reply brief…”].) The demurrer is therefore
overruled.
Defendant moves
to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages (FAC, Prayer H) based on
Plaintiff’s failure to plead fraud. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion to
strike, and so the motion is granted.