Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV07951, Date: 2024-03-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV07951 Hearing Date: March 25, 2024 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Y.W. Rising
Builders, Inc. vs. Bram, et. al.,
Case No. 23STCV07951
Tentative Ruling
re: Cross-Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Cross-Defendants
Y.W. Rising Builders Inc. and Andy Su move to strike the fifth cause of action
in its entirety from the First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”), strike
language pertaining to the loss of revenue from paragraph 65 of the FAXC, and strike
references to the fifth cause of action for negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage in the prayer for relief. The motion is granted.
California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 436(a) allows a court to strike
out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 436(b) allows a court to strike
out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
Cross-Defendants seek to strike the
entire fifth cause of action for negligent interference
with prospective economic advantage, as well as a portion of
the prayer for relief related to such cause of action based on Section 8.1.1 of
the contract between the parties. Section 8.1.1 states that “[t]he Contractor
AND Owner waive all claims against each other for consequential damages arising
out of or relating to this Contract” and that the mutual waiver includes
“damages incurred by the Owner for rental expenses, for losses of use, income,
profit, financing, business and reputation, and for loss of management or
employee productivity or of the services of such persons.” (FAXC, ¶ 7; Exh. A
at § 8.1.1.)
The fifth cause of action in the
FAXC alleges the following: Cross-Complainants had a reasonable expectancy of
profit to be derived as a result of the project which was to be used as an ADU
to rent to third parties. (FAXC, ¶ 58.) Cross-Defendants were notified of
short-term renters who had attempted to lease the ADU but had to be turned away
due to the dangerous and faulty HVAC. (FAXC, ¶ 58.) Cross-Defendants knew of
Cross-Complainants’ expectation of profit to be garnered from their ownership
and lease of the completed ADU. (FAXC, ¶ 59.) Cross-Defendants had a duty not
to interfere with the foregoing expectancy of profit. (FAXC, ¶ 60.) Commencing
in September 2021, Cross-Defendants began to take negligent actions which
interfered with Cross-Complainants’ expectation of economic advantage
including: (1) failing to construct and deliver a safe and habitable ADU
according to all applicable regulations and (2) failure to remedy defalcations
despite being notified thereof. (FAXC, ¶ 61(a)-(b).)
Here, the fifth cause of action—and
the entire FAXC—is based upon the purported breach of contract by
Cross-Defendants. As an initial matter, the Court finds that Section 8.1.1 is
not violative of public policy. “All contracts which have for their object,
directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” (Civ.
Code, § 1668.) An “exculpatory provision may stand only if it does not involve
the public interest.” (Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal. (1963) 60
Cal.2d 92, 96.) “[N]o public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in
which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law
would have otherwise placed upon the other party.” (Id. at p. 101.)
“Nothing . . . shall prevent a party to
a construction contract and the owner or other party for whose account the
construction contract is being performed from negotiating and expressly
agreeing with respect to the allocation, release, liquidation, exclusion, or
limitation as between the parties of any liability (a) for design defects, or
(b) of the promise to the promisor arising out of or relating to the construction
contract.” (Civ. Code § 2782.5.)
A transaction will be deemed in the
public interest if the following factors are present: (1) the transaction
concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation;
(2) the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for
some members of the public; (3) the party holds himself out as willing to
perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for
any member coming within established standards; (4) the party invoking
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services; (5) in exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence; and (6) as
a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed
under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the
seller or his agents. (CAZA Drilling (California), Inc. v. TEG Oil & Gas
U.S.A., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 453, 468.) None of these factors are
present in the instant action.
The Court rejects
Cross-Complainants’ contention that the clause at issue does not cover a claim
for tort damages. “The phrase any controversy . . . arising out of or relating
to [a] contract . . . is certainly broad enough to embrace tort as well as
contractual liabilities so long as they have their roots in the relationship
between the parties which was created by contract.” (Berman
v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003.)
“[E]xculpatory clauses are construed against the released party.” (Queen
Villas Homeowners Assn. v. TCB Property Management (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1, 6.) “The language of an agreement in order to exclude liability for
negligence must be clear and explicit and free of ambiguity or obscurity.” (Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 234, 237,
internal quotations omitted.) “The law generally looks with disfavor on
attempts to avoid liability or to secure exemption for one’s own negligence.” (Ibid.)
“[T]o be effective, a release need not achieve perfection . . . [i]t suffices
that a release be clear, unambiguous, and explicit, and that it expresses an
agreement not to hold the released party liable for negligence.” (Queens
Villas Homeowners Assn. v. TCB Property Management, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6.) “Whether a release bars recovery against a negligent party
turns primarily on contractual interpretation, and it is the intent of the
parties as expressed in the agreement that should control.” (Sanchez v.
Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 67-68.)
Here, based on a reading of the
waiver clause, it is clear that the parties intended to waive all claims
against each other—be it a claim in contract or tort—for consequential damages.
The fifth cause of action clearly arises from Cross-Defendants’ alleged actions
pursuant to the contract. Moreover, the fifth cause of action alleges that
Cross-Complainants’ had an expectation of profit that was interfered with. The
Court fails to see how such allegations do not implicate the waiver clause at
issue in the contract. Thus, Cross-Complainants’ fifth cause of action in the
FAXC is within the scope of the waiver clause under Berman v. Dean Witter
& Co., Inc., supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003. Such clause
is not vague or ambiguous.
As to
Cross-Defendants’ request to strike “and loss of revenue” from Paragraph 65 of
the FAXC, which is set forth under the sixth cause of action for unfair
competition, the Court finds striking such allegation is appropriate. A claim
for loss of revenue is barred by the waiver language in the contract between
the parties as Cross-Complainants agreed to waive damages for loss of income.
(FAXC, ¶ 7; Exh. A at § 8.1.1.)