Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 23STCV08155, Date: 2024-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV08155, Date: 2024-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08155 Hearing Date: January 11, 2024 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Hernandez vs. Legacy Management Services, Inc., et. al., Case No. 23STCV08155

Tentative Ruling re: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to Strike

Defendants Legacy Management Services, Inc., PAMA Management, Inc., and Group VII Covina Properties, LP (collectively, Defendants) demur to and move to strike the Complaint of Plaintiff Oscar Hernandez (Plaintiff). The demurrer is sustained with ten (10) days leave to amend. The motion to strike is denied as moot.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

Plaintiff alleges that demurring Defendants and two other individual defendants, Daniel Gonzalez, and Daniel Cervantez, leased to Plaintiff the residential property at 2456 North Magnolia Ave., Rialto, CA (the Property). (Comp. ¶ 18.) Because the Property “had faulty electricity and no air conditioning” and was hot during the summer, Plaintiff purchased an outdoor cooker to cook outside. (Comp. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff placed the outdoor cooker in the back side yard of the Property, next to the garage. (Comp. ¶ 20.) Nearby, there was “a hole in the wall of the garage that appeared to be meant for a dryer hose.” (Comp. ¶ 27.) This hole allegedly allowed gas from a leaking gas tank used with the cooker to enter the garage. (Comp. ¶ 27.)

On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff was using the outdoor cooker in the side yard. (Comp. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff entered the garage to reach the house. As Plaintiff walked through the garage, the pilot light on his water heater turned on and ignited the gas from the leaking tank in the cooker. (Comp. ¶ 30.) This resulted in an explosion which caused extreme physical injury to Plaintiff and property damage. (Comp. ¶ 31.)

Plaintiff has asserted two causes of action against Defendants, for Negligence (Premises Liability) and Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability. Plaintiff’s negligence claim alleges, “Plaintiff and Defendants were in privity of contract at the time of the incident. Defendants were Plaintiff’s landlord, and Plaintiff was Defendants’ tenant,” and that Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff as landlords. (Comp. ¶¶ 39-43.) The claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability likewise alleges that “Plaintiff and Defendants had a contract for a lease agreement, where Plaintiff had the right to occupy the Premises.” (Comp. ¶ 61.)

Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiff has not properly pled the agreement establishing the parties’ alleged landlord-tenant relationship. The Court agrees.

“An action by a tenant alleging a breach of the warranty of habitability is an action on the contract…” (Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 924–25.) “A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) In determining whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists from the facts alleged, “[t]he relationship created by the agreement must be characterized by reference to the rights and obligations of the parties and not by labels. (Greene v. Municipal Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 450.)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the lease agreement underlying his claims against Defendants. Plaintiff has neither attached a copy of the contract to the Complaint nor pled the contract by its legal effect. Given this, Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between him and Defendants, and so both claims against Defendants fail.

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s prayers for attorney’s fees and punitive damages and related allegations. (Comp. ¶ 52; Prayer (1st) 5-6, (3rd) 5.) Because the demurrer is sustained, the motion to strike is denied as moot.