Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV09283, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV09283 Hearing Date: November 6, 2024 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
NextGear Capital, Inc. v. Whittington Motor Sports, Inc.,
et. al., Case No. 23STCV09283
Tentative Ruling
re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s
Fees
NextGear Capital, Inc. (Plaintiff) moves for an award of attorney’s
fees in the amount of $32,783.00 and costs in the amount of $2,572.10 against
Whittington Motor Sports, Inc. (Defendant). The motion is granted.
“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as
costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel.
Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 424, 429.)
Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
California Rules of Court 3.1700 and 3.1702 on the
basis that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. The California
Rules of Court are not a statute or agreement which can be properly used to
justify the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs. However, Plaintiff argues
that as the prevailing party in a contract action they are entitled to seek
attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717.
“In any action on a contract, where the contract
specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to
enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing
on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or
not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other
costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) The court may determine fees pursuant
to the section upon notice and motion by a party. The party prevailing on the
contract is that “who recovered a greater relief in the action on the
contract.” (Id., § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) The court may also determine
that there is no prevailing party.
The attorney bears the burden of proof as to
“reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).)
This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the
services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A
plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs,
expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive
because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging
party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and
citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive,
duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)
In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are
“reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a
calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on
consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the
fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara
Development Corp. (2008) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92.) In determining whether to
adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of
the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed
to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other
circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
770, 774.)
Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of
$32,783.00 and costs in the amount of $2,572.10 against Defendant. The contract
in question includes a provision requiring Defendant to pay legal fees incurred
by Plaintiff from any event of default. (Brown Decl. Ex. 1. ¶ 18 [filed October
4, 2023].) On June 26, 2024, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendants Whittington Motor Sports, Inc. and RD William
Whittington as to all causes of action. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff
is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees under section 1717.
Reasonableness of Rates
Requested
rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged
by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s
Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The
Court may consider the sworn declarations of Plaintiff’s attorneys regarding
their customary fees, hourly rate determinations in other cases, and the
prevailing fees in the community as evidence of the reasonable market rate. (Heritage
Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)
The Court finds that the rate of $350 per hour requested by
Plaintiff’s counsel, is within the range of reasonable rates by comparable
attorneys for comparable work. (Normandin Decl. ¶6.)
Reasonableness of Hours
Plaintiff submits evidence showing
99.6 hours billed over the course of litigation. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) At a
rate of $350 per hour, this would amount to $34,860 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff instead requests $32,783 in fees,
likely due to some work being performed by others with lower hourly rates. With
no opposition filed, the Court declines to award the anticipated $1,500 in
costs associated with a reply.
The Court finds that 99.60 hours of
billable work is a reasonable amount of time spent to draft the complaint,
communicate with the client, file a motion for summary, judgment and conduct
discovery. (Id.) Accordingly, The Court grants Plaintiff an award of attorney’s
fees in the amount of $32,783.00.
Costs
Plaintiff
seeks to recover $2,572.10 in litigation costs. These Costs include filing fees
and service of process fees. (Id., ¶¶ 1 and 5.) Additionally, Plaintiff
has provided a separate memorandum of costs for attorney’s fees and costs
associated with the underlying complaint. (Normandin ¶ 4.) These costs are all
associated with Plaintiff successfully suing Defendants. This
motion is unopposed.
The Court finds these costs reasonable and grants $2,572.10 in
costs.