Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV13558, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV13558 Hearing Date: November 15, 2024 Dept: 30
Dept.
30
Calendar
No.
Present, et. al. vs. Playa Properties 2, LLC, et.
al.,
Case No. 23STCV13558
Tentative Ruling re:
Defendants’ Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike
Derek Eitel, Jay
Eitel, and Jenie Eitel, Robert Eitel and Jaynee Eitel (Defendants) demur to Harold Present, Regina
Present, and Jacqueline Present’s (Plaintiffs) second cause of action for
trespass in their second amended complaint (SAC). Defendants also move to
strike Plaintiffs’ prayer and justification for punitive damages. Defendants’
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend and their motion to strike is denied. Defendants are ordered to answer within ten
(10) days of today’s date.
A demurrer is
sustained where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer tests the
legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Yalung v.
State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.) In reviewing a complaint’s legal
sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza
v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.) It is well
settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “We not only treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co.
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling
on a demurrer, a court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters
which may be judicially noticed. (Blank,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic
evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations pleaded or the difficulty
a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868,
881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally
construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
The Court
may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems
proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The Court may also strike all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).)
The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false
or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id.,
§ 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the
pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)
When a
demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded
the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court
should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since
plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the
ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v.
Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.)
Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ cause
of action for trespass on the ground that Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient
facts to support such a claim. (Id., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “The elements
of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2)
the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property;
(3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm;
and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.”
(Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 82, 90 (Golden Gate) [quoting Ralphs Grocery Co. v.
Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262].)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants exposed
bedding planes on a hillside, leaving the hillside on which Plaintiffs’
property is situated unsupported. (SAC ¶ 11.) This created a landslide
vulnerable slope and impaired the lateral and subjacent support of Plaintiffs’
property. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs further allege that this removal of support
and resulting landslide constitutes a trespass. (Id. ¶ 22.) As a result
of these actions, Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered economic losses and
emotional distress damages. (Id. ¶ 23–24.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
allegations do not include an entry onto Plaintiffs’ property as required under
Golden Gate. A cause of action for trespass must include an alleged “unauthorized
and tangible entry on the land of another, which interfered with the
plaintiff’s exclusive possessory rights.” (McBride v. Smith (2018) 18
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1174.) A physical entry may be via personal intrusion or by
throwing or placing something on the land. (Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1132.) It may be
on the surface of land, above it, or below it. (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiffs plead no physical
intrusion onto their land. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ actions have
interfered with their land by causing instability and a resulting landslide.
(SAC ¶ 11.) The landslide caused parts of Plaintiffs’ property to collapse, but
did not result in a physical entry of an object or person onto Plaintiffs’
land. The landslide occurred because of actions on Defendants’ land. (Id.
¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege no personal intrusion onto their land above or below
ground, nor the entry of any unauthorized object.
Instead, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’
removal of support on their own property is an indirect invasion still recognized
as trespass in California. However, “[r]ecovery allowed in prior trespass
actions predicated upon noise, gas emissions, or vibration intrusions has, in
each instance, been predicated upon the deposit of particulate matter upon the
plaintiffs’ property or on actual physical damage thereto.” (Wilson v. Interlake
Steel Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 229.) Even indirect invasions upon property
still require a physical intrusion or damage from an entry to be actionable
trespasses. No such intrusion is alleged here, where the damage to Plaintiffs’
property derives from a secondary effect of moving adjacent earth. Thus,
Plaintiffs’ cause of action for trespass fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs are not granted leave to
amend. The Court does not find that there is a reasonable probability Plaintiffs
can cure their cause of action for trespass with amendment. Plaintiffs’ theory
of trespass is inherently flawed, in that their SAC does not allege any sort of
entry onto their property by a person or an object. Accordingly, Defendants’
demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for trespass is sustained
without leave to amend.
Motion
to Strike
Defendants move to
strike Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages. A plaintiff may recover
punitive damages where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(a).) Malice is defined as conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or
despicable conduct by a defendant acting with a willful and conscious disregard
of the rights and safety of others. (Id., § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
Oppression means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of their rights. (Id., § 3294, subd.
(c)(2).) And fraud refers to intentional misrepresentations or concealment of a
material fact known to the defendant. (Id., § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
A plaintiff attempting
to prove malice or oppression must offer clear and convincing evidence of
despicable conduct. (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 306, 328 (Mock).) This refers to conduct “so vile, base,
contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down
upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Id. at p. 331.) A claim
for punitive damages is insufficient where it lacks a factual assertion
supporting the conclusion that a party acted with oppression, malice, or fraud.
(Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
Here, Plaintiffs
allege that “the conduct of Defendants . . . has been oppressive, fraudulent,
or malicious in that said Defendants have acted with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights and safety of others . . . because they ignored
citations from the City of Los Angeles (City) requiring them to repair the
retaining wall . . . and also ignored numerous warnings that their retaining
wall and slope was about to collapse.” (SAC ¶ 10.) These do not constitute
conclusory allegations without any factual basis. Plaintiffs support their
claims of oppressive and malicious conduct with Defendants’ ignoring the
warnings and citations from the City which preceded and foretold the eventual
collapse.
Defendants further
argue that their alleged failure to head the warnings and citations from the City
does not constitute despicable conduct under Mock. Contrary to
Defendants’ assertions, such conduct is potentially despicable. If Defendants
were aware of an imminent landslide risk as Plaintiffs allege, then they knew
that Plaintiffs were in physical danger. Defendants’ failure to heed warnings from
officials, and placing lives in danger as a result, could prove despicable to a
jury, justifying punitive damages. Thus, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts
to warrant a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
strike is denied.