Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV19265, Date: 2023-10-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV19265 Hearing Date: October 30, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar No.
Davidov vs. Salimpour, et. al., Case
No. 23STCV19265
Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s
Motion to Strike
Defendant
Pejman Salimpour, M.D. (Defendant) moves to strike the allegations and prayer
for relief relating to punitive damages in the Complaint of Plaintiff Allan
Davidov (Plaintiff). (Comp. ¶ 30, Prayer 2.) The motion is denied.
Any
party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike
any “irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part
of the pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state,
a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant
allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a
claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and
demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)
From March 2008 to March 2021, Plaintiff resided
with his wife, Nilou Davidov (Nilou), at 104 S. Medio Drive, Los Angeles, CA
(the Property). When Plaintiff and Nilou separated in March 2021, Plaintiff
moved out of the Property, though Plaintiff and Nilou continued to co-own the
Property and did not yet finalize their divorce. (Comp. ¶ 9.)
Following the separation, Plaintiff became concerned
about paying the two mortgages on the Property, particularly the second
(subordinate) mortgage that would become due in December 2022. (Comp. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff warned Nilou that they should sell the Property in order to avoid
having to sell the house in foreclosure, which would likely yield a lower price
– in particular, due to significant investment in the Property’s internal
components that would not be visible at a foreclosure auction. (Comp. ¶ 11.)
However, Nilou refused to sell the Property at the
direction of Defendant, Nilou’s brother. (Comp. ¶ 14.) Defendant had learned of
Plaintiff’s requests to sell the Property, and concocted a scheme to deprive
Plaintiff of his fair share of the Property’s value. The scheme is described as
follows: “[Defendant] himself would purchase the Second [mortgage] from the
Second Lender, and thereafter foreclose on the Property, while instructing
Nilou to (a) use her relationship with [Plaintiff] to acquire information about
the identity of the Second Lender and other information as necessary for their
scheme, and (b) refuse to allow any Ordinary Sale to go forward.” (Comp. ¶ 16.)
Defendant “realized that as long as he could (a) foreclose on the Property and
(b) keep Nilou from agreeing to put the Property up for sale, he could use his
knowledge (from Nilou) of the interior of the Property and its recent
remodeling to make a superior bid to purchase the Property at an auction.”
(Comp. ¶ 17.)
Defendant’s scheme was
not only motivated by financial gain. Defendant also “desired to ‘punish’
[Plaintiff] for leaving Nilou,” knowing that obstructing a pre-foreclosure sale
of the Property would place Plaintiff into financial distress and harm
Plaintiff’s career as a real estate developer. (Comp. ¶ 19.)
Defendant carried out
his scheme; he persuaded Nilou to block any sale of the Property, instructed
Nilou to ask Plaintiff for information about the lender of the second mortgage,
used that information to purchase the second mortgage from the lender, and then
filed a Notice of Foreclosure on the Property in January/February 2023. (Comp.
¶ 20.) The foreclosure has not yet gone forward, though is imminent. (Comp. ¶
21.)
Defendant moves to
strike Plaintiff’s request for recovery of punitive damages (Comp. ¶ 30, Prayer 2), arguing that Plaintiff has not pled malice,
oppression, or fraud.
Punitive damages may
be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (a).) “To support punitive damages, the complaint ... must allege
ultimate facts of the defendant's oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Cyrus v. Haveson
(1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-17.)
“Malice” means
conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code §
3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code
§ 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the
part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights
or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)
The allegations in the
Complaint are sufficient to support recovery of punitive damages. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant specifically intended to cause Plaintiff harm and take
advantage of Plaintiff’s financial distress in aiding Nilou’s tortious conduct.
(Comp. ¶¶ 17-19.) These allegations show conduct intended to cause injury “with a willful and conscious disregard
of the rights or safety of others,” supporting a finding of malice under Civ. Code § 3294. (See Roby v. McKesson Corp.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 713 [relevant factors for reprehensibility of conduct
include whether “the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability”].)