Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 23STCV27752, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STCV27752, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27752 Hearing Date: October 25, 2024 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

1200 Management LLC vs. Shvartz, et. al., Case No. 23STCV27752

Tentative Ruling re: Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike

Liron Shvartz and Black Rock Market Caffe, Inc. (Defendants) demur to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) of 1200 Management LLC (Plaintiff). Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s FAC, or alternatively, portions thereof. Defendants’ demurrer is overruled and their motion to strike is denied. Defendants are ordered to answer within ten (10) days of today’s date.

A demurrer is sustained where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Yalung v. State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.) In reviewing a complaint’s legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)

When ruling on a demurrer, a court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations pleaded or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Id., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s FAC on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing; (2) Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)); (3) Plaintiff’s cause of action is uncertain (id., § 430.10, subd. (f)); and (4) there is a misjoinder of parties (id., § 430.10, subd. (d)).

Standing

Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring the present action. Every action must be prosecuted in the name of a real party in interest. (Id., § 367.) A complaint filed by a party who lacks standing is subject to demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995.) In an unlawful detainer action, the successor in interest to a prior lessor is a proper plaintiff. (Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Button (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 651, 652–653.) Here, Plaintiff is a successor lessor pursuant to contractual assignments of all interests. (FAC ¶ 9, Exs. C, D.) Thus, Plaintiff has standing to bring the present action.

Misjoinder of Parties

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC is subject to demurrer because there has been a misjoinder of parties. A demurrer should be sustained where there is misjoinder. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d).) Parties may be joined in one action if there is asserted against them “(1) Any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or (2) A claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.” (Id. § 379, subd. (a).) “It is not necessary that each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.” (Id. § 379, subd. (b).)

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of lease constitutes misjoinder because the relevant lease binds only Liron Shvartz as an individual, while Plaintiff asserts this cause of action against both Defendants. (FAC ¶ 16.) The lease in question lists the parties as the original lessor and Liron Shvartz, an individual. (Ex. A at p. 1.) However, both Defendants are listed as parties on the signature page. (Id. at p. 17.) It appears that Shvartz intended for both parties to be bound. Regarding the second lease, Defendants claim that it is a forgery. When ruling on a demurrer, the Court assumes pleaded facts to be true therefore Defendants’ argument is without merit. Questions of law common to both parties will arise in this action concerning leases binding both parties. Thus, there has been no misjoinder.

Plaintiff states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for breach of contract. Courts sustain demurrers where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A party suing for breach of contract must establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance; (3) the defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damage to Plaintiff. (Piedmont Capital Management, LLC v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 968.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges the existence of two contracts, both leases. (FAC ¶¶ 7–8, Exs. A, B.) Plaintiff also alleges that it has performed all obligations required of it with respect to each lease. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 25.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have breached both leases. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 24.) And Plaintiff claims that it has incurred damages. (Ibid.) Thus, Plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to constitute breach of contract for both causes of action.

Plaintiff’s causes of action are not uncertain.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s causes of action are uncertain. A demurrer should be sustained where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) Defendants claim that the exhibits offered by Plaintiff contradict factual assertions in its FAC. Defendants’ argument is not suited for demurrer, where a liberal construction of the pleadings is demanded. Plaintiff’s allegations might be weak considering these issues, but they are not rendered unintelligible as required by statute.

Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s entire FAC on the ground that Plaintiff lacks standing. For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to strike is denied on this ground. Defendants also move to strike improper demands or requests for relief from Plaintiff’s FAC, namely Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees and prayer for damages.

A Plaintiff may claim attorney’s fees where provided for by statute or agreed to by the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Plaintiff alleges that both relevant leases contain provisions awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any dispute. (FAC ¶¶ 22, 30, Exs. A, B.) Plaintiff has pleaded a contractual basis for attorney’s fees, and thus Defendants’ motion to strike on this ground is denied.

Defendants argue that the Court should strike Plaintiff’s entire prayer for damages because it is inconsistent with discovery. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Defendants’ motion is based on extrinsic evidence. Thus, Defendants’ motion to strike is denied on this ground as well.