Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 23STUD03108, Date: 2023-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 23STUD03108, Date: 2023-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STUD03108 Hearing Date: February 8, 2024 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Wolfe, et al. vs. Lee, et. al., Case No. 23STUD03108

Tentative Ruling re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs move for the recovery of attorney’s fees totaling $37,909 and costs totaling $2,280.21. Plaintiffs request an additional fee of $1,138.50 for preparation of the reply brief for a total fee award of $39,047.50. The motion is granted.

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded to either one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the prevailing party on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) “The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract . . . whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) “[T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who received a greater relief in the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

“[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) “[T]he burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) “[A]n award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1365.)

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) “[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence and arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id. at p. 564.) It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

A “court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to the tasks completed in an action because he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1111.) A losing party cannot litigate tenaciously then be heard to complain about the time spent or tasks performed by the prevailing party in response. (City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 580, fn.11.) Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate as reasonable. (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Tiffany Truong’s declaration in support of the motion sets forth the procedural history of this action including a recitation of the pleadings and motions filed by the parties. (Truong Decl., ¶¶ 2-9.) Defendant filed a demurrer which was overruled and, in his answer to the complaint, Defendant demanded a jury trial. (Id., ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs filed a motion to reclassify this action from limited to unlimited civil jurisdiction. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted, and Defendant filed a motion for relief from forfeiture which was denied. (Id., ¶¶ 6-9.) The parties filed ex parte applications seeking to advance hearing dates and to shorten time on hearings for the parties’ respective motions. (Id., ¶¶ 4-8.)

Plaintiffs’ declaration asserts that her firm, KTS, is known in the real estate industry for having extensive experience handling unlawful detainer actions. (Id., ¶ 11.) Counsel Truong herself has practiced in the area of landlord-tenant law and unlawful detainers continuously for eight years in Los Angeles County. (Id.) Troung declares that the hourly rates for herself and Scott Andrews are $450 per hour. (Id., ¶ 12.) The hourly rate of senior attorney Brittany McClintick is $400 per hour. (Id.) Associate John Barbar’s hourly rate is $350 per hour. (Id.) Paralegals Eval Bulgari and Beverly Banner have hourly rates of $150 per hour. (Id.) Truong states that effective January 1, 2024, the rates for partners have increased to $475-$525 per hour with her hourly rate being $495 per hour. (Id.) The hourly rate for associates is now $375 per hour and is $175 per hour for paralegals. (Id.) Truong states that the new and old hourly rates are reasonable in both the County of Los Angeles in the area of unlawful detainer practice and commercial landlord/tenant litigation. (Id.) Truong has attached the billing records as to this action concerning attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id., ¶ 13; Exhibits 2 and 3.) Truong states that the attorneys’ fees and costs requested are reasonable given the length of time between the initiation of this action and entry of judgment. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Truong further declares that Defendant’s demand for jury trial required Plaintiffs to conduct basic written discovery to determine the bases of its defenses. (Id., ¶ 15.) Truong states that throughout this case, Plaintiffs also reasonably filed multiple ex parte applications to advance hearings because of the Court’s busy calendar and the statutory priority of the unlawful detainer action. (Id.) Defendant filed several ex partes and motions which necessitated further expenditure of Plaintiffs’ attorney time to successfully oppose said motions and ex parte applications. (Id.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel has not substantiated their hourly rates. The Court finds that such contention is unsupported. Truong has substantiated the hourly rates of the attorneys and paralegals who worked on this action. Truong clearly stated that the rates charged are reasonable for both Los Angeles County and the practice of unlawful detainer and commercial landlord/tenant litigation. (Troung Decl., ¶ 12.) The Court also knows from its own experience that the rates are reasonable.

Defendant attacks the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ claimed attorney’s fees on the grounds that Plaintiffs should not be awarded fees for their motion for reclassification. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claimed attorney’s fees should be reduced in the amount of $4,730. While Defendant is correct in that a notice of non-opposition was filed as to such motion, the notice of non-opposition was filed after Plaintiffs filed their motion for reclassification. Moreover, according to Truong’s declaration, the case was not incorrectly classified but, rather, the amount of damages during the litigation grew over the life of the action to exceed $25,000, which warranted reclassification. The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the motion to reclassify was not an essential service.

Lastly, Defendant cites to Keith v. Volpe (C.D. Cal. 1986) 644 F. Supp. 1312 for the proposition that clerical and secretarial tasks “should be considered part of a law firm’s overhead and included in the attorney’s hourly rate.” (Opposition, 6:6-8.) Defendant argues that the following tasks were clerical and should not have been billed at professional rates: (1) attorney John Barbar 0.6 hours of billing for leaving voicemails and drafting correspondence to Defendant’s counsel regarding Plaintiff’s ex parte applications amounting to $210 (Opposition, 6:12-14); and (2) paralegal Eval Bulgari billing 1.1 hours, amounting to $165, for clerical and secretarial tasks (Opposition, 6:14-17).

The Court does not agree that the challenged tasks are clerical and should not have been billed at professional rates.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that counsel’s rates are reasonable, and the amount of work was also reasonable and necessary to the successful prosecution of this action.