Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 24STCV02014, Date: 2024-07-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV02014 Hearing Date: July 3, 2024 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Monegain v. Anschutz
Entertainment Group, Inc, et. al., Case No. 24STCV02014
Tentative Ruling
re: Defendant’s Demurrer to First
Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike
Defendant Curtis James Jackson III demurs
to the second, third and fifth cause of action in FAC and moves to strike the
claim for punitive damages. The demurrer
is overruled and the motion to strike is denied. Defendant is ordered to answer within ten
(10) days of today’s date.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, the
court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co.
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) It is well settled
that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a
complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co.
v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (internal quotes
omitted).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be
construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
When ruling on a demurrer, the Court may only consider the complaint’s
allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The Court may not consider any
other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or
the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110
Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint,
liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of
action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action: Battery, Assault,
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“The essential elements of a cause
of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff
to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff;[emphasis
added] (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed
or offended by defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff's
position would have been offended by the touching. [citation].” (So v. Shin
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.)
“The essential elements of a cause
of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful
or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or
offensive manner; [emphasis added] (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she
was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably
appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3)
plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and
(5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.
[citation].” (Id., p. 668–669.)
Defendant argues that the demurrer
should be sustained as to the second, third and fifth causes of action because
Plaintiff has not sufficiently plead fact that the Defenant acted intentionally
as required by each tort. The FAC alleged that “[Mr. Jackson] devoted little or
no thought as to the probable consequences of his conduct and the likelihood
that it would result in the SUBJECT INCIDENT.” (FAC, Lines 18-19, p. 12.) As a result, Defendant contends the FAC does
not support that conclusion that Defendant intentionally harmed Plaintiff.
Intent: Battery and Assault
Plaintiff argues that it has been
shown that Defendant acted with intent based on the following authority:
“In order to establish a case of
civil assault and battery, all that is necessary is that the evidence show that
plaintiff’s injury was caused by defendant’s violence, or that defendant acted
with wanton, willful or reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights. The general
rule is that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. If the cause of action is an alleged battery
committed in the performance of an unlawful or wrongful act, the intent of the
wrongdoer to injure is immaterial. In other words, if the defendant did an
illegal act which was likely to prove injurious to another, he is answerable
for the consequence which directly and naturally resulted from the conduct,
even though he did not intend to do the particular injury which followed.” (Lopez
v. Surchia (1952) 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318)
Here, the FAC alleges that when
Defendant JACKSON realized his microphone was not working, he threw the
microphone towards a crowed area, causing the microphone to strike Plaintiff’s
face and wrist, and resulting severe and permanent injuries. (FAC ¶ 13.)
Accordingly, the Court overrules
the demurer as to the second and third causes of action because the FAC pleads
sufficient facts to satisfy the intent requirements of assault and battery.
Intent: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress (IIED)
“A cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; [emphasis added] (2) the
plaintiff is suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct.’ [citation] A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so
‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.’ [citation] And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict
injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’
[citation].” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.)
In the FAC it is alleged that Defendant’s
conduct was outrageous and went beyond all possible bounds of decency “because a
reasonable person would regard the conduct of throwing a microphone as he did
as intolerable in a civilized community.” (Plaintiff’s opposition to demurrer
Lines 10-14, p.5; FAC ¶¶ 59-60.) Additionally, Defendant’s actions constituted
a “reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiff would suffer emotional
distress, knowing that the area where the SUBJECT INCIDENT occurred had attendees
of the performance, including Plaintiff.” (FAC ¶ 62.)
The Court overrules the demurrer as
to the fifth cause of action because throwing a microphone into a crowd is
extreme and outrageous reckless conduct that demonstrates a disregard for the
potential to cause emotional distress. Therefore, Plaintiff’s FAC sufficiently
states a cause of action for IIED.
Motion to Strike
Punitive damages may be imposed
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff
or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
“‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of
extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens
should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner
v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)
To succeed on a motion to strike
punitive damages, it must be said as a matter of law that the alleged behavior
was not so vile, base, or contemptible that it would not be looked down upon
and despised by ordinary decent people.¿ (Angie M. v. Superior Court
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-29.) “In order to survive a motion to strike
an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to
such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”¿ (Clauson v. Superior Court
(1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any
factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted
with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.
App. 4th 1033, 1042.)
Defendant
argues that there are not sufficient facts to indicate that he acted
intentionally. As discussed above, the Court has found that the Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged facts to show that the Defendant acted intentionally.
Defendant also contends that “Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is completely
devoid of any ultimate facts supporting her claim for punitive damages and
fails to show that the acts were vile, wretched, loathsome, and carried on by
Defendant Jackson with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or
safety of others.” (Defendant’s motion to strike, Lines 1-4, p. 4.)
The Court is not persuaded by this
argument. The FAC alleges that the Defendant threw a microphone into a crowd of
people. (FAC ¶ 13.) This action can properly be considered “despicable conduct
which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others,” because it was likely that someone in the crowd would be hit
and injured by the microphone that Defendant allegedly threw. (Civ. Code, §
3294, subd. (c)(1).)
Accordingly, the court denies the
motion to strike.