Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 24STCV14633, Date: 2024-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 24STCV14633, Date: 2024-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV14633 Hearing Date: October 31, 2024 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Buniatyan vs. Tesla Motors, Inc., et. al., Case No. 24STCV14633

Tentative Ruling re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Edgar Buniatyan (Plaintiff) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against Tesla Motors, Inc. (Defendant). The Court awards Plaintiff fees and costs of $13,071.26.

“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (Civ. Code, §§ 1790, et seq.) Specifically, if the buyer prevails, they may recover “a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Id., § 1794, subd. (d).)

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Id., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are “reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.) In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the outcome, and other circumstances. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

The parties’ settlement agreement provides that Defendant shall pay Plaintiff reasonably incurred attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) as determined by the Court via noticed motion. (Barahmand Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

Defendant challenges the hourly rates alleged by Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff alleges an hourly rate of $375 for Attorney Navid Barahmand (Barahmand Decl. ¶ 9), an hourly rate of $600 for Attorney Eli Banayan (Eli Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 14–15), and an hourly rate of $900 for Attorney Koorosh Banayan (Koorosh Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, 12). Fee rates are recoverable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) In calculating the lodestar rate, “the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [Citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [Citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. [Citation.]” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)

Here, the rates alleged by Plaintiff’s counsel are inconsistent. Barahmand alleges a reasonable hourly rate of $375. The Court finds a $600 or $900 hourly rate charged in the same case unreasonable given the rate of $375 charged by a comparable attorney. (Barahmand Decl. ¶ 9.) Given Eli’s and Koorosh’s greater levels of experience, the Court applies an hourly rate of $450 and $500, respectively.

Defendant also challenges the number of hours Plaintiff billed. First, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s complaint and discovery requests as material created from a template. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint is nearly identical to an earlier complaint filed by the same attorney. (Hooper Decl. Exs. B1, B2.) Plaintiff’s discovery requests are similarly generic. (Id. Ex. C.) Plaintiff alleges the complaint took 4.1 total hours to draft and the discovery requests took 4.4 hours. While these billings do not reflect the drafting of documents from scratch, given the few edits of templates required to produce these papers, the hours claimed are unreasonable for attorneys claiming to have high levels of experience. Thus, the Court will award fees for half of the alleged hours with respect to these matters.

Defendant further challenges Plaintiff’s billing regarding communication between Plaintiff’s various attorneys. Indeed, considering the high hourly rates and levels of experience claimed by Barahmand, Eli, and Koorosh, a simple case such as this did not require over 20 hours of communication time between attorneys who could likely handle the case on their own. Thus, the Court will award fees for half of these alleged hours as well.

Finally, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s requested lodestar multiplier of 1.1. A fee multiplier may be warranted in cases taken on a contingency basis, based on the elevated risk involved. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) Other potential factors to consider when applying a multiplier include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, [and] (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys.” (Ibid.) The Court finds that a multiplier is not called for in this matter.

Defendant does not contest the $2,000 in fees claimed by Plaintiff with respect to drafting the present motion and reply.

Accordingly, the Court awards $12,478.75 in attorney’s fees to Plaintiff (([$375 per hour Barahmand] x [19.5 hours / 2]) + ([$450 per hour Eli] x [24.1 hours / 2]) + ([$500 per hour Koorosh] x [5.6 hours / 2])) + [$2,000 present motion and reply] ). (Barahmand Decl. ¶ 7–8; Eli Decl. ¶ 8; Koorosh Decl. ¶ 8.)

Costs are awarded in the amount of $592.51.