Judge Barbara M. Scheper, Case Number: 24STCV20333, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: 24STCV20333, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20333 Hearing Date: December 12, 2024 Dept: 30

Dept. 30

Calendar No.

Muhammad, et. al. vs. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, et. al., Case No. 24STCV20333

Tentative Ruling re: Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Defendant) demurs to Loreal Muhammad et al.’s (Plaintiffs) fifth cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act contained in its first amended complaint (FAC). Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant is ordered to answer within ten (10) days of today’s date.

A demurrer is sustained where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Yalung v. State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.) In reviewing a complaint’s legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.) Causes of action under the CLRA must be stated with reasonable particularity, a more lenient pleading standard than that applied to common law fraud claims. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261.)

When ruling on a demurrer, a court may only consider the complaint’s allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations pleaded or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) Demurrer is also appropriate where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) on the basis that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

The CLRA bans certain deceptive practices intended to result, or resulting in, the sale or lease of goods and services to a consumer. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).) One such deceptive practice involves “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not have.” (Id. § 1770, subd. (a)(5).) The CLRA also prohibits “representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.” (Id. § 1770, subd. (a)(7).) Another prohibited practice involves “[r]epresenting that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not have or involve, or that are prohibited by law.” (Id. § 1770, subd. (a)(14).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action under Civil Code section 1770 because they have not established causation. “A causal link between the deceptive practice and damage to the plaintiff is a necessary element of a CLRA cause of action.” (Torres v. Adventist Health System/West (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 500, 514.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant gave warranties that Plaintiffs’ vehicle would be free from all defects, would pass without objection under the contract description, would be fit for ordinary use, and that it would provide safe and reliable transportation. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs further allege that they have presented the vehicle for repair numerous times because of various defects. (Id. ¶ 10.) Each time they did so, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant represented it would conform the vehicle to the applicable warranties. (Id. ¶ 12.) However, the vehicle continues to suffer from various defects. (Id. ¶ 39.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant falsely represented that the vehicle was of a particular standard, quality, or grade that it was not. (Id. ¶ 61.) These allegations constitute a causal link between the false representations by Defendant in the form of warranties and the damages incurred by Plaintiffs through their various unsuccessful repair attempts.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not allege causation because there are no facts in the FAC which allege that the warranty induced Plaintiffs to buy the vehicle. The scope of the CLRA is not so narrow. Deceptive practices need not directly result in the sale or lease of goods but are actionable even if only “intended to result” in the sale of goods. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).) Thus, Defendant could be found liable under the CLRA even if Plaintiffs do not present evidence that the warranty representations were the direct cause of their purchase. Defendant’s separate contention that Plaintiffs allege active concealment misconstrues Plaintiffs’ complaint. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s warranty constituted a misrepresentation based on its subsequent failure to remedy defects with Plaintiffs’ vehicle.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs must identify specific advertising which led to them purchasing the subject vehicle. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants falsely represented that the Vehicle was of a particular standard, quality, or grade and could not conform to the quality of the vehicles it was advertising which is in direct violation of the CLRA.” (FAC ¶ 61.) Advertised statements include “any statement, representation, act or announcement intentionally communicated to any member of the public by any means whatever, whether orally, in writing or otherwise.” (Ford Dealers the Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 356 (Ford Dealers).) Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations concern representations made by Defendant through its written warranty, a form of advertising under Ford Dealers. Thus, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs have failed to properly identify advertising is inapposite.

Finally, Defendant argues that fraud allegations against a corporate defendant made pursuant to the CLRA require specific allegations about the names of persons who made representations and their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, citing West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793. However, that case did not concern the CLRA, but rather common law fraud. Thus, Defendant’s argument fails.