Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: BC633169, Date: 2022-08-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC633169 Hearing Date: August 30, 2022 Dept: 30
Dept. 30
Calendar No.
Pulliam vs. HNL
Automotive, Inc., et al., Case
No. BC633169
Tentative Ruling
re: Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs
Defendant TD Auto Finance, LLC (TD
Bank) moves for an order striking post judgment attorney’s fees and costs against
it in the Memorandum of Costs filed by Plaintiff Tania Pullman (Plaintiff) on March
11, 2022. The motion is granted.
A prevailing party in litigation
may recover costs, including but not limited to filing fees. (Code of Civ.
Proc. §1033.5, subd. (a)(1).) Under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2), allowable costs are only
recoverable if they are “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the
litigation.” Even mandatory costs, when incurred unnecessarily, are subject to
section 1033, subdivision (c)(2). (Perko’s
Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 245.)
The memorandum of cost is a
verified statement by the party, attorney, or agent that the costs are correct
and were necessarily incurred in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1700(a)(1).) If the items on a verified cost bill appear proper charges, they
are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed therein
were necessarily incurred. (Oak Grove
School Dist. v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698 (Oak
Grove).) “The trial court’s first determination is whether the statute
expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face;
if so, the burden is on the objecting party to show the costs to be unnecessary
or unreasonable.” (Foothill-DeAnza
Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29 (Foothill-DeAnza).) The burden of showing
that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the party
challenging the costs. (Wilson v. Nichols
(1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 678, 682-683 (Wilson).)
“The judgment creditor is entitled
to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney’s fees
incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under
this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney’s fees incurred in
enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the
underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment
creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of
Section 1033.5.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 685.040.)
On May 29, 2018, following jury
trial, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff for damages, attorney’s
fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, jointly and severally against Defendants
TD Bank, N.A. and HNL Automotive, Inc. On October 23, 2018, Defendants appealed
the order granting attorney’s fees. The Court issued a declaratory order
confirming automatic stay of the attorney’s fees portion of the judgment on
November 26, 2018.
The Court
issued an order lifting the stay on October 9, 2019, based on Defendants’
failure to post an appeal bond. That Order reads, “The stay on enforcement of
the judgment due to Defendants’ appeal is hereby conditioned on Defendants
posting a bond in the amount of $339,204.00. This condition goes into effect on
September 4, 2019. If a sufficient bond is not posted by September 4, 2019, the
stay on enforcement is lifted.” Plaintiff subsequently began judgment
enforcement activities. As of February 21, 2020, Defendant TD Bank satisfied
all portions of the Judgment except for the award of attorney’s fees, which totals
$169,602. (Le Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.) TD Bank later posted an appeal bond with the
Court in the required amount on February 24, 2020.
TD Bank
argues that Plaintiff may not be awarded post judgment fees for enforcement of
the attorney’s fees portion of the judgment, arguing that it did not need to
post an appeal bond to stay Plaintiff’s post-judgment enforcement action, or,
alternatively, that the stay became effective following TD Bank’s posting of
the appeal bond.
“The perfecting of an
appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or order in cases not
provided for in Sections 917.1 to 917.8, inclusive, if the trial court, in its
discretion, requires an undertaking and the undertaking is not given,” in cases
where “[t]he judgment against appellant is solely for costs awarded to the
respondent by the trial court pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section
1021) of Title 14.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 917.9, subd. (a)(3).) “The undertaking
shall be in a sum fixed by the court and shall be in an amount sufficient to
cover all damages which the respondent may sustain by reason of the stay in the
enforcement of the judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 917.9, subd. (b).)
This section vests the trial court with discretionary authority to require an
undertaking in certain situations. (See May v. May (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d
264, 281.)
The Court already
determined in its Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Set a Bond Pending
Defendants’ Appeal, issued October 9, 2019, that Defendants were required to
post a bond as a condition to the automatic stay on judgment enforcement
following appeal. This Order lifted the initial automatic stay following
Defendants’ appeal.
Though the stay was initially
lifted on October 9, 2019, the Court finds that the automatic stay became
effective after TD Bank posted the bond on February 25, 2020. While Plaintiff
argues that Defendants’ February 25 bond was untimely, “[t]here
is no time limit for filing the bond or undertaking.
It can be filed any time before execution on the judgment or order.” (Eisenberg
et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (2021) ¶ 7:181 [citing Bradley
Co. v. Mulcrevy (1913) 166 Cal. 325, 327].) The Court’s October 9 order did
not preclude the bond being posted at a later point in time.
Furthermore, Plaintiff did not file
any motion objecting to the bond. Appeal bonds and undertakings
are governed by the Bond and Undertaking Law, Code
Civ. Proc. § 995.010 et seq. Under that chapter, an objection to a bond
“shall be in writing and shall be made by noticed motion,” and “the objection
shall be made within 10 days after service of a copy of the bond on the
beneficiary or such other time as is required by the statute providing for the
bond. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.930, subds. (a), (b).) “If no objection is
made within the time required by statute, the beneficiary is deemed to have
waived all objections except upon a showing of good cause for failure to make
the objection within the time required by statute or of changed circumstances.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 995.930, subd. (c).) Because Plaintiff did not timely
object, Plaintiff has waived objections to the bond.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the automatic stay as to enforcement of the attorney’s fee
award became effective as to TD Bank following its posting of the bond on
February 25, 2020.
Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Costs After Judgment filed March 11, 2022 seeks recovery of post
judgment costs including attorney’s fees in the amount of $70,400.50 incurred
from March 13, 2020 to March 11, 2022, and costs in the amount of $11,426.56
pursuant to Civ. Code § 1794(d) and CCP § 685.040. Because the stay on post
judgment enforcement was effective as to TD Bank during that period, those
costs were not reasonably incurred. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion
and strikes the costs against TD Bank in the total of $81,827.06.