Judge: Barbara M. Scheper, Case: BC709376, Date: 2023-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC709376 Hearing Date: October 19, 2023 Dept: 30
Calendar
No.
Sadeghi vs. Pinscreen Inc., et. al.,
Case No. BC709376
Tentative Ruling re:
Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Defendants Pinscreen, Inc., Dr. Hao Li,
Yen-Chun Chen, Liwen Hu, and Han-Wei Kung (collectively, Defendants) move to
strike portions of the Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC) filed by Plaintiff Dr.
Iman Sadeghi (Plaintiff). The motion is denied as to the allegations referring
to Doe Defendants, and is otherwise granted.
Any party may file a timely notice of a
motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435,
subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any “irrelevant, false or improper
matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of the pleading “not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Irrelevant allegations include
allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations
that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment
requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10,
subds. (b), (c).)
“[W]hen a substantive
defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a violation of the
applicable statute of limitations or a purported claim of right which is
legally invalid, a defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by
filing a motion to strike.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682–1683.)
Plaintiff is
a computer graphics engineer. Plaintiff was employed by Google as a Software
Engineer beginning in 2011. In January 2017, Plaintiff resigned from Google and accepted an offer to
join Defendant Pinscreen, Inc. (Pinscreen) from Dr. Hao Li (Li), Pinscreen’s
co-founder and CEO. Plaintiff’s employment at Pinscreen lasted from February 2,
2017, to August 7, 2017. (4AC ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated
on August 7, 2017, shortly after arriving at Pinscreen’s office. (4AC ¶ 106.)
When he attempted to leave the office, Li and three of Pinscreen’s employees,
Defendants Chen, Hu, and Kung, “under Li’s commands, surrounded [Plaintiff] and
physically attacked him outside of Pinscreen’s premises and after [his]
termination. [¶] They intentionally touched and grabbed Sadeghi and his
backpack . . . forcefully restrained him, physically attacked him, and
violently shoved him to the ground.” (4AC ¶¶ 140-141.)
Plaintiff
filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on May 1, 2019. The SAC pled three
causes of action against Chen, Hu, and Kun, for (1) battery, (2) IIED, and (3)
invasion of privacy. The SAC also pled six causes of action against Li.
Li,
Chen, Hu, and Kun filed a joint demurrer to the SAC, heard by the Court on
November 21, 2019. The Court sustained the demurrer as to the three causes of
action against Chen, Hu, and Kun without leave to amend, finding that the “sham
pleading doctrine” applied and that Plaintiff’s claims were barred under
workers’ compensation exclusivity (Lab. Code § 3600, et seq.) based on
allegations in prior pleadings. The Court also sustained the demurrer as to the
claims against Li for battery, invasion of privacy, IIED, and intentional
interference with contract without leave to amend. On March 10, 2021, the Court
granted Chen, Hu, and Kun’s motion for entry of dismissal and dismissed those
defendants with prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Court’s ruling
on the SAC as to Chen, Hu, and Kun.
On
December 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) against
Pinscreen and Li. The TAC alleged two causes of action against Li, for
fraudulent inducement of employment contract by intentional misrepresentation
and fraudulent inducement of employment contract by intentional concealment. Li
and Pinscreen filed a demurrer to the TAC heard on October 2, 2020. The Court
sustained the demurrer as to both causes of action against Li, finding that
Plaintiff did not plead cognizable damages because Plaintiff alleged that he “lost
his compensation when he was terminated from Pinscreen after complaining of
activities engaged in by Pinscreen, not when he left Google.” The Court cited
the rule that “damages for a fraudulent inducement to change employment are
caused when the new employment is for less compensation than promised and/or
less than obtained from the prior employer” and found that Plaintiff had not
alleged that his compensation at Google was greater than his compensation at
Pinscreen, or that he was misled about his Pinscreen compensation. On September
8, 2021, the Court dismissed Li with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed following
the dismissal.
On
February 23, 2023, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling on Plaintiff’s first
appeal as to the claims in the SAC against Chen, Hu, and Kun. The appellate
court reversed in part the Court’s order, finding that the sham pleading
doctrine did not apply, Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted by workers’
compensation exclusivity, and that Plaintiff had sufficiently pled claims for
battery and IIED. The ruling affirmed the portion of the Court’s order
sustaining the demurrer as to the invasion of privacy claim without leave to
amend.
On
March 6, 2023, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling on Plaintiff’s second
appeal concerning the claims against Li. Plaintiff argued that the Court erred
in (1) sustaining the demurer to the SAC without leave to amend as to the
claims against Li for battery, invasion of privacy, IIED, and interference with
contract, and (2) sustaining the demurrer to the TAC without leave to amend as
to the claims for fraudulent inducement of employment contract by intentional
misrepresentation and concealment. The Court of Appeal reversed the order
sustaining the demurrer as to the claims for battery and IIED, reversed the
Court’s denial of leave to amend the two claims for fraudulent inducement of
employment contract, and affirmed the Court’s denial of leave to amend the
claims for invasion of privacy and interference with contract. The Court of
Appeal issued remittitur on June 6, 2023.
Plaintiff
filed the 4AC on July 20, 2023. Consistent with the Court of Appeal’s rulings,
the 4AC alleges four causes of action against Li for fraudulent inducement of
contract by misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement of contract by
concealment, battery, and IIED. Against
Chen, Hu, and Kun, the 4AC alleges two causes of action for battery and IIED.
In
this motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has added new factual allegations
to the 4AC that exceed the scope of the leave to amend granted by the Court of
Appeal.
“It is the
rule that when a trial court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, the scope
of the grant of leave is ordinarily a limited one. It gives the pleader an
opportunity to cure the defects in the particular causes of action to which the
demurrer was sustained, but that is all.” (Community Water Coalition v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency
Formation Com. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.)
The 4AC includes a
significant number of allegations that were not included in Plaintiff’s prior
pleadings. These include new allegations regarding scientific misconduct
investigations against Li (¶¶ 3:16-22; 18:12-19; 36:22-24; 38:16-20); PMK
testimony from Li concerning the allegedly fraudulent technology presentations and
other misconduct (¶¶ 16:12-24; 40:9-12); details of Plaintiff’s Google
compensation (¶¶ 28:4-7; 52:10-13); and details of the alleged battery (¶
147:26-10).
Plaintiff concedes that the
4AC includes many allegations that have not been previously pled, but argues
that they are proper because they merely supplement previously pled allegations
and do not alter or expand Plaintiff’s claims. The Court disagrees. The Court
of Appeal granted leave to amend only as to the two fraudulent inducement of
contract claims against Li. The addition of new factual allegations exceeds the
scope of leave to amend granted, and so are improper. (See Community Water
Coalition, 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“To the extent the amendment
adds new facts attacking the substance of [agreement], it goes beyond the scope
of the trial court's ruling.”].) Even
accepting Plaintiff’s argument that the new factual allegations have no effect
on Plaintiff’s claims, they would be subject to the motion to strike as
irrelevant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
Plaintiff also argues that the allegations in Paragraphs
60-95 of the 4AC are proper because they were previously pled in the TAC. In
the TAC, these allegations were pled under Plaintiff’s cause of action for
whistleblower retaliation; in the 4AC, they have been moved to Plaintiff’s
claim for breach of employment contract against Pinscreen. (TAC ¶¶ 60-94; 4AC
¶¶ 60-95.) The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s grafting of these
allegations onto the claim for breach of contract exceeds the scope of leave to
amend granted by the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim that Paragraphs
60-95 are not “new allegations” is not correct; many of the factual allegations
in this portion of the 4AC were not pled in the TAC. (See, e.g., 4AC ¶¶ 62:1-4;
63:14-18; 64:4-8; 78:12-26.)
For the same reasons, the new allegations in the 4AC
supplementing Plaintiff’s claim for breach of employment contract are also
improper. (4AC ¶¶ 111-128; compare TAC ¶¶ 100-102.)
The
parties dispute whether the allegations concerning Plaintiff’s post-termination
damages for fraudulent inducement against Li fall within the scope of the leave
to amend granted. The 4AC alleges, “[Plaintiff’s] monetary damages of his lost
Google income and benefits pertaining to after August 7, 2017 are unsubstituted
amounting to around $23,819/month. Therefore, [Plaintiff‘s] total monetary damages
of his lost Google income and benefits until August 7, 2023 are at least around
$1,768,511.” (4AC ¶ 28:4-7; 52:10-13.)
The
Court of Appeal’s ruling granted Plaintiff leave to amend only as to
pre-termination damages. In granting leave to amend, the appellate court relied
on Plaintiff’s argument that he “incurred at least $53,543 in monetary damages
before his wrongful termination as a result of his fraudulent inducement”; the
ruling notes that Plaintiff “requested [in
trial court] that he be given leave to amend the TAC so that these ‘specific monetary
amounts . . . can be added in [as] an amendment.’ [¶] He repeats this argument
on appeal…” (Davidson Decl., Ex. B, p. 35.) The allegations regarding
post-termination damages exceed the scope of the leave granted.
Finally,
Defendants move to strike all references to Doe
defendants in the 4AC. On March 4, 2022, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the
Court dismissed Does 1 through 100 from the TAC. At this point, the only
remaining claims were those for Breach of Employment Contract and Negligence.
In the 4AC, Plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent inducement of contract, battery,
and IIED are pled against Does 1-100. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the
Doe allegations are proper.