Judge Blaine K. Bowman, Case Number: 37-2022-00025224-CU-EI-CTL, Date: 2024-06-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Blaine K. Bowman, Case: 37-2022-00025224-CU-EI-CTL, Date: 2024-06-07 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 06, 2024

06/07/2024 08:30:00 AM C-74 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman

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Civil - Unlimited Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2022-00025224-CU-EI-CTL SIDDELL VS CITY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

This matter is set for hearing on the trial of the bifurcated issue of liability on the second cause of action for inverse condemnation. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, this issue is to be heard by the court on the parties' briefs [ROA 92].

The court first addresses the evidentiary issues.

Defendant City of San Diego's request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Although Plaintiffs' trial brief refers to 'Plaintiff's request for Judicial Notice' there is no request for judicial notice from Plaintiffs in the court file. Nonetheless, the court considers both of the exhibits to Plaintiffs' trial brief.

The court then rules on the merits.

Plaintiffs contend that San Diego City Municipal Ordinance No. 0-21447, which imposed a temporary moratorium on no-fault evictions for residential tenants during the state of emergency related to COVID-19, constituted a taking of property rights which requires compensation to landlords in the City of San Diego. It is undisputed that Ordinance Number O-21447 lapsed, by its own terms, on September 30, 2022, and is no longer in effect. Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance violated Article 1, Sections 1 and 19 of the California Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In opposition the first argument the City raises is that Plaintiffs lack standing. As People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486 explains, '[s]tanding concerns a specific party's interest in the outcome of a lawsuit. [Citations.] We ... require a party to show that he or she is sufficiently interested as a prerequisite to deciding, on the merits, whether a party's challenge to legislative or executive action independently has merit. [Citation.]' (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247-1248, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 395 P.3d 274.) 'Standing is a threshold issue necessary to maintain a cause of action, and the burden to allege and establish standing lies with the plaintiff. [Citations.]' (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.) ' 'As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process requires an actual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to suffer an injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3108077 2 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: SIDDELL VS CITY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] 37-2022-00025224-CU-EI-CTL facts and issues will be adequately presented to the adjudicator. [Citations.] To have standing, a party must be beneficially interested in the controversy; that is, he or she must have 'some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved and protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.' [Citation.] The party must be able to demonstrate that he or she has some such beneficial interest that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical.' [Citation.]' (Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 599, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 365, 336 P.3d 686, italics in original.) People ex rel. Becerra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 495–496. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555 sets forth the following criteria to establish standing.

. . . . First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756, 104 S.Ct., at 3327; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 508, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2210, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n.

16, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368–1369, n. 16, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972);1 and (b) 'actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' ' Whitmore, supra, 495 U.S., at 155, 110 S.Ct., at 1723 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly ...

trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' Id., at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct., at 1924, 1926.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–561.

The court finds, as pled, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish Plaintiffs' standing.

Specifically, the complaint fails to allege that either Plaintiff LeRoy George Siddell, or any of the 'Taxpayers' on whose behalf Siddell brings the complaint, are landlords within the City of San Diego who are subject to the Ordinance. Allegations that 'Plaintiffs are taxpayers and landowners within the City of San Diego' [Cplt. ¶ 1], without more, are insufficient. The complaint also fails to allege that either Plaintiff Siddell or the Taxpayers suffered an injury in fact because of the Ordinance. In Plaintiffs' trial brief Plaintiffs argue that '[t]he City of San Diego did nothing to protect Owners from losses they have sustained when tenants are unable – or are able and refuse – to pay their rental obligations' and '[t]he Owners injuries are exacerbated by the fact that Owners remain obligated to pay property taxes to the state and local government and pay for electricity, sewer, water and garbage removal for the nonpaying tenant.' However, absent evidence that Plaintiffs are landlords subject to the Ordinance, and absent evidence that any of the Plaintiffs actually suffered any loss, Plaintiffs fail to establish that Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact because of the Ordinance. As Plaintiffs have not filed a reply, Plaintiffs do not raise any arguments or present any evidence in dispute.

Even if Plaintiffs are able to overcome the hurdle of establishing standing, the result would not change because Plaintiffs fail to establish that the Ordinance was a taking. As set forth in Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal. (1992) 503 U.S. 519, [t]he Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: '[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' Most of our cases interpreting the Clause fall within two distinct classes.

Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). But where the government merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole. See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–125, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3108077 2 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: SIDDELL VS CITY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] 37-2022-00025224-CU-EI-CTL rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.

Yee, 503 U.S. at 522–523.

Plaintiffs first argue that the Ordinance was a per se physical taking. The court finds the Ordinance was not a per se physical taking because the Ordinance did not effectuate a permanent physical occupation of Plaintiffs' property. See, Yee, 503 U.S. at 532; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.

(1982) 458 U.S. 419, 441. Nothing in the terms of the Ordinance effectuates a physical taking of any property. Moreover, the Ordinance was expressly time-limited and expired by its own terms on September 20, 2022.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance was a regulatory taking. The court finds the City meets its burden of establishing necessity as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. TrinCo Inv. Co. v. U.S. (Fed.

Cir. 2013) 722 F.3d 1375 recognizes the . . . principle, 'absolving the State ... of liability for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent' ... or forestall ... grave threats to the lives and property of others,' is commonly referred to as the 'doctrine of necessity' or the 'necessity defense.' Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n. 16, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992).

TrinCo, 722 F.3d at 1377. As recognized in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (9th Cir.

2020) 959 F.3d 938, the COVID-19 pandemic was as a result of a 'highly contagious and often fatal disease for which there presently is no known cure.' South Bay United, 959 F.3d at 939. The court finds such circumstances support application of the doctrine for necessity. As there is no reply, Plaintiffs do not raise any arguments to the contrary.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of establishing standing to bring the inverse condemnation cause of action and fail to meet their burden of establishing a taking so as to support a finding of compensation due to Plaintiffs under the inverse condemnation action.

Accordingly, the court adjudicates the second cause of action in favor of Defendant City of San Diego and against Plaintiffs.

In light of this ruling, there will be no separate trial on the issue of damages.

As the second cause of action for inverse condemnation was the only remaining cause of action at issue in this case, the court orders the City to submit a proposed judgment consistent with this ruling within 10 days of this ruling.

If this tentative ruling is confirmed the Minute Order will be the final order of the court and the parties shall not submit any further order on this motion.

Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear.

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