Judge Blaine K. Bowman, Case 37-2022-00039596-CU-CO-NC 2024-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Blaine K. Bowman, Case: 37-2022-00039596-CU-CO-NC, Date: 2024-01-05 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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SOUTH BUILDING TENTATIVE RULINGS - December 28, 2023

12/29/2023 01:30:00 PM N-31 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman

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Civil - Unlimited Contract - Other Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2022-00039596-CU-CO-NC MOSES VS. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for Reconsideration, 10/30/2023

The Motion for Reconsideration brought by defendant Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. (Toyota) is GRANTED in a very limited way and solely to clarify that the denial of the previous Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication (ROA 69) was without prejudice to the bringing of another Motion for Summary Judgment if new evidence could be found.

The Evidentiary Objections brought by plaintiffs Allen and Patricia Moses (collectively, Plaintiffs) are disposed as follows: Objection No. 1: Sustained Objection No. 2: Sustained Objection No. 3: Sustained Objection No. 4: Sustained Toyota previously brought a Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication making a distinction between an 'express warranty' and a 'service contract' as elaborated upon in the case of Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246. However, in so doing, Toyota failed to include a copy of the contract that was at issue. (ROA 69.) Since that time, Toyota has been able to procure a copy of the contract at issue, and Toyota now asks this Court to reconsider its prior ruling on grounds that there is new evidence to be provided under Code of Civil Procedure § 1008. As set forth above, this Court has sustained objections to much of that evidence as the documents in question do not presently appear to be properly authenticated. Moreover, to the extent that reconsideration is limited to scenarios where there are new facts or new law discovered, the declaration providing the 'new' evidence does not really demonstrate why the evidence is 'new.' While the declaration of counsel does characterize the prior efforts to obtain the contract as having been 'diligent,' the Court sustains the objection to this characterization as speculative and conclusory, but also rejects the factual assertion as it is linked to the follow-up assertion that 'TMS was unable to obtain a copy of the VSA prior to the hearing date on its Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication ('MSJ').' (ROA 73, ¶ 4.) The way this reads, one would think that some third party set the Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication and that Toyota itself was powerless to change or reset the date to a time when it actually had all the evidence it needed to support its position. But, as motions are set by the party bringing them, this is not the case. If Toyota did not yet have the evidence to support its position, it was incumbent upon Toyota to get the appropriate documents first and then set its motion for hearing.

Moreover, it appears based upon how quickly Toyota was able to get the contract that it is now providing and which it obtained from a non-party (albeit a non-party that might soon be added to this case) without Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3046024 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: MOSES VS. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES [IMAGED] 37-2022-00039596-CU-CO-NC the aid of legal tools (such as a subpoena) that Toyota had fairly ready access to the document in question all along. As such, even if the assertion were not objectionable, the Court would still find it somewhat lacking in credibility that Toyota truly exercised 'diligence' to obtain the document in question prior to filing its motion for summary judgment/adjudication.

The Court is not inclined to utilize the reconsideration process – a process which is notably discouraged – to assist a party in cleaning-up its own deficiencies. Moreover, the summary judgment statute imposes a 75-day notice rule precisely to enable opposing parties to conduct discovery to see if they can establish triable issues of fact. Here, by allowing Toyota to retroactively include the contract at issue within the scope of its motion via reconsideration, Plaintiffs will be denied the full and fair opportunity to utilize the 75-day notice time frame to marshal evidence to oppose the position now being advance by Toyota. Additionally, because a motion for reconsideration does not have the same separate statement requirements, the Court will be saddled with the additional task of reviewing the new evidence without the assistance and aid of a properly-drafted separate statement as is required when bringing a motion for summary judgment/adjudication.

On the other hand, if the documents are clear on their face and can be addressed via summary judgment/adjudication, the Court sees no reason to preclude the bringing of another motion for summary judgment/adjudication. As such, the Court will grant the instant Motion for Reconsideration in only the most limited of ways to specifically indicate that the prior denial of Toyota's Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication was without prejudice to the bringing of another motion if and when the appropriate evidence could be provided.

To be clear, the Court does not view this evidentiary issue as one that warrants a continuance. Trial of this matter is currently set for January 26, 2024, and there presently is not sufficient time to bring a new motion for summary judgment/adjudication. However, that is a procedural error wrought by Toyota's deficiency in how it brought its original motion. As such, the Court is not inclined to continue the trial solely to give more time to a party so that it can re-bring a motion that it failed to properly support in the first instance. The Court is also not inclined to utilize the reconsideration process to assist a party with avoiding additional filing fees for a motion for summary judgment/adjudication when the original motion wasted considerable judicial time and resources due to a failure by the party bringing the motion.

On the other hand, Plaintiffs indicate in their opposition brief that they intend to amend their complaint to add the third-party insurer (a purported subsidiary of Toyota) to the instant action as a 'Doe' defendant.

Plaintiffs further argue that: 'It would be highly prejudicial to not allow Plaintiffs to conduct additional discovery as TMIS may claim Toyota was responsible for the repairs conducted.' (Opposition, p. 7:16-17.) To the extent that an additional party may be added to this case, and thereby trigger a need for additional discovery to take place, if the parties seek a trial continuance on other grounds at some future date and thereby open up an opportunity for Toyota to re-file another motion for summary judgment/adjudication, this Court's limited granting of the Motion for Reconsideration would enable Toyota to re-file a similar motion – this time with additional documentation in support (if proper authentication can be provided).

Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear.

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