Judge: Bradley S. Phillips, Case: 22STCV35068, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV35068 Hearing Date: October 10, 2024 Dept: 26
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel,
Reisner & King LLP, is denied.
Defendant lacks standing to seek counsel’s
disqualification. The general rule is
that “an attorney-client relationship between the complaining party and the attorney
sought to be disqualified is a prerequisite to seeking disqualification.” Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 425, 432.
Even if the Court applied the “minority” view with respect to standing,
Defendant has not shown an “ethical breach [that] is ‘manifest and glaring’ and
so ‘infects the litigation in which disqualification is sought that it impacts
the moving party’s interest in a just and lawful determination of [its] claims.’” Id. at 433. Defendant’s lack of standing alone warrants
denial of the motion.
In addition, however, Defendant has not shown any ethical
breach. Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s
counsel’s representation of Mr. Decuir in this matter is materially adverse to the
interests of its former client, Mr. Davoudi.
See California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9(a). Nor has it shown that the circumstances
present here present “a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of [Mr.
DeCuir] would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own
interests or by the lawyer’s duties to [Mr. Davoudi].” Sharp v. Next Entertainment, Inc.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 410, 425-426.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s “representation of
Davoudi … provided significant exposure to Defendant’s organizational structure
and policies (thus presuming the possession of confidential information” (Mtn.
at 8) and that “misuse of confidential information from [Plaintiff counsel’s] representation
of Davoudi to the detriment of Arup and the integrity of the judicial system is
near-certain” (Reply at 10). The Court fails
to understand how information about Defendant obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel
in its representation of Mr. Davoudi adverse to Defendant could
constitute “confidential information” for this purpose. Defendant has not shown that any protective
order existed in the earlier case; and, even if there were one, the Court would
presume that counsel would abide by it.
The only relevant “presumption of knowledge of confidential information”
that could arise here would be presumption of counsel’s knowledge of
confidential information about counsel’s former client, Mr. Davoudi,
not about Defendant. It is certainly not
the law that an attorney who represents one client in a matter adverse to a
company is then precluded from representing other clients adverse to that company
because the attorney may have learned about the company in the first representation,
even if the matters are related.
Even if Defendant had standing, and even if some ethical
breach vis-à-vis Mr. Davoudi had been shown, the Court would deny the motion on
equitable grounds. Defendant delayed for
nearly two years in bringing this motion, although it has known throughout that
time that Mr. Davoudi would likely be a witness in this case and that Plaintiff’s
counsel previously represented him. See
Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 839. The delay certainly
destroys any credibility of Defendant’s purported concerns now about counsel’s
knowledge of “confidential information,” given that Defendant has known since
March 2022 both that Reisner & King represents Plaintiff and that they had
represented Mr. Davoudi in the prior litigation in which such information was
purportedly acquired (before March 2022).