Judge: Bradley S. Phillips, Case: 22STCV35339, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV35339    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: 26

DigitalBridge Group, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co.

No. 22STCV35339

Tentative Rulings on Motions in Limine

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine:

1.       Plaintiff’s MIL #1 is granted.  The issue is whether, in light of the Court’s ruling, Plaintiff will be allowed to make the “potential coverage” argument.

2.       Plaintiff’s MIL # 2 is denied.  The Court will not exclude evidence based on the assumption that referring to the President by name will prejudice Plaintiff.  Barrack’s relationship with the President is relevant.

3.       Plaintiff’s MIL #3 is granted.  Barrack’s appointment as ambassador to Turkey long after the events at issue here is not relevant.  To the extent it might have any probative value, that is outweighed by its potential to mislead the jury and cause undue consumption of time.

4.       Plaintiff’s MIL #4 is granted, absent a showing by Defendants that the insurance broker’s email is not inadmissible hearsay.

Defendants’ Motions in Limine:

A.      Defendants’ MIL A is granted.  There is no dispute that the premiums required were paid, and the amounts are irrelevant.

B, C, & D.   With respect to Defendants’ MILs B, C, and D, the Court would like the parties to be prepared to discuss Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33; the Court’s prior rulings on summary judgment and summary adjudication; and whether the Court should hold a preliminary hearing to consider (without admitting) extrinsic evidence to determine whether the policy is susceptible to more than one meaning.

E.      Defendants’ MIL E is granted.

F.       Defendants’ MIL F is denied, without prejudice to Defendants’ objecting to specific evidence offered by Plaintiff at trial.  The Court previously determined there are triable issues of fact with respect to coverage for fees and costs incurred by Colony employee witnesses and Matthew Grimes.

G.      Defendants’ MIL G is denied, conditioned on production within 2 court days of the unredacted agreement between Plaintiff and Barrack referenced in the motion.

H.      Defendants’ MIL H is granted with respect to testimony about portions of invoices that were redacted from the copies produced to Defendants.  MIL H is otherwise denied, but without prejudice to Defendants’ requesting a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code § 402 to determine the extent to which Mr. Bowman’s opinions are based upon the redacted material.  The Court does not believe that the fact that, at some point, Mr. Bowman reviewed the unredacted invoices by itself warrants precluding him from testifying.

I.       Defendants’ MIL I is granted with respect to invoices that allegedly support the employee-representation fees sought by Plaintiff but which were not produced in discovery.  This is not an improper motion for summary adjudication; in its opposition, Plaintiff acknowledges that it could potentially prove its claim for these fees based on other evidence.

J.       Defendants’ MIL J is denied.  It is overly broad and lacking in specificity.  Moreover, Defendants could have but did not make a motion asserting that Plaintiff and/or Mr. Barrack had waived the attorney-client and/or work-product privileges and seeking further discovery.  This denial is without prejudice to Defendants’ making objections to specific evidence at trial.

K.      Defendants’ MIL K is denied.  The coverage issue is in what capacity Barrack committed the allegedly wrongful acts, which issue cannot necessarily be resolved based upon only the criminal proceedings.  

L.      Defendants’ MIL L is granted.  Any testimony about the reasons for the jury’s acquittal of Mr. Barrack would be hearsay or speculation. 

M.     Defendants’ MIL M is denied.  To the extent it is determined at trial that attorney’s fees and costs incurred prior to a particular date are not recoverable, evidence of such fees and costs can be excluded or the jury can be instructed accordingly.  The Court does not believe introduction of such evidence would materially prejudice Defendants, even if such fees and costs are ultimately not recoverable.