Judge: Bradley S. Phillips, Case: 23STCV27421, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27421    Hearing Date: October 2, 2024    Dept: 26

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TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ Ninth and Eleventh Causes of Action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, respectively.  Plaintiffs have agreed to amend the Eleventh Cause of Action to plead a disparate-impact FEHA claim.  Defendants’ demurrer to that cause of action is therefore moot.

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages and the related allegations and Plaintiffs’ prayer for tax-neutralization damages.  Plaintiffs have agreed to remove the prayer for tax-neutralization damages, and Defendants’ motion to strike that prayer is therefore moot.

The Court finds that the totality of Plaintiffs’ allegations, all of which the Court must accept as true at this stage, is sufficient to support both the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the request for punitive damages.  Were Plaintiffs to prove all such allegations, a reasonable jury could find (1) outrageous conduct by Defendants; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress on the part of Plaintiffs; and (4) actual and proximate causation of such emotional distress.  See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.  Further, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants were guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice.  See Civil Code § 3294.  While Defendants might have a better argument based upon the individual allegations of the Complaint, or even some smaller subsets of those allegations, the Court must consider the totality of the alleged circumstances in deciding whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their claims.

California Civil Code § 1942.5 expressly provides for punitive damages “where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice.”  Civil Code § 1942.5(h)(2).  Defendants’ argument that use of the word “guilty” in that statute means that Plaintiffs must prove that Defendants have been found guilty in a criminal proceeding is meritless.  “Guilty” is the same word used in Civil Code § 3294, which unquestionably does not require any such finding.

Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike are accordingly both denied.