Judge: Bradley S. Phillips, Case: 24STCV19216, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19216    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 26

            Plaintiffs moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) from Defendant Omega Extruding Corp. of California.  Specifically, Plaintiffs move to compel from Defendant Omega further responses to (1) RFP Nos. 1-5, 17-19, 26-27 and 31-33, specifying whether the production is being made in whole or in part pursuant to CCP §2031.220; and (2) RFP Nos. 7-16, 21-22, 28-29 and 35-37, specifying the reason for Defendant’s inability to comply pursuant to CCP §2031.230.  Plaintiffs also ask that Defendant produce a privilege log to substantiate its privilege-based objections pursuant to CCP §2031.240(c)(1).  Plaintiffs also ask for sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $2,000. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to establish good cause. The Court finds that Plaintiff has established good cause to compel further responses and that Defendant has failed to justify its objections. 

Defendant has also moved for a protective order with respect to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, on essentially the same grounds on which Defendant relies in opposition to the motion to compel.

·         Plaintiff establishes good cause and Defendant’s relevance objections are overruled.  Where a party is seeking to compel further responses to requests for document production, the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (CCP §2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Supr. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (“Once good cause was shown, the burden shifted to Kirkland to justify his objection”); Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Supr. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.)  Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)  Plaintiff establishes good cause as to each of the disputed RFPs (1-19, 21-22, 26-29, 31-33 and 35-37 (“Disputed RFPs”)).  Each of the RFPs seeks documents specifically relating to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s terms of employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s pay as Defendant’s employee. and Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination, retaliation and/or harassment by Defendants, which form the basis of Plaintiff’s instant complaint.  Such documents are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s employment discrimination, retaliation, and harassment case against Defendants.  The burden therefore shifts to Defendant to justify its objections and/or its failure to provide complete production. 

·         Failure to provide a privilege log.  In response to each of the Disputed RFPs, Defendant Outsource objected on grounds of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine.  Defendant Outsource did not, however, provide a privilege log in accordance with CCP §2031.240(b), which requires that Defendant (1) identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made; and (2) set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege must be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim must be expressly asserted.” Defendant Outsource is ordered to serve a privilege log in compliance with CCP §2031.240(b) as to each Disputed RFP.

·         Failure to Comply with CCP §2031.220 as to RFP Nos. 1-5, 17-19, 26-27 and 31-33.  As to each of these RFPs, Defendant produced responsive documents but failed to indicate whether Defendant has produced all responsive documents.  Plaintiff is entitled to a verified further response clarifying whether Defendant is complying in full or in part per CCP §2030.220:  “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection…has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection…demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” 

·         Unsubstantiated right to privacy objection as to RFP Nos. 7-16 and 21-22.   “In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Supr. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35).) 

“Whether a legally recognized privacy interest is present in a given case is a question of law to be decided by the court.  Whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and whether defendant's conduct constitutes a serious invasion of privacy are mixed questions of law and fact. If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.”  (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 40.)

“In general, the court should not proceed to balancing unless a satisfactory threshold showing is made. A defendant is entitled to prevail if it negates any of the three required elements. A defendant can also prevail at the balancing stage. An otherwise actionable invasion of privacy may be legally justified if it substantively furthers one or more legitimate competing interests.  (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 40.) 

Defendant asserted privacy objections to each of RFP Nos. 7-16 and 21-22.  Since Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause, the burden is on the Defendant to establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious per Hill and Williams.  Defendant did not establish any of these three elements.  Defendant does not identify as to each RFP what legally protected interest is at stake, whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, or whether the threatened intrusion is serious.  Defendant’s privacy objections are overruled. 

·         Objections that RFPs were impermissible compound, unintelligible, vague and ambiguous.  Having reviewed the RFPs, the Court finds they are not impermissibly compound, unintelligible, vague, or ambiguous.  Defendant also fails to argue the merits of these objections.

·         Objections that RFPs oppressive, burdensome, and harassing.  Defendant fails to submit any evidence of the burden that production would place on it.  Defendant therefore fails to substantiate with evidence its claim that it would be unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing to respond to the Disputed RFPs.

·         Sanctions.  Plaintiff requests $2,000 in sanctions based on four hours motion preparation.  (Motion, Buenrostro Dec., ¶7.)  Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is granted with respect to Defendant only (not Defendant’s attorney)  .         

ORDER

           

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.  Defendant Outsource is ordered to serve further responses consistent with the preceding order within 30 days. 

Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions is GRANTED in part.  Defendant shall pay sanctions in the amount of $2,000 to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days.

Defendant’s motion for a protective order is denied.

Plaintiff’s counsel to give notice.

 





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