Judge: Bradley S. Phillips, Case: 24STCV25673, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling
1. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling, please email the clerk at SMCdept26@lacourt.org (and "cc" all other parties in the same email) no later than 7:30 am on the day of the hearing, and please notify all other parties in advance that you will not be appearing at the hearing. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motion, and the Court may decide not to adopt the tentative ruling.
2. For any motion where no parties submit on the tentative ruling in advance, and no parties appear at the motion hearing, the Court may elect to either adopt the tentative ruling or take the motion off calendar, in its discretion.
3. PLEASE DO NOT USE THIS EMAIL (SMCdept26@lacourt.org) FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO SUBMIT ON A TENTATIVE RULING. The Court will not read or respond to emails sent to this address for any other purpose.
Case Number: 24STCV25673 Hearing Date: May 8, 2025 Dept: 26
TENTATIVE RULING ON DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff Erin Campos
(“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant Office of the Public
Defender, County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 100. The
complaint asserts four causes of action for (1) Discrimination Based on
Disability; (2) Retaliation for Engaging in Protected Conduct (Gov. Code §
12940(h)); (3) Failure to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination; and
(4) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.
Plaintiff alleges that she was a long-term
employee with no history of discipline who requested a reasonable accommodation
(remote work) due to a disability (asthma, which increased her risk from
COVID-19). Plaintiff contends that shortly after making this request and
participating in a discrimination investigation as a witness, she was
retaliated against, harassed, and ultimately terminated under the pretext of
compensatory time off (CTO) violations. Plaintiff claims she was singled out
despite the widespread use of the same CTO practices by other employees, and
that her termination was motivated by discriminatory and retaliatory intent to
avoid accommodating her disability and future medical leave needs.
On
January 15, 2025, Defendant filed a demurrer. On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff
opposed. On May 1, 2025, Defendant replied.
INSTANT MOTION
Defendant demurs to the whole complaint on the
grounds that the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a
cause of action.
Defendant contends that the Complaint consists
of conclusory allegations lacking the factual specificity required to state a
claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and fails to meet the
pleading standard of particularity. Campos alleges wrongful termination from
her position as an Administrative Services Manager II, but does not support
this with concrete facts.
Defendant argues that exhibits attached to the
Complaint, specifically, records from the Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission, demonstrate that Campos and her colleague were discharged for
misconduct, including time card fraud, and that the discharge was unrelated to
discrimination. Campos did not raise any FEHA-based defenses in the
administrative proceedings, and she fails to reconcile this with her current
claims.
Additionally, Defendant asserts that Campos’s
common law wrongful termination claim is barred because (1) the County is
immune from such claims and (2) she did not plead compliance with the
Government Claims Act. On these grounds, Defendant requests that the Court
sustain its demurrer without leave to amend.
Summary of Allegations
Plaintiff Erin Campos alleges she began her
employment with the County of Los Angeles in 2007 and transferred to the Office
of the Public Defender in 2019, where she served as an Administrative Services
Manager II (“ASM II”) supervising subordinate staff. (Complaint ¶8.) She
alleges that she has asthma, which placed her at higher risk during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and that she requested a remote work accommodation in March
2020. (Complaint ¶9.) She claims she was initially denied but began remote work
in April 2020. (Complaint ¶12.)
Campos further alleges that in January 2020,
she “participated” as a witness in a Human Resources investigation involving
another employee, Rebecca Moseley (Complaint ¶10), and later complained about
being denied accommodation and subjected to harassment and retaliation. (Complaint
¶¶11, 13, 17.) She claims that on September 11, 2020, she received a Notice of
Intent to Discharge based on alleged compensatory time off (“CTO”) violations
(Complaint ¶14), and that this was a pretext for discrimination and retaliation
based on her disability or perceived disability. (Complaint ¶¶15-17, 21-27.)
Campos attaches the report of the Los Angeles
County Civil Service Commission Hearing Officer, which found that while Campos
engaged in misconduct including misuse of CTO, unauthorized disclosure of
confidential medical information, and discourteous behavior toward colleagues
(Complaint Exh. 3 at 2-6, 10), discharge was excessive. The Commission reduced
her discipline to a 30-day suspension and demotion to ASM I. (Complaint Exh. 3
at 10; Exh. 2 ¶12.)
Despite these findings, Campos claims four
causes of action: (1) Disability Discrimination; (2) FEHA Retaliation; (3)
Failure to Prevent Discrimination; and (4) Wrongful Termination in Violation of
Public Policy.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
On or about December 13, 2024, Defendant’s
counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael Carr, outlining the
grounds for a demurrer and inviting participation in the meet and confer
process. (Stratton Decl. ¶ 2.) A telephonic meet and confer took place on or
about December 30, 2024. (Stratton Decl. ¶ 3.) The parties discussed related
proceedings (Campos and Moseley), acknowledging the overlap in
pleadings and legal issues. (Stratton ¶¶ 3-4.) After discussions, defense
counsel informed Mr. Carr that agreement could not be reached. (Stratton ¶ 6.)
The
Court finds the meet and confer requirement to be satisfied.
Discrimination under the FEHA
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”) or for common law wrongful termination. To plead disability
discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment
action; and (4) circumstances suggesting a discriminatory motive. (Soria v.
Univision Radio Los Angeles, 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 584 (2016); Caldwell
v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist., 41 Cal. App.4th 189, 197 (1995).) Claims
against public entities must be pled with particularity. (Covenant Care v.
Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 771, 790 (2004); Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 40 Cal.3d 780, 795 (1985).)
Plaintiff alleges she has asthma and feared
contracting COVID-19 (Complaint ¶9), but Defendant argues she does not allege
that her asthma impaired her ability to work or that she was denied
accommodation. In fact, she admits she was allowed to telecommute. (Complaint
¶12.) Defendant states that her allegation that her discharge in September 2020
was “out of the blue” (Complaint ¶14) is contradicted by attached exhibits
showing she had been under investigation and previously warned about suspected
timecard fraud. (Complaint Exh. 3 at 5.) Defendant concludes that since Campos
does not allege facts linking her asthma or telecommuting request to the
County’s decision to terminate her, she fails to allege a prima facie case.
Additionally, she fails to plead facts showing that the County’s proffered
non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. Defendant
contends that the Civil Service Commission’s Report attached to the Complaint
contradicts Campos’s factual allegations and thus controls. The Report
attributes Campos’s discharge to misconduct, including timecard fraud,
unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information, and unprofessional
behavior toward colleagues, not to any discriminatory motive. (Complaint Exh. 3
at 2-6, 10.).
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for disability discrimination under the FEHA,
and that no heightened pleading standard applies to such claims. Plaintiff
alleges she has asthma, a condition that placed her in the high-risk category
for COVID-19, and she requested remote work accommodation in March 2020,
supported by documentation from her physician. (Complaint ¶9.) The Public
Defender initially denied this request without explanation and failed to engage
in an adequate interactive process. (Complaint ¶11.) Plaintiff further alleges
that out of approximately 800 employees, only she and one subordinate were
disciplined for alleged CTO violations, supporting an inference of
discriminatory treatment. (Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiff asserts she had no prior
history of discipline and was fully able to perform her job with or without
accommodation. (Complaint ¶9.) She argues that she has adequately alleged all
elements of a prima facie FEHA claim: (1) disability, (2) qualification for her
position, (3) adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances suggesting
discriminatory motive.
In
reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to
support her FEHA claim for disability discrimination. As required under Sandell
v. Taylor-Listug (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 310, Plaintiff must show she
was subjected to an adverse employment action because of her disability.
However, she does not allege any facts demonstrating that her asthma played any
role in the County’s decision to terminate her employment. Defendant argues
that vague references to disability, unsupported by specific factual
allegations, cannot establish causation—a required element of a prima facie
case. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint is contradicted by the Civil Service
Commission’s Report (attached as Exhibit 3), which found that Plaintiff was
terminated for time card fraud and other misconduct, not because of her
disability. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to reconcile her claims with
the content of her own exhibit and does not provide facts sufficient to infer
discriminatory intent.
Here, although Plaintiff alleges that she
suffers from asthma and feared contracting COVID-19 (Complaint ¶9), she does
not allege that her asthma substantially limited her ability to perform her job
duties. Nor does she allege that she was denied accommodation. In fact, she
concedes that the County permitted her to telecommute. (Complaint ¶12.) Her
assertion that her discharge was “out of the blue” (Complaint ¶14) is
contradicted by Exhibit 3 to the Complaint, which documents that she was
investigated and warned for suspected timecard fraud and other misconduct. The
Civil Service Commission’s Report attributes her discharge to specific findings
of dishonesty, misuse of time, unauthorized disclosure of medical information,
and unprofessional conduct. (Complaint Exh. 3 at 2-6, 10.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of
discriminatory motive are conclusory and unsupported by facts demonstrating a
causal connection between her alleged disability and the County’s decision to
terminate her employment. Plaintiff’s Opposition does not address or reconcile
the Commission’s findings, which undermine her claim that the termination was
motivated by discrimination. Plaintiff does not she allege any specific facts
from which the Court could reasonably infer that the County’s stated reasons
for her discharge were a pretext for unlawful conduct.
Accordingly, the Court sustains with leave to
amend the Demurrer as to the first cause of action for disability
discrimination under FEHA.
Retaliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for retaliation under the FEHA or for wrongful termination based on
retaliation. To state a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff
must show: (1) participation in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the two. (Flait v. North American
Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (1992).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff
fails to allege any facts demonstrating a causal connection between her alleged
request for accommodation and her discharge. Even assuming her accommodation
request was protected activity, Defendant notes Plaintiff admits she was
allowed to telecommute (Complaint ¶12), and thus suffered no adverse action
tied to that request. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege with particularity
any retaliatory intent behind the County’s decision to discharge her.
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that her
termination was in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under FEHA,
specifically:
·
Requesting a reasonable accommodation
(Complaint ¶9);
·
Complaining to HR about discrimination,
retaliation, and a hostile work environment (Complaint ¶13);
·
Participating in a discrimination investigation
involving another employee, Rebecca Moseley (Complaint ¶10, ¶16).
Plaintiff contends these activities are
protected under Government Code § 12940(h). She alleges a causal link supported
by close temporal proximity between her complaints and her termination, which
courts recognize as strong circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive. Plaintiff
argues that the County’s justification (CTO violations) was pretextual, citing
the employer’s inconsistent explanations and selective enforcement. Under Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000), she asserts
that falsity in the employer’s explanation supports an inference of retaliatory
intent.
In
reply, Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under FEHA
also fails for lack of factual specificity. To state a claim, Campos must show
a causal link between her protected activity (e.g., requesting accommodation,
participating in an investigation) and her termination. (Flait v. North
American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467.) However, the Complaint and
Opposition lack facts establishing that her discharge occurred “because of”
these activities. Plaintiff does not dispute that she was under investigation
long before her termination, and the Commission’s Report makes clear that the
discharge was based on misconduct unrelated to any protected conduct. Defendant
also challenges Plaintiff’s reliance on temporal proximity as speculative and
unsupported. Significantly, Plaintiff did not argue at the administrative
hearing that retaliation or discrimination motivated her termination, further
undermining the plausibility of her current claim. By ignoring the Commission’s
findings, which contradict her retaliation theory, Defendant concludes that
Plaintiff effectively concedes the absence of causation.
Although
Plaintiff attempts to rely on temporal proximity, Defendant points to the Civil
Service Commission’s findings (attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 3), which
document that Plaintiff was terminated for substantiated misconduct, including
timecard fraud and unprofessional behavior. Plaintiff does not dispute that she
was under investigation well before her termination, nor does she offer any
factual allegations rebutting the Commission’s findings or showing that the
County’s stated reasons were pretextual. She did not raise retaliation or
discrimination as defenses during the administrative hearing.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's reliance on
conclusory assertions and general legal standards fails to cure the absence of
specific factual allegations linking her termination to any protected activity.
Her Opposition does not meaningfully address the Commission’s findings or
explain how the stated grounds for her discharge were false or retaliatory.
Accordingly, the Court sustains with leave to
amend the Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for retaliation.
Wrongful Termination
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s common law
claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is barred by
governmental immunity as a matter of law. Under the Government Claims Act,
Government Code § 815(a), a public entity is not liable for injuries arising
from acts or omissions unless liability is imposed by statute. This section
abolishes all common law tort liability for public entities unless required by
statute or constitutional mandate. (Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 (2008).) The California Supreme Court
in Miklosy confirmed that public entities are immune from
common law wrongful termination claims. Courts have repeatedly applied this
principle. In McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 216
Cal.App.4th 1198, 1219 (2013), the court rejected a wrongful termination claim
by a teacher, reaffirming that such claims cannot be maintained against public
entities. Similarly, in Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles, 172
Cal.App.4th 320, 328–330 (2009), the court held that the County was immune from
a wrongful termination claim under Government Code § 815.
Defendant states that Plaintiff also fails to
plead a valid claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy as
she does not allege facts showing that her discharge was based on a violation
of public policy or link it to any statutorily protected activity. Further,
Defendant argues this claim is barred because Campos did not allege compliance
with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code § 911.2) and because claims against
public entities must be pled with particularity.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues her wrongful
termination claim is grounded in public policy violations protected under FEHA,
namely, retaliation and disability discrimination. She maintains that:
·
The termination was directly tied to her
complaints and requests for accommodation;
·
The adverse action was based on pretextual
reasons (Complaint ¶14);
·
The underlying FEHA violations support the
wrongful termination claim.
Plaintiff asserts that a demurrer is
inappropriate where factual disputes exist about motive, and that she has pled
sufficient facts to infer a violation of public policy under Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980).
In
reply, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s common law claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy also fails for several independent
reasons. Defendant reiterates that Government Code § 815 bars common law tort
claims against public entities, and Plaintiff fails to address this statutory
immunity in her Opposition. As established in Miklosy v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 and reaffirmed in McAllister v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, wrongful
termination claims may not be asserted against public entities unless expressly
authorized by statute. Defendant states that Plaintiff does not meaningfully
respond to this argument and does not allege any statutory basis that overrides
the County’s immunity. Further, the Commission’s Report, which Plaintiff
attached to her own Complaint, confirms the termination was based on policy
violations and misconduct. Defendant reasons that this eliminates any inference
that the County discharged her for reasons violating public policy.
The
Court finds that Plaintiff’s common law claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy is barred as a matter of law by the Government
Claims Act. Government Code § 815(a) establishes that public entities cannot be
held liable for common law torts unless such liability is expressly authorized
by statute or mandated by the state or federal constitution. Plaintiff has not
identified any statutory basis that would allow her claim to proceed despite
this immunity, nor does her Opposition meaningfully confront the County’s
argument on this point.
Additionally, even if the claim were not barred
by § 815, Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing that her termination violated
a fundamental public policy. Her allegations are conclusory and rely on the
same factual assertions already contradicted by the Civil Service Commission’s
Report attached to her Complaint, which found that she was discharged for
misconduct unrelated to any statutorily protected activity. Plaintiff’s general
reference to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980),
does not save her claim in the absence of a specific statutory violation that
applies to public entities.
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege
compliance with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement
under Government Code § 911.2, which is a prerequisite to bringing any claim
for damages against a public entity. The failure to allege timely compliance is
fatal to the cause of action.
Accordingly, the Court sustains without
leave to amend the Demurrer as to the fourth cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
Failure to Prevent
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s cause of
action for failure to prevent discrimination under the FEHA fails because it is
derivative of her underlying discrimination claims. A claim for failure to
prevent discrimination requires a viable underlying claim of discrimination.
Courts have held that if a plaintiff cannot adequately plead discrimination,
then a failure to prevent claim necessarily fails as well. (Dickson v. Burke
Williams Inc., 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1315-1316 (2015).) Because Plaintiff
has failed to allege facts constituting a valid FEHA discrimination claim,
Defendant contends that her failure-to-prevent claim is also deficient and must
be dismissed.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that because
she has adequately alleged underlying FEHA violations (discrimination and
retaliation), her claim for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation
must also survive demurrer. Under Dickson v. Burke Williams Inc., 234
Cal.App.4th 1307, 131-–1316 (2015), a failure-to-prevent claim is derivative of
valid FEHA claims. Because Plaintiff asserts facts supporting both underlying
claims, she argues her third cause of action is properly pled.
In
reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for failure to prevent
discrimination and retaliation is derivative of her underlying FEHA claims,
which are deficient. Defendant states that Plaintiff offers no independent
factual basis for this cause of action, nor does she address its dependency on
her other claims.
The
Court finds that Plaintiff’s third cause of action for failure to prevent
discrimination under the FEHA fails as a matter of law because it is entirely
derivative of her underlying FEHA claims, which the Court has already found to
be insufficiently pled. Here, by sustaining Defendant’s demurrers to
Plaintiff’s claims for both discrimination and retaliation under FEHA, the
derivative failure-to-prevent claim likewise fails. Plaintiff offers no
separate or independent factual allegations to support this cause of action,
and her Opposition does not overcome the fundamental pleading deficiency. Accordingly, the Court sustains with leave to
amend the Demurrer to the third cause of action for failure to prevent
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
.The Court
SUSTAINS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ Demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action of Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Court SUSTAINS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants' Demurrer to the fourth cause of action of Plaintiff's Complaint.