Judge: Brian F. Gasdia, Case: 24NWCV02737, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NWCV02737    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: R

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CARR v. TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, INC.

CASE NO.: 24NWCV02737

HEARING:  Wednesday, June 11, 2025 at 10:30 a.m.

Plaintiff DR. FIRPO WYCOFF CARR, PHD’s Motion to Quash a Subpoena for Production of Business Records in the alternative, for a Protective Order is DENIED.

The Court notes that a Notice of Reassignment was filed in this case on May 1, 2025 which states that effective June 2, 2025, this action was reassigned to Judge Brian F. Gasdia as an individual, direct calendaring judge for all purposes, including trial, in Dept. R.

Opposing Party to give notice.

No Reply filed as of June 9, 2025. Due by June 4, 2025. (CCP §1005(b).) 

This action for defamation was filed by Plaintiff DR. FIRPO WYCOFF CARR, PhD (pro per) (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, INC. (“Trader Joe’s”); JEFF KIRBY (“Kirby”); Jane Doe I; Jane Doe II; and Does 1-50 on August 26, 2024.

Plaintiff now moves for an order to quash the deposition subpoena for production of business records, served by Trader Joe’s to the City of Los Angeles; or alternatively, for entry of a protective order. Neither the deposition subpoena at issue, nor a list of the records sought to be quashed, are attached to or contained within the Subject Motion. Moreover, there is no Separate Statement attached to the Moving Papers.

In Opposition, Counsel for Trader Joe’s and Kirby (collectively “Defendants”) states: “On October 28, 2024, Defendants served a deposition subpoena for production of business records to the City of Los Angeles seeking any and all records of benefits paid, all insurance and/or claim files, copies of checks and/or monies paid to applicant on medical claims, and all medical/accident reports and documents, excluding privileged and confidential documents, for a February 12, 2002, incident wherein Plaintiff was allegedly injured, specifically suffering stress, while employed with the City of Los Angeles.” (Arim Decl., ¶2.) Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied because: (1) the Motion is untimely; (2) the right to discovery is liberally construed; (3) Plaintiff’s right to privacy is not absolute and is outweighed by Defendants’ legitimate discovery interests; (4) the records sought by the subpoena are subject to discovery and good cause exists to compel their production.

Procedural Issues

Plaintiff’s Subject Motion is untimely. A motion to quash a subpoena must be filed and served a minimum of five days before the date of production of documents. (See CCP §1985.3(g).) However, the Court has discretion whether or not to consider a motion to quash, even if the motion is late. (See In re: R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1276-1277.) Although Plaintiff’s Motion is untimely, Defendants have filed a substantive Opposition on the merits, and there is no indication that any prejudice would result from the late filing of this Motion.

Plaintiff’s Motion fails to comply with CRC Rule 3.1345. CRC Rule 3.1345 requires that a Separate Statement be filed whenever a discovery motion involves the contents of a discovery request. (See CRC Rule 3.1345(a)(3).)  A separate statement is also required for a motion to compel answers at a deposition and a motion to compel or quash the production of documents or tangible things at a deposition. (CRC Rules 3.1345(a)(4-5).) Plaintiff offers no justification for this defect. However, since the subpoena (as described by the Opposing Party) only contains a single requested set of documents, the Court finds this defect to be harmless error, as the body of the Motion sufficiently explains Plaintiff’s stance regarding why production should not be compelled.

In the interests of judicial efficiency and in favor of adjudicating the issues on the merits, the Court waives the procedural deficiencies affecting Plaintiff’s Motion. The Court will therefore address the Motion on the merits.

Analysis

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b),… may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. (CCP §19871(a).)

Plaintiff contends that the subpoena at issue is overbroad, an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy, and seeks information that is irrelevant to this action.

In ruling on a privacy objection, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonably expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) “The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Id.)

The Court notes that the subpoena at issue appears to seek Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation documents pertaining to a stress-related workplace injury that Plaintiff suffered in 2002. However, to the extent that the subpoena at issue seeks to obtain “medical records”—“[i]t is settled that a person’s medical history, including psychological records, falls within the zone of informational privacy protected under Section 1.” (People v. Martinez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 465, 474-475.)  Thus, before the discovery will be allowed, the opposing parties must identify what legitimate and important interests would be served by the disclosure. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he “has sustained and will sustain damages and suffered anxiety, worry, mental anguish,[and] emotional distress….” (Complaint ¶148.) Plaintiff has placed his medical history/emotional health at issue in this action where he seeks to recover damages stemming from his alleged emotional distress.

With respect to the worker’s compensation records that are actually being sought by way of the subject deposition subpoena, Plaintiff cites to no authority that the workers compensation documents which are named in the subpoena are the kind of documents in which Plaintiff might have a legally protected privacy interest, or a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court finds nothing improper with Defendants’ subpoena for records in connection with Plaintiff’s 2002 workplace injury. Plaintiff suffered a stress related workplace injury in 2002. Plaintiff is now seeking stress-related damages in this action. Defendants should not be foreclosed from obtaining discovery pertaining to possible defenses as to the causation of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that the subpoena will lead to the production of irrelevant/private/overbroad documents lacks merit. The language of the subpoena expressly excludes privileged and confidential documents.

The Motion to Quash is DENIED.