Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 20STCV04212 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion for attorneys’ fees is granted; the motion for costs is denied.

Defendants Jeffrey Preston Bezos and Gavin de Becker (“Defendants”) moved for $329,709.40 in attorney fees and $13,903.63 in costs incurred for their previous attorney fee application, collection efforts, and Plaintiff Sanchez’s appeal of the Court’s granting of Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants also seek $42,219.50 in attorney fees and $711.29 costs incurred for the instant attorney fee application, for a total of $371,928.90 in fees and $14,614.92 in costs.

The Court grants Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and denies the request for costs.

On November 5, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, striking the entirety of Plaintiff Sanchez’s Complaint, and dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. On January 21, 2021, as the prevailing party, Defendants moved for $1,676,919.50 in attorney fees and $36,019.26 in costs. On March 5, 2021, the Court awarded $218,385 in fees and the full amount of requested costs.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) appealed the judgment. Defendants appealed the fee award and Plaintiff cross-appealed to seek vacatur of the fee award should the appeals court reverse the trial court’s grant of the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants dismissed their appeal prior to briefing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and the order awarding attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff petitioned for review, which our Supreme Court denied.

As the appeal was pending, Defendants filed an action for fraudulent conveyance to set aside Plaintiff’s conveyance of his residence to 143 Ventures, LLC. Concurrently, Defendants filed a lis pendens on Plaintiff’s residence.

On November 29, 2022, Defendants moved for attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff opposed; Defendants replied; and Plaintiff filed a purported sur-reply.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1) provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” As the moving party, the prevailing defendant seeking fees and costs bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (Christian Research. Inst. v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (Christian Research).)

To assess the fees and costs, the trial court begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure based on the compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney who worked on the case. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132.) The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id. at p. 1134; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) The court may increase or decrease the lodestar figure depending on a variety of factors, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum, at p. 1132.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. (Id.)

For that purpose, the court may require a party to produce records to provide a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims. The court also may reduce compensation because the attorney did not maintain appropriate time records. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.) The party that seeks payment must “keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 441 (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Contemporaneous time records in support of an attorney fee motion are often the most useful evidence, but are not indispensable. A detailed declaration describing the legal work done is acceptable. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4^th 1084, 1095, n. 4 [fee claim based on detailed reconstructed records upheld; noting that contemporaneous records facilitate accuracy]; Taylor v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5^th 205, 207 [contemporaneous time records are the best evidence of lawyer’s hourly work; they are “not indispensable”]; People v. Kelly (2020) 59 Cal.App.5^th 1172, 1182 [“no legal requirement that an attorney supply billing statements to support a claim for attorney fees”; attorney declarations acceptable].) Block billing is not impermissible per se. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4^th at p. 1325.) Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1011.)

“Padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) In Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375-1376, declarations from counsel explained how the two law firms collaborated on the anti-SLAPP motion by allocating different legal issues between the firms and assigning different tasks to each, and the court found that the attorney fees were not excessive.

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, the opposing party must point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 [“General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice”].)

As evidence, Defendants summarize the hours expended by each attorney for each action: (1) litigate the previous attorney fee application; (2) enforce the judgment from the anti-SLAPP motion; (3) respond to Plaintiff’s appeal to the California Court of Appeal; (4) respond to Plaintiff’s application to seek leave to appeal to the California Supreme Court. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pp. 9-10, lines 12-18; 1-21.) Defendants do not seek payment for the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions and time spent by paralegals and support staff. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg. 9, lines 9-10.) In summarizing, Defendants describe the general duties for each action but do not identify who performed the duties. (Ibid.) In the supporting declaration, Defendant’s counsel states that the attorneys who billed at higher rates performed the “most complex and difficult tasks,” while attorneys who billed at lower rates performed “lower-level tasks.” (Decl. Isaacson ¶ 34.) Additionally, Defendants engaged two other law firms, Boies Schiller and Corr Corwin, and do not explain how they collaborated with each firm by allocating different legal issues between the firms and assigning different tasks to each. (Notice of Motion and Motion, ps. 9-10, lines 12-18; 1-6.) Defendant’s counsel also asserts that the complexity, scope and intensity of the litigation required the work of multiple attorneys. (Decl. Isaacson ¶ 34.)

Defendants argue that the fees are reasonable because of the circumstances of the case: the lawsuit assails Defendants’ reputations and appears calculated to cause them personal embarrassment and negative press while also extracting a large amount of damages. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p.10, lines 4-6.)

Defendants also argue that defense counsel’s rates are reasonable considering the rates charged for work of similar complexity by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation, and the rates charged by defendants’ counsel represent a negotiated discount from its typical market rates. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p.11, lines 19-21.) Defendants note that Paul, Weiss and Boies Schiller are widely recognized as top law firms, both nationally and in California, and are recognized for their expertise in complex litigation. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg.11, lines 21-23.) Defendants further contend that the attorneys at Corr Cronin provided essential local expertise in connection with legal issues pertaining to judgment enforcement. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p.11, lines 23-24.)

Defendants further argue that their costs are reasonable and necessary because they compensate for direct operating costs, including photocopying and computer research. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pp.11-12, lines 26-28; line 1.)

Defendants also argue that the total hours for which they seek compensation is consistent with this court’s prior ruling on attorney’s fees. In its prior ruling, this court determined that it was reasonable for two partners and three associates to spend 280 attorney hours to litigate Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion, oppose Plaintiff’s motion to lift the automatic discovery stay, and oppose interim requests for appeals to the Court of Appeal. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p. 9, lines 2-6.) Here, Defendants argue that an award based on a total of 367.5 attorney hours to litigate the previous attorney fee application, enforce the judgment from the anti-SLAPP motion, collect from Plaintiff, respond to Plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, and respond to Plaintiff’s application to seek leave to appeal to the California Supreme Court is consistent with the court’s prior ruling. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p. 9, lines 6-9.)

Much of Sanchez’s opposition seeks to relitigate what has been resolved against him. He repeats his claims that Defendants defamed him and heaps equal scorn on his former attorneys. The issue here is whether litigating against Mr. Sanchez reasonably required significant time and resources. Plaintiff’s philippic supplies convincing evidence that it did.

Plaintiff argues that courts award a lower amount in anti-SLAPP cases because of their limited duration and scope. (Opposition, p. 9, lines 9-10.) He further argues that a review of fee awards in anti-SLAPP cases and appeals suggests fee awards typically range from about $10,000 to $80,000, depending upon the particulars of the case. (Opposition, p. 9, lines 11-12.) Plaintiff argues that the anti-SLAPP motion in this case revolved around one primary issue: whether the plaintiff improperly relied on hearsay evidence. (Opposition, p. 10, lines 24-26.) Plaintiff further argues that the briefs addressed the same issues, cited many of the same cases, and made many of the same arguments, and defense counsel profess they are experts in these issues. (Opposition, ps. 10-11, lines 18; 1-2.) Plaintiff states that the substantive hearings in the case averaged perhaps 15–20 minutes each. (Opposition, p. 11, lines 2-3.) Plaintiff cites to no evidence in support of his argument about the narrow scope of the anti-SLAPP motion, and the Court disagrees with the characterization.

Plaintiff advances other arguments made in the previous fee motion. They are not pertinent here.

Defendants counter that the fee request is consistent with other anti-SLAPP fee awards. (Reply, pp. 3-4, lines 16-25; 1-7.) The cases Plaintiff cites involved fees for anti-SLAPP motions and fees on fees, not fees for appeals or collections, and they involved simpler proceedings and required less work. (Reply, p. 4, lines 8-13.) Contrary to what Plaintiff argues, Defendants argue that this case was not simple and straightforward. On appeal, Plaintiff urged the court to resolve an “important question of law” and called for a fundamental shift in the type of evidence that should be admissible in a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Reply, p. 4, lines 15-19.) Also, Defendants argue that one third of the fees Defendants seek relate to fees and collection efforts. (Reply, p. 4, lines 21-22.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s contention that the number of hours billed is unreasonable is conclusory. (Reply, p. 5, lines 3-8.) Defendants also argue that its staffing was reasonable because of the range of issues and jurisdictions to litigate in the fee applications, collections, appeals, and in the current request. (Reply, p. 5, lines 15-17.) Defendants further contend that they billed efficiently because collectively, the associate attorneys worked more than twice the number of hours as the partners, and the teams were as limited as practicable in size considering the needs of the case. (Reply, p. 6, lines 23-25.) Defendants aver that in the ruling on the previous fee motion, the Court found that two partners would have been reasonable. Similarly, here, Defendants primarily seek the fees of the hours worked by two partners from Paul, Weiss and by two local counsel partners. (Reply, p. 5, lines 2-9.) Defendants argue that the associate attorney rates are reasonable because in the ruling on the previous attorney fee motion, the court found counsel’s hourly rates to be reasonable for the locality. (Reply, p. 6, lines 10-13.) Additionally, Defendants argue that the summary descriptions of time, supported by an attorney affidavit are sufficiently specific absent that an attorney’s time statements are erroneous. (Reply, p. 6, lines 14-21.)

Defendants also seek $42,219.50 in attorney fees for 54.1 hours worked and $711.29 costs incurred for the instant attorney fee application. They provide a similar summary of the duties and the hours worked by each attorney. (Reply, pg. 8, lines 6-17.)

Mr. Sanchez’s unauthorized surreply is largely a screed against Plaintiffs and their counsel. With little sense of irony, he calls Mr. Bezos “bitter, angry, confused.” Plaintiff’s indecorous submission lends further credence to Defendants’ argument that Sanchez’s litigation conduct necessitated extraordinary legal resources. Plaintiff repeats his argument that applying the Court’s percentage reduction in the previous fee motion would result in an award of no more than $51,541.95 in fees and costs in this motion. This approach lacks any legal justification. The Court disregards Plaintiff’s unauthorized submission.

Defendants bear the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonable and necessary. The Isaacson declarations helpfully categorize tasks and set forth the hours of each attorney for the category. The declarations list each lawyer’s hourly rate. It would have been far more helpful had the declarations included a calculation of each attorney’s hours multiplied by the hourly rate to yield the total fees per attorney per category.[1] The declaration is more helpful than simply the raw bills themselves, but only with both a summary of time spent by category of activity and the individual time entries can the Court efficiently perform its duties.[2]

The Court applies its knowledge of the case and a review of the appellate filings and decision, and concludes that the hourly rates claimed are reasonable, as are the hours incurred. This is not the inquiry of an auditor, but akin to a review by a knowledgeable general counsel. (See Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 642 [trial court should not “become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation”]; Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4^th 238, 254 [trial court “should try to get the ‘big picture’ of the case” (Family Law attorney fees procedure)].) For instance, one might question whether this fee motion required Mr. Isaacson to spend 9.2 hours when capable associates were handling the matter. But a senior partner accounting for 17 percent of the time and 28 percent of the fees is well within the bounds of efficient oversight of litigation.

In any case, about two-thirds of the fee request concerns not “fees on fees,” but Sanchez’s failed appeal. Defendants’ legal response was required by Plaintiff advancing a far-reaching revision of the type of evidence the Court may consider in an anti-SLAPP motion. The number of attorneys involved, and the hours each devoted, reflect a reasonable amount of time spent and a reasonable allocation of the work load, with no issues about overstaffing.

The Court concludes that Defendants’ attorneys’ fees request of $371,928.90 is reasonable.

The Court takes a different view concerning the $14,614.92 in expenses that Defendants seek. The costs sought here are not those authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. They represent less than four fpercent of the total requested. The information about them is sparse: “operating expenses, such as photocopying and computer research, which are not incorporated into Defendants’ counsel’s hourly billing rates.”

First, one would expect a showing of how this very precise figure was derived. Second, while courts may at times award fees for computer research, they have done so when specific hours and charges are provided. (See Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 290 v. Duncan (2007) 157 Cal.App.4^th 1083, 1099.) And finally, a prudent general counsel would likely assume that an hourly rate of $1,278 would have factored in a law firm’s photocopier lease and Lexis subscription. In the absence of more detailed evidence regarding these operating expenses, the Court declines to award them.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez is ordered to pay, as and for attorney’s fees, the total amount of $371,928.90. This amount shall be paid to the Paul Weiss firm within 60 days of this order. Unless the parties and counsel agree otherwise, Paul Weiss shall be responsible for disbursing the appropriate fees to co-counsel.

[1] The Court undertook this arduous task itself. Its result was some $4,900 higher than the total Defendants seek. But perhaps the Court erred. The point is that establishing the lodestar requires a total of hours expended and the hourly rate charged. The moving party is expected to show its work.

[2] What is not “indispensable” is still advisable. (Taylor v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 50 Cal.App.5^th at p. 207 [“contemporaneous time records are the best evidence of lawyers’ hourly work. They are not indispensable, but they eclipse other proofs. Lawyers know this better than anyone”].)

Department 58

Tentative Ruling: The Motions for Sanctions are denied.

On November 5, 2020, the court granted the anti-SLAPP motion of Defendants Jeffrey Preston Bezos (“Bezos”) and Gavin de Becker (collectively, “Defendants”), striking the entirety of the complaint, subsequently entering judgment in favor of the defendants, and then dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. On January 21, 2021, as the prevailing party, Defendants moved for $1,676,919.50 in attorney fees and $36,019.26 in costs. The court awarded $218,385 in fees and the full amount of requested costs.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) seeks sanctions against counsel for Defendants, William A. Isaacson (“Isaacson”), for filing purported false and defamatory statements with the court. Plaintiff asks the court to deny Defendants’ motion for attorney fees, grant Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, and refer the violations to the State Bar of California. (Motion for Sanctions, pg. 4, lines 1-5.) Plaintiff does not specify what sanctions he seeks. Plaintiff also filed a purported “supplemental” motion for sanctions.

Defendants opposed both of Plaintiff’s sanctions motions. Plaintiff filed a reply.

An attorney or unrepresented party who presents a motion to the court makes an implied certification as to its legal and factual merit, which is subject to sanctions for violation of this certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. (Murphy v. Yale Materials Handling Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 619, 623.) The Court may impose sanctions for conduct that violates any one of the requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, subdivision (b). (Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 967, 976.)

(b)¿By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all the following conditions are met:

(1)¿It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(2)¿The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

(3)¿The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically, so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4)¿The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically, so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189.) A claim is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact.” (Id.) The moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. (Id.) A claim is objectively unreasonable if “any reasonable attorney would agree that it is totally and completely without merit.” (Id.)

Separately, a judge cannot impose sanctions for an attorney's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483.)

Preliminarily, Plaintiff has not provided notice of the motion to the opposing party. A noticed motion must be given whenever the order sought may affect the opposing party's rights. (McDonald v. Severy (1936) 6 Cal.2d 629, 631.)

Without citing to evidence, Plaintiff argues that Isaacson, acting on behalf of Defendants, falsely claimed the following: (1) Plaintiff called Bezos an “evil, monstrous liar”; (2) Plaintiff admitted under oath that he betrayed his sister; (3) Plaintiff admitted that he sold private communications to a tabloid; (4) the underlying action was a baseless suit; (5) Plaintiff had no admissible evidence; and (6) Plaintiff is motivated by animosity and a desire to “extract” a valuable settlement. (Motion for Sanctions, pg. 2, lines 5-11.) Plaintiff also argues that Isaacson omitted the following: (1) Plaintiff’s confidential agreement with The National Enquirer, which prohibited the magazine from publishing any of the non-pornographic photos and texts Plaintiff used “solely to verify Mr. Bezos’ extramarital affair”; (2) that the FBI and Amazon investigators confirmed Plaintiff’s truthful statements to the press; (3) Plaintiff’s sole motive was to protect Bezos, “his mistress,” and their families. (Motion for Sanctions, pg. 2, lines 12-21.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not cited any legal authority to support his motion for sanctions. (Opposition, pg. 2, lines 4-18.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s papers are procedurally improper. (Opposition, pgs. 2-3, lines 19-28; 1-2.) Defendants further argue that even if procedurally proper, Plaintiff’s motion does not meet the standards of California Code Civil Procedure section 128.7(c). Additionally, Defendants argue that the statements are true, and that Isaacson did not omit anything. (Opposition, pgs. 3-7.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not identified any basis for in camera review. (Opposition, pg. 7, lines 7-20.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that he has never called Bezos a “monstrous liar” or ever admitted that he betrayed his sister. (Opposition, pgs. 1-2, lines 26-27;1-2.) Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s argument that he has not cited legal authority to support his motion, that his papers are procedurally improper, or that his motion does not meet the standards of California Code Civil Procedure section 128.7(c). Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ argument that he has not identified any basis for in camera review.

Plaintiff also argues that Isaacson violated the California Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 8.4(c), which covers “Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, and Reckless or Intentional Misrepresentation”; the California Code of Civil Procedure; and the Business and Professions, including Code 6106, which covers “Moral Turpitude, Dishonesty, and Corrupt Acts.” (Motion, pg. 2, lines 1-4.) In opposition, Defendants argue that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the rules of professional responsibility. (Opposition, pg. 2, lines 7-10.) The court agrees.

The Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiff’s request for sanctions because it does not know which “pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper” Plaintiff refers. As discussed above, Plaintiff identifies purported false statements, but does not state which paper they are from or even which action they are from. Plaintiffs’ purported motions, in short, lack both evidentiary support and legal basis.

As for Plaintiff’s request for in camera review, such a step is ordinarily used when a judicial decision concerns information claimed to be covered by some rule of confidentiality or privilege. (Pack v. Kings Cnty. Hum. Servs. Agency (2001) 89 Cal. App. 4th 821, 837.) Nowhere in Plaintiff’s request does he offer evidence of a need to protect such information. Plaintiff’s request for in camera review is denied.

Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and his purported supplemental motion for sanctions are denied.