Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 20STCV21895, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV21895 Hearing Date: May 8, 2025 Dept: 58
Hearing
Date: May 8, 2028
Case
Name: Flores v. Great Supplies & Services,
Inc.
Case
No.: 20STCV21895
Matter: Motion for Post-Judgment
Attorney Fees
Moving
Party: Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor Fernando Flores
Responding
Party: None
Tentative Ruling: The
Motion for Post-Judgment Attorney Fees and Costs is granted in a reduced amount.
This action arises from consumer protection
violations. The Complaint, filed on June 10, 2020, alleges Defendant Great Supplies & Services, Inc. (GSS),
which was doing business as a used-car dealership under the fictitious business
name Ayla Motors, committed numerous violations of California consumer-protection
laws in selling the subject 2016 Ford Mustang (Vehicle) to Plaintiff Fernando
Flores in October 2019.
Thereafter, Defendant GSS moved to compel
arbitration. On January 12, 2021, the Court granted the motion. In October
2022, the arbitrator issued an interim award including monetary relief in favor
of Plaintiff and against Defendant GSS; in December 2022, the arbitrator issued
a final award that included prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees. The
following month, Plaintiff filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award,
which GSS did not oppose. The Court entered judgment on February 15, 2023.
On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff/Judgment
Creditor moved to amend the judgment to add Mehdi Omrani (Omrani), Kaladar Co.,
Inc. (Kaladar), and Luxury Auto Sales, Inc. (Luxury Auto) as judgment debtors pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 187. A late opposition was filed on March
22, 2024 by GSS. The motion was granted, and an amended judgment was filed on
March 25, 2024.
Plaintiff/Judgment
Creditor now moves for attorney fees and costs in the total amount of $54,348.22.
No opposition was filed.
The motion
is granted in a reduced amount.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section
685.040 states, in part, “The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable
and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment.” Attorney’s fees incurred in
enforcing a judgment are expressly excluded unless otherwise provided by law. (Id.) “[W]hen a fee-shifting statute
provides the substantive authority for an award of attorney fees, any such fees
incurred in enforcement of the judgment are within the scope of section
685.040.” (Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602, 614.)
Discussion
Plaintiff/Judgment
Creditor now moves for attorney fees in the amount of $48,367.00 (plus an
additional $1,092.00 in attorneys’ fees to review Judgment Debtors’
opposition, drafting the reply brief, and appearing for the hearing) and costs in
the amount of $5,981.22.
I.
Hourly Rate:
In
assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on
its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the
experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation],
the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied
[citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in
the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿(569 East County
Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including]
the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in
the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case”
’ ”].)¿
Here, Judgment
Creditor’s counsel seeks Court approval of hourly rates of
$715 for Christopher P. Barry, $635 for Gregory T. Babbitt, $390 for Michelle
A. Cook, $320 for Kaden Byron, and $295 for Karla Gasca. (Mot., 1:15-19.) In failing
to oppose the motion, Judgment Debtors do not challenge the reasonableness of Judgment Creditor’s counsels’
hourly rates.
Based on the Court’s familiarity
with the current local market, and Judgment Creditor’s evidence of the
experience and skills of their attorneys, and the non-complex nature of the
litigation – the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested rates per hour must be
reduced with respect to Attorney Barry and Babbitt’s hourly rates. The Court
will reduce these rates to $600 for Christopher P. Barry and $535 for Gregory
T. Babbitt.
The new weighted blended rate for Judgment
Creditor’s attorneys is $440. The adjusted lodestar is $44,805.
II.
Number of Hours Incurred:
Judgment
Creditor also argues the number of hours incurred are reasonable. In support,
Judgment Creditor submit its attorney billing records showing 101.7 hours over
a two year period. (Barry Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)
Judgment Debtors – in failing to
oppose this motion – do not challenge the reasonableness of the number of hours
incurred for various tasks during this litigation. (Lunada
Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 [“In challenging
attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is
the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged,
with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments
that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.
Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on
appeal.”].) Further,
in reviewing the hours incurred, the Court, on its own, has determined that the
amounts do not appear excessive.
Thus, the
hours incurred are reasonable and the motion is granted with respect to the attorney’s
fees in the amount of is $44,103.[1]
With respect to the requested costs,
Judgment Debtors failure to challenge the amounts means these costs “are
allowed.” Section 685.070, subdivision (d), states that, “If no motion to tax
costs is made within the time provided ... the costs claimed in the memorandum are
allowed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (d).) In essence, “[s]ection
685.070 provides that if the judgment creditor files a memorandum of costs and
the judgment debtor does not timely file a motion to tax costs, then the court
is required to allow all of the costs claimed in the memorandum
of costs.” (David S. Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 133, 147 [italics added]; see also Briggs v. Elliott (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 683, 695 [citing Ahart, Cal. Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments
and Debts (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 6:51 [“If a timely motion to tax is not
filed by the judgment debtor, enforcement costs claimed in the judgment
creditor's Memorandum are automatically allowed and added to the
judgment.” (italics added)]].)
Conclusion
The motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in part. In sum,
the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $44,103, which is a reduction of the
lodestar amount by $4,264.
Judgment Debtors are ordered to pay
to Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor Fernando Flores’ counsel the sum of $44,805 for
attorneys’ fees and $5,981.22 in post-judgment costs.
[1] Judgment
Creditors “anticipates justifiably incurring an additional $1,092.00 in
attorneys’ fees to review Judgment Debtors’ opposition hereto, drafting the
reply brief, and appearing for the hearing.” (Mot., 7:16-18.) This amount is
already included in the Judgment Creditor’s lodestar amount. (See Ex. 1 [last
three billing entries].) Moreover, in the absence of an opposition and reply,
this amount is reduced to $390 – the cost of attending the hearing only.