Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 20STCV30383 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Department 58

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Leave to File the First Amended Complaint is granted. Plaintiffs are ordered to file their First Amended Complaint within 20 days.

This is an action under the Song-Beverly Act in which Jorge Salazar and Jocelyn Vargas (Plaintiffs) allege defects in a used, 2013 Chevrolet Cruze. The Complaint asserts breach of express and implied warranties and negligent repair against General Motors, LLC (Defendant).

Plaintiffs request leave to file their First Amended Complaint to add in allegations for breach of warranties under the Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. They indicate that the recent case of Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 (Rodriguez) may dispose of their Song-Beverly claims and seek to add in these allegations for additional recourse against Defendant.

Defendant opposes the motion for leave to amend the Complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly claims are futile and there is prejudice through delay. Plaintiffs reply and argue that that Defendants are improperly arguing the merits of the causes of action.

Given the law’s liberality in allowing amendment, the trial date being over four months away, and Defendant’s failure to show any prejudice, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint.

The court may, in furtherance of justice, allow a party to amend any pleading upon any terms as may be proper. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (a), 576.) Courts liberally grant leave to amend based on a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same case. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Thus, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment, and the delay will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is permitted. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; see also Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636, 642 [“instances justifying the court’s denial of leave to amend are rare.”].) Absent prejudice, delay alone is insufficient to deny leave to amend. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)

A party requesting leave to amend must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and added, as well as specify where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the changes are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(1)-(3).) The moving party must also attach the proposed amended pleading with a declaration by counsel, describing (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b)(1)-(4).)

Plaintiffs complied with the Rules of Court. The declaration of counsel, Otis R. Hayes III, attaches the proposed First Amended Complaint. (Hayes Decl., Ex. 1.)

Counsel avers that the First Amended Complaint would add in two additional causes of action under the Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which is necessary because of the Rodriguez holding. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs purchased a used car from an “unaffiliated, third party reseller” and “no warranties were issued at the time of sale.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 216.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the phrase “other motor vehicles sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” under the Song-Beverly Act did not apply to “previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.” (Id. at p. 225.) Thus, Rodriguez appears facially applicable in this case because Plaintiffs purchased a used vehicle. On July 13, 2022, our Supreme Court granted review of Rodriguez, stating that pending review, the Court of Appeal opinion may be cited for its persuasive value, and that the request for depublication was denied. (Rodriguez v. FCA US (July 12, 2022, S274625)[295 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 (Mem)].)

Leave to amend should be denied, however, when the proposed amendment will unfairly prejudice the defendant. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) There is prejudice if the amendment results in the loss of critical evidence, adds costs of preparation, and increases the burden of discovery. (Id. at pp. 486-488.) Thus, it is proper to deny leave to amend if the additional causes of action would change the “tenor and complexity of the complaint from its original focus.” (Id. at p. 487.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in seeking leave and that they are trying to avoid summary judgment. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs could have filed this motion sooner given that Rodriguez was decided eight months ago; however, the delay is not so substantial to justify denying leave. And even if Plaintiffs are seeking to circumvent summary judgment, Defendant does not contend that the new causes of action are not viable. (Voget v. Thrift Drug Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 184, 189 [finding that it is proper to deny leave if the new allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action].) As to discovery, Plaintiffs’ amendments do not propose to expand the scope of discovery and counsel avers that while new legal theories are pled, the facts “concern the same Subject Vehicle, same express warranties, and the same defects and/or nonconformities.” (Hayes Dec., ¶ 4.)

The case of Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 (Dagher) is instructive here. In Dagher, the plaintiff similarly alleged Song-Beverly claims, and defendant Ford moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing because the vehicle was purchased used from a private seller. (Id. at p. 912.) The plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment; one week later, he also filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to plead a new cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Id. at p. 913.) The plaintiff admitted that he did not initially allege a claim under Magnuson-Moss for strategic reasons. (Id. at pp. 927-928.) The trial court denied the request for leave to amend and granted summary judgment. (Id. at p. 914.) The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that plaintiff’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act was viable and defendant failed to show any prejudice by the delayed amendment. (Id. at pp. 928-929.)

Here, Defendant’s arguments as to prejudice are not compelling because the same discovery (and likely the same motion for summary judgment) may be used, albeit at a later date once the amended complaint is filed. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [“Even if [there was unreasonable delay], it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment”]; Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at p. 530 [“If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion”].) The Court finds that any prejudice would be minimal given that trial is still over four months away and the time for Plaintiffs to file their opposition to the motion for summary judgment has not passed.

Accordingly, the Court grants leave for plaintiff to add the causes of action for violation of the Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Plaintiffs are ordered to file their First Amended Complaint within 20 days of this hearing. The motion for summary judgment is taken off calendar.