Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 20STCV37273, Date: 2024-08-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV37273 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing
Date: August 22, 2024
Case
Name: Mendez v. Ygrene
Energy Fund Inc., et al.
Case
No.: 20STCV37273
Matter: Demurrer to Plaintiff’s
Third Amended Complaint
Moving
Party: Defendant
Ramona Rivera
Responding
Party: Plaintiff Estela Mendez
Tentative
Ruling: The Demurrer is SUSTAINED without
leave to amend.
I.
BACKGROUND
In this
employment action, Plaintiff
Estela Mendez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint on September 29, 2020, a First
Amended Complaint on April 9, 2021, and a Second Amended Complaint on February
22, 2022. Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) on April 19, 2022,
against defendants Ygrene Energy Fund Inc. (dba Ygrene, Ygrene Energy Fund
California, Ygreneworks, and Ygrene Fund California), Western Design Builders
Inc., Eduardo Rivera; County of Los Angeles, FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, First
American Loanstar Trustee, LLC; Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.; Matt Skolnik;
and Renew Financial Group LLC, alleging causes of action for (1) Actual Fraud;
(2) Conspiracy to Defraud; (3) Cancellation of Written Instrument; (4) Breach
of Fiduciary Duty; (5) Violations of Code of Civil Procedure sections
2923-2924.5; and (6) Slander of Title.
The TAC
alleges that in June 2018, Plaintiff contacted defendant Ygrene Energy Fund
Inc., through its certified solicitor, defendants Western Design Builders Inc.
and Eduardo Rivera. (TAC, ¶ 19.) Rivera went to Plaintiff’s home to assess the
services, make updates to her property, and repairs that she would be entitled
to through the PACE program. (Id. at ¶ 20.) After Rivera left
Plaintiff’s home, Plaintiff had no contact with Rivera or any other
representatives for Western Design Builders for over a year and three months. (Id.
at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff did not enter into any agreements, sign any documents, or
authorize any repairs or work to be done by Western Design Builders. (Id.
at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff attempted to contact Rivera and Western Design Builders
several times during this period but was unsuccessful. (Id. at ¶ 24.)
In July 2020, Plaintiff
received her tax assessment from the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor. (TAC, ¶
25, Exh. A.) Plaintiff became aware of fraudulent activity concerning her
property when she saw that her tax assessment showed that her property tax rate
had more than doubled due to an assessment against her home by Western Design
Builders and Ygrene Energy Fund. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was
subsequently charged and assessed a bill for payment for services that were
never rendered or agreed to by Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was
assessed for payment for replacing her home roof, but Defendants never repaired
or replaced the roof. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff contacted the Los Angeles
Department of Building and Safety, who sent an inspector to check the roof. (Id.
at ¶ 32.) The inspector confirmed that the work on the roof was never
completed. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Western Design Builders and Rivera, as
solicitors for Ygrene Energy Fund, fraudulently applied Plaintiff’s name and
electronic signature to a contract that Plaintiff never signed and only saw
when a lien was applied to her home. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff was
assessed a $122,775 bill by defendants Western Design Builders, Rivera, Ygrene
Energy Fund, and Los Angeles County for work that Plaintiff never agreed to,
and Defendants never performed. (Id. at ¶ 38, Exh. B.)
On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff
Estela Mendez filed a fictitious/ incorrect name amendment to the TAC, naming the
Estate of Eduardo Rivera, as a defendant.
On September 27, 2023, the Court
granted Ramona Rivera’s motion to quash service of summons on the estate of
Defendant Eduardo Rivera and granted leave to amend the pleadings to add Ramona
Rivera as a defendant. (9/27/23 Minute Order)
On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff Estela Mendez
filed a fictitious/ incorrect name amendment to the TAC, naming Ramona Rivera,
as surviving spouse of Eduardo Rivera, as a defendant.
On May 6, 2024, Defendant Ramona
Rivera (Defendant or Ramona) filed a Demurrer to all six causes of action
raised in the TAC concurrently with a supporting declaration, and request for
judicial notice. Plaintiff failed to
file any opposition to the demurrer.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER
Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides
for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action.
A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all
material facts properly pleaded. (Tindell
v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247.) A demurrer is treated as
“admitting all material facts properly pleaded,” but not the truth of
“contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)
The general rule on demurrer is that
the pleadings are “deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials
Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604.) Questions of plaintiff’s ability to
prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214.)
A demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as
true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how “improbable” they are. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials
Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) Allegations need not be accepted as
true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474.)
Pleadings are to be broadly
construed (Code Civ. Proc., §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the
facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant requests judicial notice
of the death certificate of Eduardo Rivera (Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) 2,
Exhibit 1). The request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (c), (h).) Mr. Rivera died on January 21, 2021.[1]
Before filing a demurrer, the
demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the
pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be
reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a).) Counsel for Defendant, H. Mark Madnick, Esq.,
met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiff on May 1, 2024, and was unable to
resolve the objections raised in the Demurrer to the TAC. (Declaration of H.
Mark Madnick, ¶¶ 3-4.)
The Court finds Defendant’s attempts
to meet and confer are sufficient for purposes of the instant motion.
Ramona Rivera, the spouse of
Defendant Eduardo Rivera (“Mr. Rivera”), demurs to Plaintiff Estela Mendez’s
Third Amended Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff’s attempt to name Mr.
Rivera’s estate in the claim by DOE amendment is improper, and that in any case,
the claims are barred by statute of limitations.
Successor-In-Interest
A cause of action against a decedent
that does not abate may be continued against the decedent’s personal
representative successor in interest, “except that the court may not permit an
action or proceeding to be continued against the personal representative unless
proof of compliance with Part 4 (commencing with Section 9000) of Division 7 of
the Probate
Code governing creditor claims is first made.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
377.41.)
Probate Code section 9370 sets forth the conditions that
must be satisfied before an action may be continued against the decedent’s
personal representative. An action or proceeding pending against the
decedent at the time of death may not be continued against the decedent’s
personal representative unless (1) a claim is first filed; (2) the claim is
rejected in whole or in part; and (3) within three months after the notice of
rejection is given, the plaintiff applies to the court for an order to substitute
the personal representative in the action or proceeding. (Prob. Code, §
9370, subd. (a).) “No recovery shall be allowed in the action against
property in the decedent's estate unless proof is made of compliance with this
section.” (Prob. Code, § 9370, subd. (b).)
Plaintiff seeks to substitute
Defendant Mr. Rivera’s spouse, Ramona Rivera, as Defendant Mr. Rivera’s
successor in interest. On September 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend pleadings to add Ramona Rivera as a defendant and to
serve with process. On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff Estela Mendez filed a
fictitious/ incorrect name amendment to the TAC, naming Ramona Rivera, as
surviving spouse of Eduardo Rivera, as a defendant. However, there is no showing that
Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Probate Code section 9370 so
that she may recover against Defendant Eduardo Rivera’s estate because no
probate was opened for Mr. Rivera, and Plaintiff never filed a motion under
Code of Civil Procedure section 377.41 to substitute Ramona Rivera as Mr.
Rivera’s successor-in interest. (Demurrer 3:2-5.)
Because Plaintiff has not moved to substitute Ramona Rivera
as the successor in interest to Eduardo Rivera, the demurrer is sustained.
Statute of
Limitations
There is a further, more serious obstacle
to Plaintiff stating a claim against Ramona Rivera. Defendant demurs to the TAC
because the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section
366.2, subdivision (a), bars the action.
Section
366.2, subdivision (a) provides that if a person against whom an action may be
brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or
otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of
the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action
may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations
period that would have been applicable does not apply. The limitations period
shall not be tolled except as provided by section 366.2(b).
Here, the
statute of limitations expired on January 21, 2022, one year after the death of
Eduardo Rivera. Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Eduardo Rivera in September
2020, and Ramona Rivera was named as a defendant in March 2024, fifteen months
after the statute of limitations expired.
This limitations
period is strictly enforced, with limited exceptions inapplicable here, even if
the result leads to arguable unfairness.
In Bradley v. Breen (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 798, the Court
of Appeal affirmed sustaining a demurrer to a claim for equitable indemnity
based on section 366.2 even though the action for equitable indemnity had not
yet accrued. The Bradley court acknowledged that in certain circumstances
creditors would not be able to bring an actin within one year of death, but
that the Legislature recognized this risk.
(Id. at p. 805.) The court reiterated that “any action against
the personal representatives . . . must be commenced before the statute
of limitations under section 366.2 has expired.” (Id. at p. 806.)
One issue in
any limitations defense is whether the relation back doctrine applies. Code of Civil Procedure Section 474 allows a named defendant
to be substituted for a fictitious defendant if, at the time of filing the
complaint, the plaintiff was genuinely unaware of the named defendant’s
identity or of facts giving rise to a cause of action against the named
defendant who was otherwise known to the plaintiff. (San Diego Navy Broadway
Complex Coalition v California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 CA5th 563, 579.) The
plaintiff’s lack of knowledge must be real and not feigned, but whether the
plaintiff’s ignorance was due to misinformation or negligence is irrelevant. (Balon
v Drost (1993) 20 CA4th 483, 488, 25 CR2d 12.) If these requirements are
met, the amendment relates back to the filing of the original petition. (General
Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) The
relation back doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff had constructive notice
of the identity of a fictitiously named defendant. (Organization Comunidad
de Alviso v City of San Jose (2021) 60 CA5th 783, 795.)
In addition, where a plaintiff is
unaware of a defendant’s death, the relation back doctrine applies to relate a
subsequent amended pleading back to the filing date of the original complaint.
(Burgos v. Tamulonis (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 757, 763.) However, the
relation back doctrine cannot be used to frustrate the intent of the
Legislature to require compliance with administrative procedures as a condition
to filing an action. (See Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App.
5th 42.)
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel was aware by November 14, 2022 that
Eduardo Rivera had died. That was when Plaintiff filed a fictitious/ incorrect name
amendment to the TAC, naming the Estate of Eduardo Rivera as a defendant. But
that was more than fifteen months before Plaintiff sought to add Ramona Rivera
as a DOE defendant. Permitting the relation-back doctrine to apply under these
circumstances would undermine the strict time limits the Legislature imposed in
Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2.
Therefore, the statute of limitations operates to bar claims
asserted against Ramona Rivera. Plaintiff has not shown any reasonable
probability that it can amend the complaint to avoid the statute of
limitations. Accordingly, the Demurrer
is sustained without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is sustained without leave to
amend. Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
[1] Ramona
mistakenly states Mr. Rivera’s date of death as January 1, 2021. (Demurrer 3: 1.)
This discrepancy does not affect the Court’s analysis.