Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 21STCV08962, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV08962    Hearing Date: October 2, 2024    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:             10/2/2024       

Case Name:                 Ronald Guritzky v. General Motors LLC

Case No.:                    21STCV08962

Motion:                       Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Moving Party:             Ronald Guritzky (Plaintiff)

This is a Song Beverly Action. On March 8, 2021, Plaintiff Ronald Guritzky (Plaintiff) filed suit against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff alleged on March 1, 2015, he entered into a warranty contract for a 2014 Chevrolet Camaro (subject vehicle), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. Plaintiff further alleged that after he received the subject vehicle it had series defects and nonconformities to the warranty including to the sensors and the engine. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Song Beverly Act, as well as for breach of the warranty.

On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

On August 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. Defendant opposes the motion. 

Evidentiary Issues

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-19 is denied.

Legal Standard

A prevailing plaintiff in a Song Beverly Act case is entitled to “recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794.) “As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d) makes clear, the trial court is ‘to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount charged.’ [Citation.] In the case of contingency fee arrangements, “a prevailing buyer ... is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his or her attorneys.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal. App. 5th 240, 247.)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “ ‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’ ” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿

A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks $36,109.29 in attorneys’ fees comprised of (i) a lodestar of $22,248.00, (ii) a multiplier of 1.35 of $7,849.80, (iii) anticipated fees for the reply and hearing on this motion of $3,500, and (iv) costs of $2,331.49.   

Attorneys’ Fees

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005; see also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322 [“ ‘starting point of every fee award … must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in terms of the time he has expended on the case.’ ”] (Press)) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)¿ “ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ ” (Id.¿at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿(Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

Here, the court has considered the declarations of Payam Shahian and Christian R. Castor submitted in support of the motion, along with the other papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion. With respect to the hours billed by counsel, the court concludes that some reduction of both hours and billing rates is warranted.

Hourly Rates

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ”].)¿

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ time records reflect hourly rates from $285 to $610. With respect to billing rates, the court reduces James Carroll, Sanam Vaziri, Ian McCallister, Olivia Avelino, and Elizabeth Larocque’s hourly rates down to $575. These individuals have extensive experience in the legal field and have all been licensed at least fifteen years. Nevertheless, the court finds that rate above $575 per hour is beyond reasonable for this region and this area of the law and thus reduces their hourly rates.

The court reduces the hourly rate for Ms. Sadanaga to $285. Plaintiff fails to include any information about Ms. Sadanaga’s background and, therefore, it reduces her rate.

The court also reduces the rate of Ms. Carvalho’s work to $525. Ms. Carvalho passed the bar in 2014. While she is now a partner, the court concludes $570 or $595 based on Ms. Carvalho’s nine years of experience is unreasonable. In so concluding, the court notes the hourly rates of Ms. Vaziri and Mr. McCallister, barred in 1995 and 1998 respectively.

The approved rates are as follows:

            Reasonableness of expenditures

Defendant argues this case suffers from excessive staffing and block billing. The Court does not find that, for a Song Beverly Act case, Plaintiff’s counsel overstaffed it. The Court’s inquiry is whether expenditures were unreasonable because they were duplicative or unnecessary. Certain entries that reflect issues arising from block billing are reduced, also discussed below. The Court makes the following adjustments to the hours for which Plaintiff seeks compensation:

Based on these adjustments the court reduces the requested loadstar of $22,248.00 to  $19,136.00., laid out as follows:

Multiplier

Plaintiff requests a 1.35 multiplier.

            Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

“ ‘The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’ ” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351, quoting Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation.” (Ibid.)

Another factor considered by a court in applying a multiplier is the “result obtained.” “The ‘results obtained’ factor can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort produced an exceptional benefit.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 582.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.)

Here, Plaintiff argues its work justifies a multiplier; the court disagrees. While counsel did obtain a good result, this case was like many of counsel’s cases. It did not present novel issues or questions of law. Nor was it of such a substantial size that it would have precluded counsel from other work. Based on the Castor declaration, the parties only engaged in written discovery and had a motions practice confined entirely to seven motions in limine. (Castro Decl., ¶¶ 21-34.) The case did not have any dispositive motions such as a demurrer or motion for summary judgment. It settled when Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s 998 offer. This case, while a contingency, did not present a greater or more severe risk than other Song Beverly Act cases in counsel’s practice.

            The Court concludes that enhancing the lodestar with a multiplier is unwarranted.

Costs and Expenses

“Prejudgment costs allowable under this chapter shall be claimed and contested in accordance with rules adopted by the Judicial Council.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1034, subd. (a).)“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk . . . The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700, subd. (a) (1) [emphasis added].)

Under the law, the court presumes a verified memorandum of costs is correct. However, a party may contest the costs that a prevailing party seeks. (Code Civ. Proc., §1034 subd. (a).) The challenging party has the burden of demonstrating that those costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486

Here, Defendant opposed the motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. Regarding procedure, Plaintiff has not provided the court, or Defendant, with any cost memorandum in connection with the motion for attorneys’ fees. The explicit language of the Rules of Court dictate that a cost memorandum is mandatory. However, under Rule 3.1700, the memorandum is not due until judgment has been entered. Accordingly, Plaintiff has the option to file a timely motion for costs, with the appropriate documentation, later. (See also Brown v. West Covina Toyota (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 555, 560 [A premature memorandum will be deemed served the day after the notice of entry of judgment is served].)

Accordingly, the request for costs is denied without prejudice.

Conclusion

Defendant General Motors, LLC is ordered to pay to Plaintiff’s attorneys, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, as and for attorneys’ fees and costs, the sum of $19,136.00., on or before October 31, 2024.