Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 21STCV20904, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV20904 Hearing Date: December 7, 2022 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing Date: December
7, 2022
Case
Name: Alexander Gnaedig
et al. v. Favorite Healthcare Staffing, Inc.
Case No.: 21STCV20904
Matter: Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
Moving Parties: Plaintiff Alexander Gnaedig
Responding Party: Unopposed
Tentative Ruling: The Court preliminarily approves the
settlement and sets a Final Approval Hearing date on a date to be determined at
the hearing.
Background
On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff Alexander
Gnaedig filed the Complaint against Defendant Favorite Healthcare Staffing,
Inc. (Favorite) under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for numerous
Labor Code violations including failure to pay overtime wages, provide
meal/rest periods, and failure to maintain accurate payroll records. On November 18, 2022, the parties stipulated
to Plaintiff filing a First Amended Complaint to add in additional individual
plaintiffs, Akimasia Walker, Amy Weston, and Janet Clifford.
The parties reached a
settlement. Plaintiffs now moves for an
order granting conditional certification of the Class, appointment of
Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, approving the proposed Notice of Class
Action Settlement and the corresponding opt-out and objection procedures, and preliminary
approval of class settlement. The motion is unopposed.
The breakdown of
the settlement is as follows:
Gross Settlement Amount: $3,650,000.00
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Fees: $1,216,666.67
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Litigation Costs: up to $40,000.00
Plaintiff’s Service Award: $10,000.00
each
Settlement Administration Costs: up to $30,000.00
PAGA Penalties: $150,000.00
Labor Workforce Development Agency (75%): $112,500.00
Aggrieved Employees (25%): $37,500.00
Net Settlement Amount:
$2,173,333.33
Discussion
Service on the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
Plaintiff’s counsel avers that he
provided notice of the proposed settlement via online submission to the Labor
Workforce Development Agency. (Genish
Decl., ¶ 45.)
Terms of the Settlement
The parties settled this action
through the “Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice” (Settlement
Agreement.) (Genish Decl., Ex. B.) The Settlement Agreement requires Defendant
to pay the total settlement amount of $3,650,000.00 (Gross Settlement Amount). Defendant is required to transmit the funds
to the Settlement Administrator no later than 15 business days after the “Effective
Date,” which is the date upon which the time for appeal of the Court’s order
granting final approval of the Settlement and entry of judgment expires. The Settlement Administrator will disburse
the amount without asking or requiring the Class Members to submit any claims. Checks will be valid for 180 calendar days; any
checks that are not cashed will be transferred to the Controller of the State
of California and held for the benefit of the Settlement Class Member and PAGA
Group Member. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
The “Released Claims” for Settlement
Class Members include “all claims for wages, statutory and civil penalties,
damages and liquidated damages, premiums, interest, restitution, injunctive
relief, fees and costs under federal and California law that were alleged in
the operative Complaints and any Amended Complaints in the Actions, and/or any
letters submitted by Plaintiffs to the LWDA against Favorite in the Actions,
and/or claims which could have been alleged that reasonably relate to or which
reasonably arise out of the same set of operative facts pled therein, whether
such claims or forms of relief are known or unknown during the Class Period,
including, but not limited to: California Labor Code §§ 200, 201, 201.3, 202,
203, 204, 210, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 222, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 246(i),
500, 510, 512, 554, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1194.3, 1197, 1197.1,
1198, 1199, 2800, 2802 and all Applicable Wage Orders and California Code of
Regulations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b), Business & Professions Code § 17200
et seq., California Civil Code § 3287(a), California Code of Civil Procedure §
1021.5, and all other statutory and regulatory violations alleged in the
operative Complaints and any Amended Complaints in the Actions, and with
respect to the statutory and civil penalties claimed in the Actions, any source
of obligation as a basis for claiming such penalties during the Class Period,
including any and all obligations released above which are imposed by the
applicable Wage Orders. The release shall be given full res judicata and
collateral estoppel effect upon entry of judgment. All Participating
Class Members who cash their Individual Class Payment checks (that will include
language to the effect that cashing the check will release their rights under
the FLSA for any claims pled or that could have been pled based on the factual
allegations pled in the Operative Complaint and any Amended Complaint in the
Actions) will also be deemed to have opted in for purposes of the FLSA, and
their Released Claims will include a release of the FLSA claims based on claims
alleged, or that could have been alleged based on the factual allegations pled
in the Operative Complaint and any Amended Complaint in the Actions. Except as set
forth in paragraph 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members (except
Plaintiffs) do not release any other claims, including claims for vested
benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’
compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Genish Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 5.2.)
As to the PAGA claims, the release
is for “all 12 claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code pursuant to PAGA
that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated
in the Operative Complaints, any Amended Complaints in the Actions, the PAGA
Notices and ascertained in the course of the Actions. The PAGA Release shall be
given full res judicata and collateral estoppel effect upon entry of the
judgment in this Action so as to bar the LWDA and any other individual or
entity from filing or pursuing the PAGA Released Claims against the Released
Parties in any forum.” (Id. at ¶ 5.3.)
The Gross Settlement Amount will
also include a $150,000.00 PAGA Payment. (Genish Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 3.2.5.) The Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA) will receive 75%, or $112,500.00, as the PAGA penalty, while 25%, or $37,500.00,
will be allocated to the PAGA Group Members.
The Settlement Administrator will calculate the individual PAGA formula
on a pro-rated basis dependent upon the aggregate number of PAGA Pay Periods
worked by each member during the PAGA Period.
Plaintiffs additionally request
payment of attorneys’ fees not to exceed 33% of the Gross Settlement Amount
(approximately $1,216,666.67) and costs not to exceed $40,000.00. (Genish Decl., ¶ 40.) In addition, the Settlement Agreement
contemplates an enhancement payment to the named Plaintiffs in the amount of
$10,000.00.[1] (Id. at ¶ 39.)
The parties request that the Court
designate ILYM Group, Inc. (ILYM) as the Settlement Administrator to administer
the settlement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 43.) Up to $30,000.00 in Settlement Administrator costs
are allowed under the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
The amount of each Class Member’s
claim is to be determined by calculating the value of each Workweek within the
Class Period (Net Settlement Amount divided by total number of Workweeks worked
by all Class Members) multiplied by each individual member’s number of
workweeks. (Id. at Ex. B, ¶ 3.2.4.) Similarly, the PAGA individual payments are
calculated by dividing $37,500.00 by the aggregate total number of PAGA Pay
Periods and multiplying that with each Individual PAGA Group Member’s total
number of PAGA Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period. (Id. at ¶ 3.2.5.1.) As to tax treatment, 20% of each payment will
be allocated to settlement of wage claims.
These amounts are subject to tax withholding and will be reported an IRS
W-2 Form. (Id. at ¶ 3.2.4.1.)
Class Certification
Plaintiffs seek conditional
certification of a class of individuals who are or were hourly-paid and/or non-exempt
employees of Defendant between January 1, 2021 and July 31, 2022.
Class certification is appropriate
when “the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or
when parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) “The
party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an
ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of
interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as
a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012)
53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021.) Trial courts
are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification, and “ ‘[a]ny
valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order.’ ” (Linder
v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435-36.)
Ascertainability
A class is ascertainable “when it is
defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts’
that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification
becomes necessary.’ [Citation.]” (Noel v. Thrifty Payless (2019) 7
Cal.5th 955, 980.)
Here, the evidence is sufficient to
establish that the proposed class is ascertainable. The Class is defined as “ ‘all hourly-paid
and/or non-exempt employees of Favorite referred to as “Temporary Healthcare Professionals”
who performed work in the State of California and were paid for one or more pay
periods during the Class Period.’ ”
(Genish Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs
contend that potential members’ identities may be determined from “Defendants’
payroll records” and the “class definition is sufficiently specific to enable
the parties, potential Class Members and the Court to determine the parameters
of the Class.” (Motion, p. 18:17-20; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8 § 11050, subd.
(7)(A).) This proposed class is
sufficiently defined “in terms of objective characteristics and common
transactional facts” to be identified, and the Court finds that the class is
ascertainable.
Numerosity
California Courts have recognized
that “[n]o set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
class action.” (Rose v. City of
Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (Rose) [surveying cases and
recognizing that classes of ten to forty-two individuals were sufficiently
numerous for a class action], disapproved on unrelated grounds in Noel v.
Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955.)
The proposed settlement class is
estimated to be 7,290 class members. (Genish
Decl. ¶ 14.) The class is sufficiently
numerous. (See Rose, supra,
126 Cal.App.3d at pp. 934-935.)
Community of Interest
“ ‘The community of interest
requirement involves three factors: “(1) predominant common questions of law or
fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class;
and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” ’ [Citation.]
Regarding the first of these factors, [the Supreme Court has] recognized
‘ “[a]s a general rule” ’ that ‘ “if the defendant’s liability can be
determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be
certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.” ’ [Citations.]
Relatedly, ‘In certifying a class action, the court must also conclude
that litigation of individual issues, including those arising from affirmative
defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently.’ [Citation.]
Finally, other considerations relevant to certification ‘include the
probability that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove his or
her separate claim to a portion of the total recovery and whether the class
approach would actually serve to deter and redress alleged wrongdoing.’ [Citation.]”
(Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 968-970.)
Here, the evidence demonstrates that
(1) the claims at issue pertain to a common wage and hour policy or practice
applicable to all class members (including denial of meal and rest periods, requirements
to perform work off-the-clock, and failure to compensate for all time actually
worked), (2) such Plaintiffs’ claims and injuries arise from the same facts and
theories as all other class members, and (3) such claims are adequately pursued
by the Class Representatives, who were injured by the same conduct. (Motion, p. 19:5-18.)
Defendant did not file an opposition
to Plaintiffs’ motion and does not challenge Plaintiff’s assertions regarding
community of interest. Thus, the court
accepts Plaintiff’s assertions and finds that a community of interest exists
among the Class members.
Whether Substantial Benefits from Certification Exist
that Render Proceeding as a Class Superior to the Alternatives
Plaintiff
argues that class action is the superior method of adjudication because Class
Members and the Court would derive “substantial benefits.” Otherwise, individual lawsuits “would unduly
burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results.” (Motion, p. 20:8-15.)
As
the Class Members allegedly were subject to and injured by a uniform
application of the same policies and procedures, the Court agrees that
proceeding as a class would be superior to the alternatives.
Therefore, the Court certifies the
subject class for the purposes of settlement.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d).)
Settlement Approval
California Rules of Court, rule 3.769 sets forth the
procedure to evaluate class actions that settle before class certification,
which generally requires court approval.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(a).)
Either party to the settlement agreement may move for preliminary
approval and must attach a proposed notice to class members and proposed
order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.769(c).) Prior to final approval of
the settlement, “the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the
proposed settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).)
In reviewing the terms of a
settlement agreement, the court determines whether the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate to all concerned, and not the product of fraud,
collusion, or overreaching. (Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337; Nordstrom Commission Cases (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 576, 581.) In the context of
a class action settlement, the court considers various factors including
whether (1) the settlement is the result of arm’s length bargaining, (2)
investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4)
the percentage of objectors is small. (Nordstrom, at p. 581; Wershba v. Apple
Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; see also Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802
[finding a presumption of fairness to exist if those four factors are met.].) In considering the
amount of settlement, the Court is mindful that compromise is inherent and
necessary in the settlement process. (Wershba, at p. 250.) The burden of establishing
the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement is on the proponent. (7-Eleven
Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135,
1165-66.)
Arm’s Length Bargaining
Plaintiffs’
counsel attests that the Settlement Agreement was achieved over a
mediation session that was conducted at
arm’s-length. (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 10,11;
Konecky Decl., ¶ 9.) According to counsel, the parties attended a formal
mediation session on April 18, 2022 with Tripper Ortman. (Genish Decl., ¶ 11.)
The
parties do not give the court any reason to believe that the settlement was not
reached through arm’s length settlement negotiations.¿¿This factor thus weighs
in favor of a presumption of fairness.
Investigation and Discovery Sufficient to Allow
Counsel and the Courts to Act intelligently
Mr.
Genish attests that the parties engaged in informal discovery and investigation
at the outset of the case and as a condition of mediation. (Genish Decl., ¶ 10.) He attests that
Defendants produced relevant
information through discovery, including the “start date of its operations in
California, the total number of Temporary Health Professionals (“THP”) employed
during the relevant time period, total number of locations where THPs were
placed in California, and number of meal and rest period premiums paid.
Defendant also provided excerpts from employee handbooks. Plaintiffs also
obtained time and payroll data for Plaintiffs and a sample of the putative
class, along with key data points including the class size and composition, the
number of total workweeks worked, the number of locations, average rate of pay,
and the number of terminated employees.”
(Ibid.) The information
was used to inform “intensive settlement negotiations” wherein each party
debated the strengths and weaknesses of the claims. (Id. at ¶ 11.) This factor weighs in favor of
fairness.¿¿¿
The Experience of Counsel
Jonathan
M. Genish, Hali M. Anderson, Joshua Konecky, and Ashkan Shakouri attest to
their experience in class actions and labor and employment cases. This factor weighs in favor of a presumption
of fairness.
Mr. Genish
attests that he has been practicing law since 2008. (Genish Decl., ¶ 3.) In 2018, he started his labor and employment
law firm, which works on almost exclusively labor and employment class lawsuits,
with 15% dedicated to other complex general litigation. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Mr. Genish attests that he is the managing
partner of approximately 100 labor cases, 80% of which involve a wage-and-hour
component. He provides numerous examples
of class actions in which he held principal responsibility and that are ongoing
or have successfully resolved. (Id. at
¶¶ 7-8.)
Ms.
Anderson attests that that she has practiced employment law almost exclusively
since her admission to the State Bar of California in 2008. (Anderson Decl., ¶ 4.) Since September 2018, she has represented
employees. She also provides a
substantial list of cases in which she has served as plaintiff’s counsel or
class counsel. (Id. at ¶¶
6-7.) In addition, she avers to the
qualifications of other attorneys in her firm.
(Id. at ¶¶ 8-12.)
Mr.
Konecky has practiced employment, civil rights, and consumer law since
1997. (Konecky Decl., ¶ 5.) He has successfully litigated numerous class
actions. (Konecky Decl., Ex. 1.)
Finally, Mr. Shakouri also attests
to practicing employment law for over 15 years and complex employment
litigation for over 13 years. (Shakouri
Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) He has prosecuted and
successfully resolved at least five wage-and-hour class actions. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
Percentage of the Objectors
The
percentage of objectors cannot be determined¿at this time, and this factor¿does
not weigh in favor or against a presumption of fairness.¿¿¿
Best Interests of the Class
Even if a presumption of fairness
exists, the court still must “ ‘independently and objectively analyze the
evidence and circumstances before it in order to determine whether the settlement
is in the best interest of those whose claims will be extinguished.’ ” (Kullar
v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130.) “The well-recognized factors that the trial
court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action
settlement agreement include ‘the strength of¿plaintiffs’ case, the risk,
expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of
maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings,
the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.” [Citation.] This list “ ‘is not exhaustive and should be
tailored to each case.’ ” (Id. at
p. 129.)
Plaintiffs’
counsel avers that the settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the
interest of the parties. (Genish Decl., ¶ 33.)
Notably, counsel’s declaration discusses the strengths, weaknesses, and
risks of ongoing litigation. (Id.
at ¶ 25-34.) For example, he raises a
significant risk in obtaining class certification given that Defendant believes
that the individual issues would predominate.
(Id. at ¶ 77.) This risk
is exacerbated by what counsel believes are recent trends in courts’ reluctance
in certifying meal period claims. (Id.
at ¶ 28.) He expresses similar
concerns as to the rest period, minimum wage/overtime, and business expenses
claims. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.) Finally, Mr. Genish concedes that even if
class certification is obtained, it would be expensive and time-consuming to
prove the amount of wages due to Class Members.
This would require analysis of thousands of documents, contacting the members,
and obtaining declarations. (Id. at
¶ 32.) Further, Plaintiff concedes that
many employees reside out-of-state and only traveled to California for
short-term job assignments. (Ibid.)
As to
potential exposure, Plaintiff’s counsel attests that the maximum potential
liability of Defendants is $49,019,493.00.
(Genish Decl., ¶ 24.) This is
broken down into $8,076,974.00 for meal period violations (25% violation rate),
$8,076,974.00 for rest period violations (25% violation rate), $25,240,545.00
for unpaid wages (at 2 hours off-the-clock overtime per week), $3,645,000.00
for unpaid reimbursable business expenses (at $500 per employee), and
$3,980,000.00 for wage statement penalties.
The estimated PAGA penalty exposure was $7,316,100.00 for 73,161
aggregate workweeks at $100 per violation.
Factoring
in the risks to that maximum liability, Mr. Genish discounted the figure by 50%
to account for the possibility of not obtaining class certification. Counsel also discounted the figure by 40% independently
based on the potential merits of the defense, resulting in an adjusted
estimated liability of $4,901,949.30.
(Genish Decl., ¶ 35.) The gross
settlement amount represents approximately 75% of the adjusted estimated
liability and results in an estimated average payout of $298.13 per Class
Member. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
As to the PAGA claim, counsel considered the risk of success
on the merits, and the risk of discretionary reduction of penalties by the
Court based on any good faith arguments by Defendant as to compliance with its
legal obligations. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Counsel avers that the $150,000.00 allocation
represents 4.2% of the Gross Settlement Amount and is within the range of such
settlements in state and federal cases that involve both a class action and
PAGA claim. (Id. at ¶ 36.)
The Court concludes that the
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
(Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail,
Inc., supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The Court grants
preliminary approval as to the class action settlement, including the
allocation of PAGA penalties.
Reasonableness of Additional Terms
Attorney Fees and Costs
The
Settlement Agreement authorizes an award of attorney fees to Class Counsel of
not more than 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, or approximately $1,216,666.67,
and actual costs not to exceed $40,000.00. (Genish Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 3.2.2.)
The
one-third fee award is reasonable and consistent with fee awards in class
action cases.¿ (See¿Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.¿(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43,
66, fn. 11.) Counsel indicates that he
will submit further details on the legal services provided, hourly rate, and
time incurred in the Motion for Final Approval.
(Genish Decl., ¶ 42.)
Class Representatives and Enhancement Payments
Incentive payments are based on the
expense and risk undertaken by named plaintiffs for the benefit of other class
members. (Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.)
In evaluating whether an incentive award is warranted,
courts consider factors such as “ ‘the actions the plaintiff has taken to
protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has
benefitted from those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
expended in pursuing the litigation’ ” as well as the risk to a class
representative, notoriety and personal difficulties, duration of litigation,
and personal benefit. (Clark v.
American Residential Services (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-807.)
The Settlement Agreement allows for
an enhancement award to the named Plaintiffs that is included in the Gross
Settlement Amount. (Genish Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 3.2.1.) Plaintiffs indicate
that they have regularly conferred with their attorneys, providing documents,
reviewing documents, providing information about the duties of other non-exempt
employees, helping develop a strategy as to what documents and information to
obtain from Defendant, and contacting potential witnesses. (Gnaedig Decl., ¶ 4-5; Clifford Decl., ¶ 11,
16; Weston Decl., ¶¶ 12-13; Walker Decl., ¶¶ 16-18.)
Here, the Plaintiffs attest to the unique risks posed by being
a named party. For example, Plaintiff
Walker attests that she would be responsible for Defendant’s litigation costs
if the lawsuits were unsuccessful and that her name would appear through the
internet if prospective employers conducted a search. (Walker Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.) Finally, Plaintiffs Walker and Gnaedig agreed
to a general release of their claims, which is broader than the release for
other Class Members. (Id. at ¶
30; Gnaedig Decl., ¶ 9.)
The court finds that the proposed
enhancement payment is reasonable based on the declarations from all four named
Plaintiffs.¿
Notice Procedures
“The notice given should have a
reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members”
who do not search for such litigation. (Cartt
v. Superior Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974.) If the court grants
preliminary approval of the settlement, it sets a final approval hearing and
provides for notice to be given to the class. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.769(e).) “The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement
and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it
and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections
to the proposed settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f).) The trial court “ ‘
“has virtually complete discretion as to the manner of giving notice to class
members.” [Citation.]’ ” (Cellphone Fee Termination Cases
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1390.)
Plaintiffs attached a copy of the
proposed “Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for
Final Court Approval” as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement. The Court has
reviewed the proposed notice and finds that it will provide sufficient notice
to the Class Members of the class action and their rights to request exclusion
of the settlement, object to the settlement, and/or dispute the number of
credited workweeks. The proposed notice contains sufficient information to
inform Class Members of this litigation, the Final Approval Hearing, the nature
of the lawsuit and the claims at issue, the proposed settlement terms, distribution
formulas, calculations, and released claims.
Furthermore, the notice informs the Class Members how to participate in
the settlement (do nothing), how to opt-out of the settlement, how to object, and
the date of the final approval hearing, and an estimate of the individual
settlement payment.¿ (Genish Decl., Ex. B, Ex. A.)
Settlement
Administrator Fees
The parties request court approval
to appoint ILYM as the Settlement Administrator and up to $30,000.00 for
administration costs. Given that ILYM
will be responsible for distributing settlement payments for Class Members and
PAGA Group Members, the Court finds that the requested amount of $30,000.00 is
reasonable.
Conclusion
[1] Mr. Genish’s declaration indicates that only Plaintiff
Alexander Gnaedig will receive the $10,000.00 enhancement award. But the calculation for the Net Settlement
Amount (and filed declarations of the named Plaintiffs) appears to contemplate
$10,000.00 awards to the three added Plaintiffs as well: Akimasia
Walker, Amy Weston, and Janet Clifford.