Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 21STCV22240, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV22240    Hearing Date: May 9, 2023    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:              May 9, 2023

Case Name:                 Luis Licea v. Laugh Factory, Inc.

Case No.:                    21STCV22240

Motion:                       Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Luis Licea

Responding Party:      Defendant Laugh Factory, Inc.

Background

Plaintiff Luis Licea (“Plaintiff”) moves for $50,640.00 in attorney fees and $3,431.65 in costs after the Court granted his motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2022, against Defendant Laugh Factory, Inc. (“Defendant”), awarding him $4,000 in statutory damages and issuing an injunctive relief order that Defendant’s website comply with accessibility requirements. On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff moved for attorney fees and costs. Defendant opposed.

The Court makes necessary adjustments to the fee request because of inadequate documentation, and  grants Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $24,581.65.

Legal Standard

Under the Unruh Act, the plaintiff can recover attorney's fees if he or she prevails, but the defendant cannot. (Civ. Code, § 52(a).) Both California's Unruh Civil Rights Act and the ADA authorize a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. (Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp. (2014) 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1016).) The attorney claiming fees has the burden of producing evidence to support the fee claim. (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 433.)

To assess the fees and costs, the trial court begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure based on the compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney who worked on the case. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132.) The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id. at p. 1134; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) The court may increase or decrease the lodestar figure depending on a variety of factors, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum, at p. 1132.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. (Id.)

For that purpose, the court may require a party to produce records to provide a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims. The court also may reduce compensation because the attorney did not maintain appropriate time records. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.) The party that seeks payment must “keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed.”  (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 441 (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.).)  The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Contemporaneous time records in support of an attorney fee motion are often the most useful evidence, but are not indispensable.  A detailed declaration describing the legal work done is acceptable.  (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4^th 1084, 1095, n. 4 [fee claim based on detailed reconstructed records upheld; noting that contemporaneous records facilitate accuracy]; Taylor v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5^th 205, 207 [contemporaneous time records are the best evidence of lawyer’s hourly work; they are “not indispensable”]; People v. Kelly (2020) 59 Cal.App.5^th 1172, 1182 [“no legal requirement that an attorney supply billing statements to support a claim for attorney fees”; attorney declarations acceptable].)  Block billing is not impermissible per se. (Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4^th 1315, 1325.) Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1011.)  

“Padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, the opposing party must point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 [“General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice”].)

Parties’ Contentions

Moving Party

As evidence, Plaintiff summarizes the hours expended for each action: (1) client communications; (2) research and investigation; (3) motion work/drafting/filing; (4) court appearances; (5) expert time; (6) discovery; (7) communications with opposing counsel; (8) internal attorney strategy. (Decl. Knowles ¶ 10, Ex. C.) In summarizing, Plaintiff’s descriptions are vague. (Ibid.) For example, for client communications, Plaintiff seems to only identify the topics of communication without stating if the communication occurred in-person or by email or telephone. (Ibid.) In addition, Plaintiff does not always identify the duty, the amount of time expended on each duty or who performed the duties. (Ibid.) For example, for motion work/drafting/filing, Plaintiff merely identifies each motion, e.g. motion for summary judgment, without stating what was done or the amount of time expended for it. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues that the number of hours expended is reasonable because of the constant changes in website accessibility law. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg. 6, lines 23-24.)

Plaintiff argues that that the rates are reasonable because they are comparable to other rates for the same or similar work in Southern California and the greater Los Angeles area. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg.8, lines 1-2.) In support, Plaintiff submits 2014 billing rates from the National Law Journal. (Decl. Knowles ¶ 12, Ex. D.) Plaintiff also argues that they are also reasonable because they were contingent. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg.8, lines 3-5.) Further, the decision has “far-reaching effects” on website accessibility. (Notice of Motion and Motion, p. 8, lines 5-6.)

Plaintiff seeks costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1032. He submitted a memorandum of costs that identifies the amount spent for each item: (1) filing and motion fees; (2) deposition costs; and (3) service of process. (Notice of Motion and Motion, pg. 10, lines 4-9.)

Opposing Party

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met his burden because he has not provided time records and only a general summary of tasks. (Opposition, pg. 3, lines 15-16.) Further, the total time claimed is excessive. Defendant argues that the simplicity of this case does not require 4.3 hours on client communications. (Opposition, pg. 3, lines 22-24.) Defendant also argues that the amount spent on motion-related work is too high because some of it was avoidable, i.e., the motion to vacate, and Plaintiff’s counsel uses pleading and discovery templates, only having to change the facts, which do not vary a great degree from one case to the next. (Opposition, pgs. 3-4, lines 25-28; 1-7.)

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates are excessive because of the simplicity of the case and the minimal damages awarded. (Opposition, pg. 4, lines 16-17.)

Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s request for costs.

Discussion

            Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonable and necessary.  The summary part of the Knowles declaration does not adequately explain what was done for each action nor by whom. (Decl. Knowles ¶ 10, Ex. C.) In some instances, it is unintelligible. The largest category, motion drafting and filing, in the amount of $43.650.00, does not identify the time expended for each of the eleven items, some of which are not motions, nor who did what. (Ibid.) As another example, the discovery category is vague. (Ibid.) It does not identify the type of written discovery drafted. The Court also cannot deduce whether a deposition occurred or whether the parties merely prepared for one. (Ibid.)  Only with both a summary of time spent by category of activity and the individual time entries can the Court efficiently perform its duties.[1] The records submitted by Plaintiff fail to yield a reliable lodestar amount.

Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that the fees claimed were reasonable and necessary. The declaration fails to describe in sufficient detail the work that is compensable and at what rate.  The block billing and lack of adequate descriptions of what work was done, how much time was spent, and by whom, make the records deficient.  Moreover, the Court concludes that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff are excessive.  This case was not complex and did not require particular skill. The subject matter is in a narrow area of law.  As shown by the boilerplate complaint and template discovery, the litigation business model calls for high volume. 

The Court concludes that the following hours and rates represent a reasonable level of time and compensation for this case.

Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees in the amont of $21,150.

In addition, the Court approves the cost request of $3,431.65. (Code Civ. Pro., § 1033.5)   

Conclusion 

            Defendant Laugh Factor Inc. is ordered to pay, as and for attorney’s fees, the total amount of $24,581.65  This amount shall be paid to the Pacific Trial Lawyers within 45 days of this order.