Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 21STCV43632, Date: 2023-12-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV43632 Hearing Date: January 4, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing
Date: January 4, 2024
Case
Name: Masihi v. Prexa
Sant’e LLC
Case
No.: 21STCV43632
Matter: Default Judgment
prove-up
Moving
Party: Plaintiff Aida
Masihi
Responding
Party: Unopposed
Tentative Ruling: The request for default judgment is granted
in a reduced amount upon the dismissal of the remaining Defendants.
This
is an action arising from a breach of a loan agreement. Plaintiff Aida
Shahbandeh Masihi (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendants solicited a $400,000 loan
from Plaintiff, representing that the funds would be used to develop a “proven
cure” for Coronavirus/COVID-19 and that the loan would be repaid with interest
(for a total $500,000) by a due date of April 1, 2021. Defendants never
provided written loan documents and never repaid any of the funds, despite
repeated promises.
On
November 30, 2021, a Complaint was filed against Defendants Prexa Santé LLC,
Infusion Pharmacy Network LLC, Integrative Wellness Network LLC, Stem Cell
Therapeutics LA LLC, Robbin Messier, Matthew A. Bennett, and Christine Collins
(Defendants). After filing a demurrer (which the Court overruled), Defendants Prexa
Santé LLC, Infusion Pharmacy Network LLC, Integrative Wellness Network LLC,
Stem Cell Therapeutics LA LLC (collectively, Companies), Robbin Messier,
Matthew A. Bennett, Christine Collins filed an answer. Plaintiff then filed a
motion to strike the answer of Stem Cell Therapeutics LA LLC. On April 27, 2023,
the Court entered an order striking the Answer as to all Companies and entering
their defaults.
On
July 18, 2023, the Court entered Judgment against Defendants Companies, in the
amount of $500,000, jointly and severally.[1]
On
July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a FAC. The Court
granted the motion. On August 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a FAC alleging claims
for (1) breach of oral contract; (2) account stated; (3) open book account; (4)
fraud and deceit, and (5.) money had and received. On October 2, 2023, default
was entered as to Matthew A Bennet, MD and Robin Messier.
Plaintiff
moved for default judgment against Defendants Matthew A Bennet, MD and Robin
Messier. Defendant Christine Collins, MD had been dismissed. The request for
entry of default judgment was denied.
Plaintiff
again moves for entry of default judgment against Defendants Matthew A Bennet,
MD and Robin Messier.
Discussion
Plaintiff
seeks default judgment in the amount of $1,520,323.71 against Defendants
Matthew A Bennet, MD and Robin Messier.
Here, the FAC only
seeks damages in an amount “not less than $400,000.” (FAC, Prayer.) As such,
the amount of damages Plaintiff can recover is limited to $400,000. (See Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 533–536; Traci
& Marx Co. v. Legal Options, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 155, 160 [“in
a default proceeding in California, a prayer for relief ‘in excess of’ a
specified dollar amount will result in an award of ‘no more than’ that dollar
amount”].)
Moreover, included
in the default judgment request is Plaintiff’s request for an award of punitive
damages against Defendants Messier and Bennett in the amount of $1,000,000
arising from their allegedly fraudulent conduct.
On this attempt at
entry of default judgment, Plaintiff submits evidence that a statement of
damages was served on Defendants. However, the statement of damages was served
electronically on Defendants’ counsel. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11
provides that a statement of damages, when required, “shall be served in the
same manner as a summons.” As such, service of this statement of damages was
improper.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s
evidence is inadequate to show clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice or oppression, as required pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.
(Masihi Decl., ¶¶ -13.) In fact, the evidence shows nothing more than – at most
– a breach of contract. (Masihi Decl., ¶¶ 8-11, Ex. 2-4.)[2]
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover on its request for special damages.
Nonetheless,
Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment against Defendants Matthew A Bennet,
MD and Robin Messier in the amount of $400,000. Additionally, Plaintiff has
substantiated her request for prejudgment interest at 10% starting on April 1,
2021. (Eanet Decl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff is also entitled to costs in the amount of
$12,049.74. (Eanet Decl., ¶ 14.)
However,
the FAC purports to state claims against Defendants Prexa Sant'e LLC, Infusion
Pharmacy Network LLC, Integrative Wellness Network L.L.C. and Stem Cell
Therapeutics LA LLC despite the entry of default judgment as to these Defendants
in July 2023. At minimum, these Defendants must be dismissed from the FAC. Plaintiff
still has not dismissed these parties.
Further, an entry
of default judgment in the amount requested as to Matthew A Bennet, MD and
Robin Messier might allow Plaintiff to obtain a double recovery on these two
separate judgments. While Plaintiff argues alter ego between all the parties, Plaintiff
does not provide adequate evidence to support this theory of liability.
It is well established that, regardless of the nature or number of legal
theories advanced by a plaintiff, “[plaintiff] is not entitled to more than a
single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the
evidence. (Shell v. Schmidt (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 291.) Double or
duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and
is therefore prohibited. (Ibid.)” (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993)
4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158–1159.)
Here, the
FAC makes clear there was a single injury flowing from the breach of the loan
agreement as to all Defendants.[3]
To prevent
a double recovery here, “equity demands credit be given for payments received
on the judgment. Such a balance acts as an offset against the judgment. ‘At
common law, a setoff is based upon the equitable principle that parties to a
transaction involving mutual debts and credits can strike a balance between
them.’ ... The right of offset rests upon the inherent power of the court to do
justice to parties appearing before it. [Citations.]” (Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 740, 753.)
While admittedly
it is unlikely that Plaintiff has recovered any portion of her judgment from
Defendant Companies at this time, an order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 724.110 directing a plaintiff to execute and deliver a partial
satisfaction of judgment “is the appropriate means by which a codebtor on a
judgment may be credited with money received by the plaintiff in offset against
the judgment.” (Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.)
Further, the Court
should include language in each judgment that states to the effect: “To prevent
a double recovery, damages awarded pursuant to this judgment will not
be recoverable to the extent that such damages are recovered and collected
under the other judgment entered in this action on July 18, 2023 against
Defendants Prexa Sant’e LLC, Infusion Pharmacy Network LLC, Integrative
Wellness Network L.L.C. and Stem Cell Therapeutics LA LLC.”
Thus, judgment is
entered in the total, reduced amount of $520,323.71 upon the filing of a dismissal
of the remaining Defendants and a judgment is entered in accordance with this order.
[1] Generally, multiple
judgment in a single case should be avoided. “[A]s a general rule there can be
only one final judgment in a single action.” (Nicholson v. Henderson
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 375, 378.) “A final, ordinarily single, judgment is a
prerequisite to appealing from an action, its purpose to avoid piecemeal
appeals.” (Cuevas v. Truline Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 56, 60 [citing
9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 58, p. 113]; see also Kinsmith Financial Corp. v. Gilroy (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 447, 451 [“The one final judgment rule is a principle of appellate
practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal until final
resolution of the case.’”].)
[2] Interestingly, Plaintiff’s
own evidence repeatedly refer to the $400,000 as an “investment” not a loan.
[3] A judgment for damages
arising from the fraud would not be jointly and severally liable as to
Defendant Companies and would not be part of this double recovery analysis.
However, as noted above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any fraud damages and
has not proceeded in the manner required to recover punitive damages arising
from fraud.