Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 21STCV46745, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Attorney’s Fees is granted in part for a total of $20,599.50 in attorney fees. The request for costs is granted in the amount of $2,505.33.

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties settled this Song-Beverly matter except as to those issues.

This is an action under the Song-Beverly Act in which Miriam Lozano Juarez (Plaintiff) alleged defects in a 2019 Honda Accord (Vehicle). Plaintiff sued American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant or Honda) for breach of express and implied warranties.

Plaintiffs argue that, as the prevailing party, they are entitled to fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). They seek lodestar attorneys’ fees of $26,439.50, plus a 1.5 multiplier -- in the amount of $13,219.75 -- and costs of $2,505.33. The total requested in attorney fees and costs is $42,164.58.

Defendant Honda filed an opposition arguing the amounts requested in fees and costs are excessive and unreasonable.

The Court grants the motion for attorneys’ fees in a reduced amount. The request for costs is granted.

Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Attorney Kirnos are ruled as follows: Nos. 1-13, 15-16 are overruled, No. 14 is sustained.

Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s evidence are ruled as follows: Nos. 1-2 are overruled.

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “ ‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’ ” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿

A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Plaintiff seeks $26,439.50 in attorneys’ fees for Knight Law Group, LLP (Knight Law), plus a 1.5 multiplier enhancement, and costs of $2,505.33, for a total $42,164.58.

Defendant Honda does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party under the settlement agreement. Instead, Defendant argues the that hours incurred to litigate this routine, non-complex case that settled before trial is unreasonable. Defendant Honda argues that fees should be reduced to a total of $10,594.50, which represents a reasonable number of hours incurred based on the purported experience level of Plaintiff’s attorneys and the nature of the litigation. Defendant Honda also argues the amount requested in costs should be taxed to $1,540.58.

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)¿ “ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ ” (Id.¿at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿(Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

Defendant Honda first contends that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates are unreasonable.

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ”].)¿

In challenging the hourly rates, Defendant primarily challenges the foundation for Attorney Kirnos’s declaration, which purports to substantiate both the billing records and the attorneys’ hourly rates underlying the billing records. (Opp., 7:22-27.) As a basis for challenging the declaration, Defendant notes that Attorney Kirnos only incurred approximately one hour in this matter, suggesting he had limited personal knowledge of this litigation. As noted in the evidentiary objections above, Defendant’s objections are not well taken; the declaration is almost entirely admissible.

Defendant’s remaining argument as to why the hourly rates are unreasonable is unpersuasive. Defendant relies on Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 – where the Court of Appeal upheld a trial court’s reduction of a firm’s hourly rate to $350. While Mikhaeilpoor does suggest that the nature and complexity of the litigation informs the decision of what fees are reasonable (Id. at p. 255), the case does not hold that the rates requested in this case are unreasonable. That is, under the applicable standard of review, the court of appeal only found that the trial court’s decision to reduce the hourly rate was not “clearly wrong.” (Id. at p. 246.) Thus, Mikhaeilpoor is of limited help to Defendant.

Also, Defendant cites no legal authority suggesting that the extensiveness of the litigation (or lack thereof) provides guidance on the reasonableness of the hourly rate. (Opp., 8:16-9:9.) For example, that there was only one deposition does not indicate that Plaintiff’s counsels’ hourly rates should be reduced. It only bears on the reasonableness of the number of hours incurred.

Here, a review of the Kirnos Declaration in support of the motion for attorney’s fees – which contains a description of each attorneys’ education and experience – supports finding Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates ranging from $200 to $550 were reasonable; the rates are supported by substantial evidence under the present circumstances. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶ 19-30.)

Based on the Court's familiarity with the current local market, and Plaintiff’s evidence of the experience and skills of the various attorneys – the Court finds that Plaintiff's requested rates per hour are reasonable.

Defendant Honda also challenges the hours incurred, arguing that the amounts sought by Plaintiff are the result of overstaffing, overbilling, vague entire, and billing for administrative tasks.

Honda’s opposition challenges several specific entries. (Jackson Decl., Ex. A.)

Duplicative Billing: Defendant contends that, as result of overstaffing, Plaintiff billed for duplicative entries of the same task. However, Defendant’s assertion of duplicative billing appears overstated as Defendant has only identified a handful of entries as duplicative and the amounts at issue for these entries are minimal. Moreover, in reviewing these entries, many of the tasks are not duplicative and, thus, only $100 reduction is warranted.

Vague Billing: Defendant Honda also argues that numerous billing entries are vague, “making it impossible to gauge whether certain efforts were reasonable towards the conduct of the litigation.” (Opp., 3:1-2.)

Vague entries obscure a court’s ability to assess the reasonableness of a fee request, justifying a reduction of the fees. (See e.g., Maughan v. Google Technology (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251 [affirming trial court’s reduction of fees and costs from $112,288 to $23,000, in part because the time sheets submitted were “somewhat vague in their descriptions of what precisely defense counsel was doing for the claimed amount of time”].)

To be sure, there are a number of billing entries that would benefit from greater detail in the description. But the billing entries are not so vague as to preclude determination of its reasonableness. That is, the Court can generally understand the nature of the work described in the context of the litigation. Counsel “is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended” but “should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12; see also Acevedo v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 14-5661-GHK (PJWx), 2016 WL 11525321, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016) [“An entry is not considered too vague if it identifies the general subject matter of time expenditures.”].)

Excessive Billing: Defendant also argues that that the total hours claimed in this case is 71.5 hours, but “there was one deposition, no vehicle inspection, no expert discovery, no trial motions or trial preparation, and no trial.” (Opp., 10:26-27.) Of note, Plaintiff seeks numerous hours for time incurred on propounding and responding to discovery. Given Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience in this type of litigation and the simple lemon law issues at matter here, the Court agrees that the time incurred on such tasks were excessive and unreasonable uner the circumstances. For similar reasons, the time incurred on drafting this simple motion for attorney fees must also be reduced. The Court will reduce fees by $5,500.

Administrative Billing: Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s attorneys billed for administrative tasks at attorney rates. In support, Defendant identifies numerous entries where attorneys billed for reviewing emails to coordinate various scheduling issues. The Court will reduce the fees by $240 to account for an attorney hourly rate used on these administrative tasks.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks a 1.5 lodestar multiplier based on the risk of taking on the case on contingency and the substantial delay in payment of attorney fees.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Although this matter was taken on contingency (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 9), none of the other factors support the application of a multiplier. This was a garden variety Song-Beverly case; there were no novel or difficult questions presented. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.) Further, the¿contingent risks, skill, and difficulty¿Plaintiff’s attorneys¿assert are absorbed by¿their¿already high (albeit reasonable) hourly rates. (See¿Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California. Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

	Reductions	Total
Original Lodestar Amount		26,439.50
Duplicative Billing	$100
Excessive Billing	$5,500
Administrative Billing	$240

Reduced Lodestar Amount	$5,840	$20,599.50

The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the sum of $20,599.50.

Defendant Honda also challenges Plaintiff’s claimed costs of $2,505.33 – specifically, Plaintiff’s request for $529.75 for preparing for and taking a Notice of Non-Appearance of Defendant’s PMQ witness on November 22, 2022.

Defendant argues that this cost was unreasonably incurred because Defendant had timely and properly objected to the notice of deposition. Thus, the incurred cost was entirely Plaintiff’s own doing.

In response, Plaintiff argues that the cost for the statement of non-appearance for the PMQ deposition was reasonably incurred because Defendant Honda had failed to provide a date certain for this deposition to occur.

An objection to a notice of deposition does not necessarily render a subsequent non-appearance cost unreasonable. Plaintiff provides an adequate explanation for its need to proceed with the non-appearance where this step would be required for Plaintiff to seek court intervention to compel a deposition if it proved necessary. Thus, this cost is not unreasonable or unnecessary.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request to tax costs, and grants the costs requested by Plaintiff.

The motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in part. In sum, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $20,599.50, which is a reduction of the lodestar amount by $5,840. The request for costs is granted in the amount of $2,505.33.

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is ordered to pay to Plaintiff’s counsel the sum of $23,104.83 ($20,599.50+ 2,505.33) for attorneys’ fees and costs. This amount shall be paid on or before February 2, 2024.

Department 58