Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 22STCV10686, Date: 2025-01-14 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Attorney Fees is granted in the reduced amount of $25,865.

This is a Song-Beverly action. The parties settled this Song-Beverly matter except as to the issues of attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Defendant filed an opposition, arguing the amounts requested in fees is excessive and unreasonable.[1]

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “ ‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’ ” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿

A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Plaintiffs seek $45,762.50 in attorneys’ fees for the Law Offices of Issac Kohen, plus a 1.1 multiplier enhancement, for a total of $50,338.75.

In opposition, Defendant GM argues that the Court should reduce fees by $31,284.75, limiting the attorney fees to the amount of $19,054.

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)¿ “ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ ” (Id.¿at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿(Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ”].)¿

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks Court approval of hourly rates of $525 for Attorney Kohen and $325 for Attorney Imber. (Mot., 1:15-19.) Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly rates.

Based on the Court’s familiarity with the current local market, and Plaintiffs’ evidence of the experience and skills of both of their attorneys, and the non-complex nature of the litigation – the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested rates per hour are reasonable.

Defendant GM, however, challenges the reasonableness of the number of hours incurred for various tasks during this litigation.

Clerical or Secretarial Tasks: Defendant first challenges the billing entries that involved purely clerical or secretarial tasks, but were billed at a lawyer hourly rate; Defendants argue that the hours must be reduced because it was improper to charge an attorney hourly rate for these tasks, citing Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10. (See also Duarte v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (C.D. Cal., Sept. 29, 2016, No. 8:15-CV-594-JLS-RNBX) 2016 WL 11505593, at *4 [“Hours spent on clerical tasks are not recoverable as attorneys’ fees.”]; Nadarajah v. Holder (9th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3d 906, 921 [“When clerical tasks are billed at hourly rates, the court should reduce the hours requested to account for the billing errors.”]; Davis v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 opinion vacated in part on denial of reh'g [“It simply is not reasonable for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly rate, for tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could perform at a much lower cost.”].) Specifically, Defendant identifies 1.4 hours expended on clerical tasks. The Court finds that the cited entries are not “purely” clerical tasks and cannot be struck completely. However, given Attorney Kohen’s expertise – the amount of time billed for these tasks must be reduced by 1 hour ($525).

Drafting the Complaint: Defendant challenges the 1.3 hours Attorney Kohen billed to “Draft complaint,” (Kohen Decl. Ex. 1, p. 1.) Defendant argues this amount is unreasonable because the Complaint in this case is the same form document that Attorney Kohen has used in his other cases against GM. (Keshishian Decl. ¶ 2, Exs. A-B.) Consequently, GM requests that .8 hours ($420) in fees be stricken. The Court agrees for the reasons stated.

Fees Related to Expert Vehicle Inspection and other matters: Defendant also challenges 5.8 hours incurred related to the vehicle inspection of Plaintiff’s vehicle, review Plaintiff’s expert report, and unspecific communication with the client. Defendant contends the inspection was “unnecessary.” The Court will reduce these fees by 5 hours ($2,625).

Discovery Related Fees: Defendant seeks to reduce the amount of fees incurred related to discovery. Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 11.4 hour drafting and reviewing discovery.[2] This amount is excessive given Kohen’s extensive experience in this area of the law (Kohen Decl., ¶ 16-17) and the standardized nature of the discovery propounded (Keshishian Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. C). The Court will reduce these fees by 9 hours ($4,725).

Motions in Limine: Defendant also seeks to reduce the 16.1 hours billed in relation to the preparation and drafting of the numerous motions in limine. Similar to the reductions above, these fees are unreasonable given Kohen’s extensive experience in this area of the law and the standardized, templated nature of the motions in limine. The Court will reduce these hours by 14.1 hours ($7,402.50).

Attorney Fee Motion: Plaintiffs request 12 hours of fees incurred in connection to this instant fee motion. This amount is excessive for a standard lemon law fee motion with no novel issues raised. The Court will reduce these fees by 7 hours ($3,675).

Fees to “Close the Case:” Lastly, Plaintiffs request 1 hour for “Misc. tasks to complete case and close file.” (Kohen Decl. Ex. 1, p. 5.) The reply does not address these fees. Given the vague description, the Court cannot determine whether these fees were reasonably incurred and will strike these fees in their entirety ($525).

Finally, Plaintiffs also seek a 1.1 lodestar multiplier based on the risk of taking this case on contingency and the delay in payment.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Although this matter was taken on contingency (Kohen Decl., ¶ 28), none of the other factors support the application of a multiplier. This was a garden variety Song-Beverly case; there were no novel or difficult questions presented. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.) Further, the¿contingent risks, skill, and difficulty¿that Plaintiffs’ attorneys¿assert are absorbed by¿their¿high hourly rates. (See¿Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California. Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

Reduction Category	Reductions Amount	Total
		$45,762.50
Clerical Work	$525
Drafting the Complaint	$420
Fees Related to Expert Vehicle Inspection	$2,625
Discovery Related Fees	$4,725
Motions in Limine	$7,402.50
Attorney Fee Motion	$3,675
Fees to “Close the Case”	$525
Reduced Lodestar Amount	$19,897.50	$25,865

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in the sum of $25,865.

The motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in part. In sum, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $25,865, which is a reduction of the lodestar amount by $19,897.50.

Defendant GM is ordered to pay to Plaintiffs’ counsel the sum of $25,865 for attorneys’ fees.

[1] The amount of costs will be addressed, later, at the hearing on the pending motion to tax costs.

[2] As the reply notes, there is no 4 hour entry on 10/19/23 to draft discovery; however, there is a 4 hour entry incurred on 7/25/22.

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58