Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV11954, Date: 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV11954    Hearing Date: April 7, 2023    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:             April 7, 2023

Case Name:                Michael Laguerre et al. v. Manhattan Loft, LLC et al.

Case No.:                   22STCV11954

Matter:                        Demurrer to Answer

Moving Party:             Plaintiffs Michael Laguerre et al. [37 individuals in total]

Responding Party:      Defendants Manhattan Loft, LLC

Background

This is a habitability case. Michael Laguerre and thirty-seven of his fellow tenants (Plaintiffs) sue Manhattan Loft, LLC, Erica Rive Ra, an individual, and Pam Pham-Le, an individual (Defendants) for tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; negligence; nuisance; violation of Civil Code 1941.1; breach of contract; unfair business practices; breach of common law duty of care; violation of Civil Code section 1940.2; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; tenant harassment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; retaliatory eviction; failure to pay relocation assistance; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; fraud; violation of Civil Code sections 1102.7 and 2079; negligent misrepresentation; constructive eviction; negligence per se; promissory fraud; libel/defamation; violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; violation of the Bane Act; strict liability; false imprisonment; and violation  of the Ralph Act. Plaintiffs allege that they collectively have rented residential apartment units “for varying periods of time”, and throughout that time defendants, owners and/or managers of the property, have permitted the building to fall into or remain in unsanitary, unhealthy, untentantable, and uninhabitable conditions.

The court sustained a demurrer to Plaintiffs’ initial complaint on June 11, 2023, with twenty days’ leave to amend. The clerk rejected Plaintiffs’ now-operative First Amended Complaint on February 6 and February 23, 2023; on March 6, 2023, the court deemed the FAC filed as of February 6, upon Plaintiffs’ ex parte application.

Defendants answered the FAC on February 24, 2023.

Plaintiffs now demur to the Answer, arguing that seven affirmative defenses do not contain sufficient facts.  In opposition, Defendants contend there is moot because it responded to an FAC that “no longer exists” (Opp. 1:26.) In the alternative, they argue their answer satisfied pleading standards because the complaint itself contains the facts giving rise to each of the defenses Defendants raise.

Counsel for the parties disagree regarding whether Plaintiffs’ counsel satisfied his meet and confer obligations prior to bringing the instant demurrer. (Derflinger Decl., ¶ 2 and Ex. 1; Partiyeli Decl., ¶ 3.) Rather than evaluating the credibility of counsel’s conflicting declarations, the court proceeds to consider the demurrer on the merits.

Legal Standard

            A demurrer to an answer may be appropriate if “[t]he answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense [or] [t]he answer is uncertain.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subds. (a), (b).)

            An affirmative defense is considered “new matter” beyond a general denial. (§ 431.30, subd. (b)(2).) The defendant bears the burden of proof to establish any new matters. (Harris v City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 239.) The answer must allege the facts on which the defense is founded. (See California Trust Co. v. Gustason (1940) 15 Cal.2d 268, 273.)

            Ultimate facts are generally sufficient, rather than evidentiary matters or legal conclusions.  (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  Even where a defense is defectively pled, it may be allowed if the Answer gives sufficient notice to enable the plaintiff to prepare to meet the defense, in part because un-pled defenses are waived. (See Harris v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 240.)

Discussion

            Plaintiffs contend that seven of Defendants’ affirmative defenses are insufficiently pled and are devoid of factual specificity.

            While there are no evidentiary facts alleged in the Answer, the cardinal rule of pleading is that only the ultimate facts need be alleged.  (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.)  Furthermore, the “ ‘distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree. [Citations.] For example, the courts have permitted allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them “ultimate facts” or “conclusions of fact.” ’ ” (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) 

Further, the sufficiency of an answer depends on the complaint to which it purports to answer.  (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733.)  Therefore, the answer does not stand alone and is not unsupported by factual allegations as Plaintiff contends; rather it is read with reference to the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.

            The Court has reviewed the defenses and finds that it fairly apprises Plaintiff of the alleged affirmative defenses.  Plaintiff does not argue these defenses are irrelevant to the legal theories pled.  Plaintiff simply contends that the defenses all fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.  As pled, the defenses are sufficient to withstand demurrer.  (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].)  Any uncertainty as to the facts underlying Defendants’ affirmative defenses can be clarified in discovery; specifically, Plaintiff can propound Form Interrogatory 15.1 on Defendants for further details.  Unverified affirmative defenses, by their nature, are necessarily asserted at the beginning of the case and out of an abundance of caution because the failure to assert an affirmative defense may constitute a waiver and cannot always be pled in detail.  (Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1314; Code Civ. Proc., §430.80, subd. (a).)

            Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled.