Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 22STCV11954 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The court overrules defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-seventh causes of action.

The court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ sixteenth, and twenty-first causes of action, with leave to file a second amended complaint within twenty days.

The court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourteenth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-eighth causes of action without leave to further amend their complaint.

The court reaffirms its prior order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twentieth cause of action without leave to amend and striking paragraphs seven, eight, and nine of plaintiffs’ prayer for relief.

This is a habitability case brought by thirty-eight residential tenants who rent, or have rented, units in a building located at 215 West Sixth Street in downtown Los Angeles (“the Property”).

Plaintiffs Michael Laguerre, Robert Alvin Johnson, Kerry-Ann Morrison, Joselyn Garcia, Alexander Mattera, Whitney Coss, Eric Bradley, Arman Musakhanyan, Damaris Cervantes, John Michael Triana, Jamar Hart, Natali Babiyans, Jamal Shakir, Alisa Garrett, Keith Thomas, Thomas Syrowski, Justin Goslee, Jasmyne Cannick, Giovanna Dagostino, Alex Onofre, Jennifer Bailey, Matthew Dutcher, Kevin Reeves, Jacqwel Brown, Jaida Kyi, Daniel Kirkland, Nathaniel Salgo, Devante Roper, D’Marques Riley, Mario Foster, Brandie Rossi, Boston Osborne, Samantha Bran, Paul Martignetti, Sherrtl Grant, Lam Vu, Jas Jeffress, and Jean Juste (Plaintiffs) sue their landlord Manhattan Loft, LLC and its alleged agents Erica Rivera and Pam Pham-Le.

The operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleges 28 causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, numerous violations of state and local tenant protections, negligence in various permutations, fraud, unfair business practices, several types of civil rights abuses, and other wrongs, including nuisance and defamation.

Plaintiffs allege that during their tenancies, defendants knowingly permitted the Property to subsist in an untenantable condition. Specifically, plaintiffs allege the Property suffered from numerous health and safety code violations including vermin infestation, dangerous elevators, mold growth, offensive odors, and overall dilapidation. They also allege defendants abused and harassed them when they tried to assert their rights, including through physical threats and attempts illegally to evict them.

The Court heard defendant Manhattan Loft, LLC’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ initial complaint on January 11, 2023. Defendant demurred to eighteen of plaintiffs’ twenty-eight causes of action. The Court overruled defendant’s demurrer as to nine (9) causes of action and sustained as to nine (9) others. The Court granted leave to amend 8 of the 9 causes of action to which defendant’s demurrer was sustained. Plaintiffs filed their FAC on February 6, 2023.

Manhattan Loft demurs again to the nine causes of action which plaintiffs seek to cure by amendment in its FAC: the fourteenth (failure to pay relocation assistance), sixteenth (actual fraud), twentieth (negligence per se), twenty-first (promissory fraud), twenty-fourth (violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act), twenty-fifth (violation of Bane Act), twenty-sixth (strict liability), twenty-seventh (false imprisonment), and twenty-eighth (violation of Ralph Act).

Defendant argues each of these causes of action fails for uncertainty and for failure to state facts constituting a cause of action.

Defendant also moves to strike three portions of plaintiffs’ prayer for relief. The Court already struck these portions in its January 11 Order.

Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer. They largely rely on their complaint to speak for itself, drawing the Court’s attention to individual paragraphs within each cause of action and quoting case law, statute, and practice guides without applying them to the pleaded allegations.

Defendant’s reply reiterates the arguments in its demurrer. It also suggests that for any cause of action where plaintiffs failed to identify sufficient specific factual allegations in their opposition, defendant’s demurrer should be sustained.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . ..” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)

Defendant argues that each of the nine (9) causes of actions subject to its demurrer fail for uncertainty.

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, including where the pleading is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f); Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 909.) To survive demurrer, a plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Benjamin (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

Plaintiffs’ 321-page FAC, like their initial complaint, consists largely of what Justice Cardozo termed the tonsorial and aggulutinative method of legal writing – copied and pasted sections of various statutes and ordinances. The specific facts underlying plaintiffs’ causes of action begin on page 177. The individual causes of action, which begin one hundred paragraphs later, combine handfuls of new facts with improper argument and long verbatim quotations from statutes and case law. Plaintiffs’ counsel appears to believe that the longer the complaint the stronger the case will seem.

The FAC fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (a)(1), which requires the complaint to state the facts constituting its causes of action in “ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiffs failed to follow the Court’s admonition in its January 11 order regarding their pleading practices.

The FAC is overwrought and overweight. It is stuffed with inappropriate references and argument. But it is not uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Plaintiffs have stated numerous specific facts placing defendant on notice of the gravamen of their claims. None of plaintiffs’ causes of action fail for uncertainty.

Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.00 et seq., commonly referred to as the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance or “LARSO,” establishes various rights for tenants who rent residential units within the City of Los Angeles. As relevant here, LAMC section 151.09 limits circumstances in which a residential landlord may evict its tenants. Those circumstances include “for-cause” evictions (e.g., breach of lease) and “not-for-cause” or “no-fault” evictions (e.g., removing a property from the rental market). (See LAMC § 151.09, subd. (A).) Where a landlord evicts a tenant on a “no-fault” basis, it is obligated to pay a fee to the tenants to assist them to relocate. (See id., § 151.09(G).)

Plaintiffs’ fourteenth cause of action claims defendant violated LAMC section 151.09, subdivision (G), which provides that “if [a] termination of tenancy is based on [“no-fault” grounds], then the landlord shall pay a relocation fee.” (Ibid.)

Defendant argues plaintiffs do not plead basic facts, including how much relocation assistance defendant purportedly owed to plaintiffs, when defendant was required to pay it, and why the payment was required. Plaintiffs respond that they satisfied pleading requirements by alleging “service of eviction notice [sic]” and retaliatory motive.

In its January 11 Order, the Court ruled that a mere statement that the landlord failed to provide relocation assistance does not satisfy pleading requirements for this cause of action. The Court also noted in its prior ruling that retaliation is irrelevant to entitlement to relocation assistance – an observation that plaintiffs have disregarded. Plaintiffs’ allegations at paragraphs 443 through 445 of their FAC again dwell on retaliatory motive and make little reference to termination of tenancy. They state only – on information and belief – that “the Defendants served almost every tenant in the Subject Property with eviction notices.” (FAC, ¶ 443.)

The Municipal Code requires a tenancy be actually terminated, and that a landlord fail to pay relocation assistance thereafter. Plaintiffs have alleged neither. Thus, they have not stated a cause of action.

The elements of this cause of action are straightforward. Stating a claim requires only (1) termination of tenancy and (2) failure to pay relocation assistance. Even after amendment, plaintiffs have failed to plead either. Thus, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate they would be able to cure their complaint if they were permitted to amend a second time.

The Court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourteenth cause of action without leave to further amend the LARSO claim.

The elements of fraud (i.e., intentional misrepresentation) are “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631.) If the alleged misrepresentation is concealment, the element of “scienter” is replaced by the defendant’s duty to disclose the concealed fact to the plaintiff. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748.) Fraud must be pleaded specifically, not with “general and conclusory allegations.” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184; Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73 [“This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ ”]) Less specificity is required to plead fraud by concealment. (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199; but see Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 [“mere conclusionary allegations that the omissions were intentional and for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving plaintiffs and bringing about the purchase . . . are insufficient to show fraud by concealment”].) But “[i]f a fraud claim is based upon failure to disclose, and ‘the duty to disclose arises from the making of representations that were misleading or false, then those allegations should be described.’” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1262.)

Defendant repeats the argument it raised in its prior demurrer, that “[t]he FAC does no[t] show ‘how, when, where, to whom, and by what means representations were tendered.’ ” (Demurrer, 6:7-8.) Defendant contends plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing defendant knew any of its representations were false or intended to mislead the plaintiffs. (Id., 6:8-12.) In response, plaintiffs point to several paragraphs in their complaint and recite case law without argument.

Upon amending their complaint after defendant’s successful demurrer, plaintiffs have added allegations that co-defendant Erica Rivera allegedly made misrepresentations and “did not have a reasonable basis upon which to base [her] assertion[s]” that the property was habitable. (FAC, ¶ 460.) Plaintiff has done nothing else to clarify the basis of its fraud allegations, despite the Court in its January 11 ruling identifying several specific deficiencies. The Court ordered plaintiff to “be more specific as to who said (or did not say) what, to whom, and when the concealment was made.” (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 9, italics added.) The Court specifically found that allegations “generally across . . .. all Defendants” are insufficiently specific – yet plaintiff has relied on them again. (Id., at p. 9.) The Court also found that allegations that misrepresentations were made “prior to the inception of Plaintiffs’ tenancy” did not satisfy pleading standards. (Ibid.) Again, plaintiffs have repeated the same deficient allegations.

The Court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ sixteenth cause of action for fraud.

Because of the heightened pleading standards and the difficulty with pleading this cause of action, the Court grants leave to amend. But it advises plaintiffs and their counsel to carefully examine the Court’s prior orders and the elements of their cause of action. The Court reminds plaintiffs that they bear the burden to show their pleading can be cured by amendment – without such an affirmative showing, leave to amend will not be granted a third time.

The Court sustained defendant’s demurrer to this cause of action without leave to amend on January 11, 2023. Plaintiffs should not have included it in their FAC. Plaintiffs’ inclusion of the negligence per se claim indicates either disrespect for the Court’s order or a careless approach to their pleading obligations.

In order to state a claim for promissory fraud, a plaintiff must allege a promise “that the promisor did not intend to perform at the time the promise was made, that the promise was intended to deceive and induce reliance, that it did induce reliance, and that this reliance resulted in damages.” (Fleet v. Bank of America N.A. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1411.)

Defendant argues “[t]he FAC does not show intent[, because] Plaintiffs fail to mention the name of the individual who made any promise”, or how any promise induced their reliance. (Dem., 7:24-25.) In response, plaintiffs point to four paragraphs of the twenty-first cause of action and recite case law without argument.

In its January 11 order, the court sustained defendant’s demurrer because “Plaintiffs [did] not mention the name of the individual who allegedly made the promise[s in question.]” (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 10.) Plaintiff now identifies Erica Rivera as the offending party. But the court also found that “the damages allegation [was] insufficient” in the initial complaint. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has done nothing to correct this. The promises Rivera purportedly made were responses to complaints raised by the plaintiffs – demonstrating that the promises did not cause the damage in question. Plaintiffs’ claims that they suffered “worsened emotional distress and emotional injury” because they were “forced to reside in their [uninhabitable] units” (FAC, ¶ 516.) is a legal conclusion that does not put defendant on notice of any particular damage.

However, plaintiffs have introduced new allegations that support a claim for promissory fraud against Manhattan Loft. Plaintiff alleges “the apartments at the Subject Property are and were advertised” as having certain amenities that were in fact “deteriorated, unmaintained, and disgusting,” and Manhattan Loft induced plaintiffs to sign their leases in reliance on these promises. These allegations, if made more specifically, may support a claim for fraud or promissory fraud. But they currently do not provide specific notice of the basis for plaintiff’s claims.

The Court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-first cause of action for promissory fraud with leave to amend.

Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b), provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

“The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each person's inherent right to ‘full and equal’ access to ‘all business establishments.’ [Citations.] The Act, like the common law principles upon which it was partially based, imposes a compulsory duty upon business establishments to serve all persons without arbitrary discrimination. [Citations.] The Act serves as a preventive measure, without which it is recognized that businesses might fall into discriminatory practices.” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167.)

Plaintiffs allege defendants discriminated against those of them who are disabled because defendants failed to repair a broken elevator. (FAC, ¶¶ 547-548.) Defendants argue (1) plaintiffs fail to allege the premises was a place of public accommodation as defined by federal law, which defendants contend is required for liability under the Unruh Act; and (2) that because defendants did not fail to repair the elevator with the intention of targeting disabled plaintiffs, they cannot be held liable for discrimination. (Dem., 8:17 and 8:23-24.)

As to defendant’s first point: liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not depend on a violation of the ADA. Per subdivision (f) of Civil Code section 51, an ADA violation is sufficient, but not necessary, for an offender to be liable under state law for discriminatory practices. Regardless, plaintiffs have pleaded, at the very least, a failure of defendant to provide a reasonable accommodation by fixing the elevators on the Property, which would violate the ADA and satisfy the elements of an Unruh claim.

Second, plaintiffs have also alleged defendant is operating a business establishment. A landlord operates a business for the purposes of the Unruh Act. (See generally Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721.)

Third, plaintiffs have now supplied factual allegations that state a claim of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants singled out and taunted disabled tenants regarding the state of the elevators. (FAC, ¶ 547.) Construing broadly, as it should, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action.

The court overrules defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-fourth cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Civil Code, section 52.1 (the “Bane Act”) allows an individual to sue for damages if a person “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state….”¿ (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subds. (a), (b).)¿¿

“The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e.,¿‘threat[ ], intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.”¿ (King v. State of Cal.¿(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883.) “The statute requires¿a showing of threatening conduct independent from the alleged interference or violation of a civil right.¿[Citations.]” (Doe v. State of California¿(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 842–843.) It was passed primarily as hate crime legislation (Jones v. Kmart Corp (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and was meant to narrowly supplement the Ralph Act to deter violence. (Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1447.)

The elements of a Bane Act claim are: (1) defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) plaintiffs reasonably believed that if they exercised their constitutional right the defendant would commit violence against them or their property; (3) defendant injured plaintiffs or their property to prevent them from exercising their constitutional right or retaliated against plaintiffs for having exercised their constitutional right; (4) plaintiffs were harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 882.) In context, the statutory framework of section 52.1 “indicates that the Legislature meant the statute to address interference with constitutional rights involving more egregious conduct than mere negligence.” (Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 958.)

Defendant argues plaintiffs’ FAC has nothing to do with hate crimes: “This is an alleged habitable [sic] case.” (Demurrer, 9:25.) Plaintiffs reply that they have sufficiently alleged that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs because of their formation of a tenant’s rights organization and exercise of free speech and freedom of association.” (Opp., 9:9-12.)

In January, the Court observed that the initial complaint contained “no allegations of acts or threats of violence and “[did] not allege any threatening conduct ‘independent from the alleged interference’ itself.” (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 13.) At the same time, the Court agreed then, as it does now, that plaintiffs need not allege a “hate crime”; retaliation for exercising their rights will suffice for a Bane Act claim.

Plaintiffs newly allege in the FAC that defendant Rivera “would send her boyfriend to physically intimidate specific tenants in response to their complaints” about uninhabitable conditions on the Property. (FAC, ¶ 561.) She allegedly “[sent] her boyfriend to their apartments to physically intimidate them [and] to send a ‘message’ that complaints were not to be tolerated.” (Ibid.) This sufficiently pleads that defendant threatened plaintiffs for exercising their rights.

The court overrules defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-fifth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act.

“[C]ertain activities under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of such relative infrequent occurrence, that [the hazard] may well call for strict liability as the best public policy.” (Luthringer v. Moore (1948) 31 Cal.2d 489, 500.) “The doctrine of ultrahazardous activity provides that one who undertakes an ultrahazardous activity is liable to every person who is injured as a proximate result of that activity, regardless of the amount of care he uses.” (Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 68, 85.)

Plaintiffs contend that defendant’s “operation of [broken] elevators amounts to an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability.” (FAC, ¶ 556.)

Plaintiffs misunderstand the nature of strict liability based on ultrahazardous activity. Their cause of action elides theories of relief based on negligence, negligence per se (already rejected by the court), and strict liability. The relationship between these concepts can be confusing.

Perhaps the best way to understand strict liability is through the lens of law and economics. Ultrahazardous activity has social utility; “[its] utility . . . is such that [the actor] is socially justified in proceeding with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it.” (Rest. 2d Torts (1977) § 520, comm. (h).) In other words, when a person chooses to engage in a lawful activity known to be extremely hazardous, he or she or they assume the risk and the cost of any damages the activity might cause.

“[L]iability for abnormally dangerous activities is [distinct from negligence] because its imposition does not turn on a determination that the defendant committed a legal wrong. . . .” (Goldberg & Zipurksy, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability (2016) 85 Fordham L. Rev. 743, 761.) Strict liability disregards the notions of fault (i.e., duty and breach) central to a negligence action. In the case of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity, liability does not arise from a plaintiff’s irresponsibility for engaging in such behavior. In fact, ultrahazardous activity, used as a term of art, “is not unlawful and cannot be abated . . . .” (See 6 Witkin Summary Cal. Law (11th ed. 2022) Torts, § 1575, emphasis added.) In cases of strict liability based on ultra-hazard, the law regards that activity as reasonable and within the standard of care, but justice requires that the risk of injury to the public must be borne by the person engaging in the activity. (See Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries (1952) 65 Harv. L. Rev. 984, 986.) Causation is all that matters.

The law applies the theory of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity in rare circumstances. The theory undermines core notions of duty, care, and responsibility; it applies selectively to those extreme circumstances where dangerous activity is valuable to society, but comes at the cost of public danger. The courts in those cases shift the risk of loss to those who engage in the hazardous activity, based solely on their choice to do so.

Here, plaintiffs allege the elevator was illegally operated. Defendants had a legal, regulatory, and ethical duty to maintain their elevator in good repair. They allegedly did not do so, and thereby caused harm to the plaintiffs. This is a straightforward negligence claim.

Perhaps for this reason, plaintiffs argue in the alternative that their cause of action for strict liability should survive because it might as well be a cause of action for negligence. (Opp., 9:21-28.) But plaintiffs pleaded a cause of action for negligence. There is no need for them to plead it twice.

Plaintiffs’ FAC does not allege defendants engaged in an ultrahazardous activity. The Court sustains defendant’s demurrer to the twenty-sixth cause of action without leave to amend.

“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” (Easton v. Stutter Coast Hospital (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496.)

The Court found on January 11 that “there [were] no allegations that the elevator was stopped intentionally for the purpose of trapping its occupants.” (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 13.) Thus, plaintiff did not allege facts to support the first element of false imprisonment.

Defendant argues the FAC still does not allege false imprisonment because “[t]here is no evidence” of that cause of action, and “confinement in the elevator was not actually done by any Defendant, nor can that seriously be alleged.” (Dem., 11:16-20.) In opposition, plaintiffs point to three paragraphs in their complaint. They also again recite case law without argument.

Defendant’s arguments regarding sufficiency of evidence do not belong in a demurrer. The Court concerns itself here with what is and is not alleged, not whether there is evidence.

Whereas plaintiffs initially claimed only that “hazardous elevators frequently stop[ped] operating” on the Property and trapped tenants, their FAC now contains allegations that “Erica Rivera would at times stop the elevator to purposely and intentionally to [sic] trap tenants” and “giggle at the Plaintiffs and . . . ask them how the ‘weather’ was inside of the elevator.” (FAC, ¶ 583.) As alleged, Rivera would then “yell at them, tell them they would be evicted if they called 911, and . . . then take hours to take action to fix the elevator.” (Id., ¶ 584.)

The FAC now contains allegations suggesting Rivera’s intentional, nonconsensual confinement of plaintiffs.

The court overrules defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-seventh cause of action for false imprisonment.

The Ralph Civil Rights Act provides that “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of section 51, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics." (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1).)

To plead a claim for violation of the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 880-81.)

Plaintiffs allege defendants intimidated them to prevent them from exercising their legal rights as tenants (FAC, ¶ 589), without alleging any specific facts to support this contention. The Court already ruled these allegations are misplaced and nonspecific and do not state a claim under the Ralph Act. (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 14.) Plaintiffs have done nothing to clarify this portion of their complaint.

Instead, plaintiffs have elaborated on the facts related to Erica Rivera’s alleged intimidation of plaintiff Daniel Kirkland by filing a false police report against him. (FAC, ¶¶ 591-593.) Plaintiffs have alleged the conclusion that Rivera acted “because of Plaintiff Daniel Kirkland’s sex . . . [i.e., because] he is a man who has assumed a role in the Subject Property of standing up for his fellow tenants. . . . .” (FAC, ¶ 591.) Plaintiffs then provide two paragraphs of legal conclusions and improper argument.

Defendant argues, as it did on January 11, that plaintiffs have not alleged with clarity any violation of the Ralph Act. According to defendant, it has not been put on notice of what specific threats defendant purportedly made, on the basis of what purported discriminatory intent. (Dem., 12:13-16.) Plaintiffs counter by pointing out that the Ralph Act defines making a false police report as intimidating behavior, at Civil Code section 512.7, subdivision (b)(2). They also quote a practice guide at length for the contention that the Ralph Act’s list of protected characteristics is “merely illustrative.” (Opp., 11:19-20.) Otherwise, they simply point to their complaint and insist it is sufficient.

Plaintiffs have done little to correct the deficiencies identified in the court’s January 11 ruling sustaining defendant’s prior demurrer. They have only alleged the conclusion, on information and belief and with no specific supporting facts, that Erica Rivera targeted Daniel Kirkland because he is a man. No actual facts in the FAC support this conclusion. Plaintiffs allege no basis for their conclusion that Rivera was motivated by retaliatory animus or that her conduct has a causal link to any harm caused to Kirkland.

The court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-eighth cause of action without leave to amend. Plaintiffs have now filed an initial and an amended complaint completely devoid of specific facts to support this cause of action. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a capacity to amend their complaint to state a claim.

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and/or “strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)

In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

As defendants note in their motion, the court has already granted the motion to strike the three prayers for relief in question. (1/11/23 Minute Order, p. 15.) Plaintiffs’ reiteration of them in the FAC indicates a disregard for the court’s order.

The Court grants defendants’ motion to strike in its entirety, or rather, the court reiterates its prior order striking paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the prayer.

The Court overrules defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-seventh causes of action.

The Court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ sixteenth, and twenty-first causes of action, with leave to file a second amended complaint within twenty days.

The court sustains defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourteenth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-eighth causes of action without leave to further amend their complaint.

The court reaffirms its January 11 order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ twentieth cause of action without leave to amend and striking paragraphs seven, eight, and nine of plaintiffs’ prayer for relief.