Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 22STCV11954, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: Defendants SBDTLA 1, LLC, SBDTLA 2, LLC, SBDTLA 3, LLC, SBDTLA 4, LLC and Greystar California, Inc.

This is a habitability case brought by thirty-eight residential tenants who rent, or have rented, units in a building located at 215 West Sixth Street in downtown Los Angeles (Property).

Plaintiffs Michael Laguerre, Robert Alvin Johnson, Kerry-Ann Morrison, Joselyn Garcia, Alexander Mattera, Whitney Coss, Eric Bradley, Arman Musakhanyan, Damaris Cervantes, John Michael Triana, Jamar Hart, Natali Babiyans, Jamal Shakir, Alisa Garrett, Keith Thomas, Thomas Syrowski, Justin Goslee, Jasmyme Cannick,; Giovanna Dagostino, Alex Onofre, Jennifer Bailey, Matthew Dutcher, Kevin Reeves, Jacqwel Brown, Jaida Kyi, Daniel Kirkland, Nathaniel Salgo, Devante Roper, D’marques Riley, Mario Foster, Brandie Rossi, Boston Osborne, Samantha Bran, Paul Martignetti, Sherrtl Grant, Lam Vu, Jas Jeffress, Jean Juste (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued their landlord, Manhattan Loft, LLC (Manhattan Loft) and its alleged agents, Erica Rivera and Pam Pham-Le.

The operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleges numerous causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of habitability, breach of quiet enjoyment, and violations of state and local tenant protections.

Plaintiffs allege that during their tenancies, Defendants knowingly permitted Property to subsist in an untenable condition. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the Property suffered from numerous health and safety code violations, including vermin infestation, dangerous elevators, mold growth, offensive odor, and overall dilapidation. They also allege Defendants abused and harassed them when they tried to assert their rights, including through physical threats and attempts to illegally evict them.

On January 11, 2023, the Court heard Defendant Manhattan Loft’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint; Defendant Manhattan Loft demurred to eighteen of Plaintiffs’ twenty-eight cause of action. The Court overruled the demurrer as to nine causes of action, sustained with leave as to eight causes of action, sustained without leave as to one cause of action.

Manhattan Loft demurred again to the First Amended Complaint. On May 15, 2023, the Court overruled the demurrer to three causes of action, sustained without leave to amend three causes of action, and sustained with leave to amend as to sixteenth and twenty-first causes of action.

On July 5, 2023, Defendant Manhattan Lofts demurred to the sixteenth and twenty-first causes of action. Plaintiffs opposed the demurrer. The Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

Now, Defendant SBDTLA 1, LLC, SBDTLA 2, LLC, SBDTLA 3, LLC, SBDTLA 4, LLC (collectively, SBDTLA) and Greystar California, Inc. (Greystar) (collectively, Defendants) move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiff omitted Defendants as parties from the First Amended Complaint (FAC) and Second Amended Complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the grounds that the omission was based on attorney mistake and seeks relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is moot. The SBDTLA defendants and Greystar have been dismissed from the case.

“[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer.... Indeed, the only significant difference between the two motions is in their timing.” (People v. $20,000 U.S. Currency (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. The defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [internal citations omitted].)

Defendants move for a judgment on the pleading as to the entire Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that they have been dismissed as parties from the FAC and SAC.

On May 4, 2022 and June 21, 2022, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to name SBDTLA and Greystar, respectively, previously named as Does. (See 5/4/22 Amendment to the Complaint; 6/21/2022 Amendment to the Complaint.)[1] Then, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on February 6, 2023 and a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on June 5, 2023. However, neither of these pleadings name Defendants in the caption or the body of the complaint, despite the prior Doe amendments. (See generally FAC, SAC.)

“It has long been the rule that an amended complaint that omits defendants named in the original complaint operates as a dismissal as to them.” (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142.) A request for dismissal is unnecessary because the amended complaint itself constitutes the request for dismissal. (Ibid.; see Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 943, 947 [filing of amended complaint omitting a defendant as a party effected a dismissal of that defendant from the action].)

An amended complaint supersedes the original one, which “ ‘ceases to perform any function as a pleading.’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884.) Thus, an amended complaint that omits a defendant has the same effect as the dismissal of a defendant from a cause of action or complaint. (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 Cal. 789, 790 [omission of parties from amended pleadings is equivalent to a voluntary dismissal as to those parties]; JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants state that they have been dismissed as matter of law and seek judgment on the pleadings based on this fact. However, to Defendants’ point, they have been dismissed from this action. There is no additional relief the Court can offer on this particular motion to an already dismissed party.

In opposition, Plaintiffs acknowledge the omission of Defendants from the FAC and SAC, and request relief under the discretionary and mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

Plaintiff’s’ counsel states that the error in omitting Defendants from the SAC was entirely his mistake, and vaguely references some “family issues” that occurred at the time of the filing of the SAC. (Partiyeli Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)

“The mandatory relief provision of section 473[, subdivision] (b) is a ‘narrow exception to the discretionary relief provision for default judgments and dismissals.’ [Citation.] Its purpose ‘ “was to alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.” ’ ” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 226; see also Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257.)

Relief under the mandatory provision is not available here. Plaintiffs’ counsel only provides a declaration of attorney fault with respect to the SAC, but his declaration is devoid of any discussion as to Defendants’ omission from the FAC. As the reply notes, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on April 12, 2022 and then filed Doe amendments naming Defendants SBDTLA on May 4, 2022 and naming Greystar on June 21, 2022; the FAC, which did not include these Defendants, was filed on February 6, 2023. Thus, Plaintiffs could not add new parties following the filing of the SAC or through Plaintiffs’ “NOTICE OF ERRATA, RE: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT COVERSHEET AND FACE PAGE” (filed on August 30, 2023).

Further, discretionary relief under section 473, subdivision (b) is also unavailable here. The six-month period to file a motion for relief begins to run when the order or proceeding in question “was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Here, Plaintiffs seek relief from voluntary dismissal that occurred on February 6, 2023 with the FAC and then again on June 5, 2023 with the SAC. The Opposition seeking this relief was not filed until March 6, 2024. Plaintiffs’ request for relief is well outside the six-month limitation set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) for discretionary relief.[2]

In the alternative, Plaintiffs request leave to amend the pleadings. As Defendants have been dismissed as a matter of law and the Court finds this motion is moot, the Court cannot grant leave to amend on this motion for judgment on the pleadings. As such, Plaintiffs must file a motion for leave to amend that complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 if they seek to file an amended pleading.

[1] On May 21, 2022, SBDTLA filed a cross-complaint against Manhattan Loft for Contractual and Equitable Indemnity, Declaratory Relief, and Equitable Contribution.

[2] It is less clear if mandatory relief is also untimely. Mandatory relief is available “whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Civ. Code Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Here, where there was a voluntary dismissal, it is unclear if this dismissal constitutes the “entry of judgment” which starts the running of the clock. However, as a practical matter, there would be no time limit for the mandatory relief provision for a voluntary dismissal where there would otherwise be no entry of judgment; thus, it would seem that the dismissal is the appropriate action by which to start this clock. (Cf. Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Com. v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 961, 968.)