Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 22STCV14254 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Enforce Settlement is granted. Defendant Turner is ordered to execute the grant deed.

This is an action for quiet title, arising from a dispute between the parties regarding the execution of an allegedly fraudulent quitclaim deed. The complaint additionally alleges battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy for conduct by Defendant Nathaniel Turner (Defendant or Turner) while the parties were in a relationship.

Plaintiff Amaris Bell (Plaintiff or Bell) moves for enforcement of the terms of a settlement agreement that was entered on February 24, 2023 in open court before Honorable May Santos. This was a separate proceeding under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act in the Family Court, not in this Court.

In the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to dismiss Plaintiff’s restraining order matters against Defendant, and Defendant Turner agreed to return Plaintiff’s laptop and sign and notarize the grant deed returning the subject property to Plaintiff. Further, the parties agreed to cooperate in the sale of the Property, and agreed to dismiss this civil matter. (Exhibit A.)

Plaintiff brings this motion before the Court because Defendant has failed to sign the grant deed.

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.¿ If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6(a).)¿

Although Defendant argues that the settlement is unenforceable because section 664.6, subdivision (c) states that this section cannot be applied in a civil harassment action, this provision only applies to written agreements that are not signed by the parties, not agreements entered into orally before the court, which is the case here. Additionally, oral stipulations before a subordinate court officer meet the “before the court” requirement if the court officer was empowered to act with an adjudicatory function and the court officer did act in that capacity. (Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 909.)

As this was an oral stipulation for settlement “before the court,” the parties themselves were required to personally appear before the court and orally agree to the settlement. (Johnson v. Department of Corrections (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1700, 1707-1708.) Here, the record indicates that the parties expressly and unambiguously agreed to the settlement agreement. Commissioner Santos asked both parties if they understood what their attorney was asking for and if they were in agreement. Defendant responded “Yes Ma’am,” indicating that he understood and agreed to the settlement agreement, the terms of which were recited in open court. (See Motion, Exhibit A, p. 2:6-22.) After the settlement terms were read into the record, neither Defendant nor his counsel objected to the agreement or expressed any confusion about its terms. (Motion Exhibit A, p. 3:9-19, 4:1-16.) Defendant’s characterization of what the transcript reveals is misleading. Under the agreement, Defendant Turner was released from a restraining order in return for which he was to, among other things, execute a grant deed for the property. Defendant’s agreement is an enforceable stipulation before the court.

Finally, Defendant’s argument that the agreement is not enforceable because it lacks consideration or is not sufficiently definite is without merit. The agreement clearly has consideration as Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the restraining order against Defendant, while Defendant agreed to return Plaintiff’s laptop and prepare the grant deed to transfer the title to Plaintiff. Any benefit conferred is consideration, including forbearance from acting or a change in legal status is sufficient consideration. (Civ. Code §§ 1605, 1606.) Plaintiff’s agreement to dismiss the restraining order is sufficient consideration.

It is true that an agreement must be sufficiently definite to be enforceable under section 664.6. (Weddington Products, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) Here, the agreement is sufficiently definite. The agreement, as memorialized in the transcript, states that Defendant “has agreed to return title to the real property located at 5516 Graywood Avenue” through a prepared grant deed. Defendant was to sign and notarize this grant deed and deliver it to his attorney’s office by the Tuesday after the hearing. (Motion Exhibit A, p. 3:9-19, 4:1-16.) This agreement is sufficiently definite.

Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement is granted. Defendant Turner is ordered to execute the grant deed provided by Plaintiff’s counsel within 48 hours of it being provided to him. If Defendant fails to do so, Plaintiff may apply ex parte for an order that the Clerk of the Court execute the deed on his behalf, and for an order of monetary sanctions against Defendant. Such sanctions may include an assessment under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 for up to $1,500.

Department 58