Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV26201, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV26201 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 58
Hearing Date: August 15,
2024
Case Name: Yazdan
Hajizamani v. Peraton Inc. et al.
Case No.: 22STCV26201
Matter: Motion for
Summary Judgment
Moving
Party: Defendants Peraton,
Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Yazdan Hajizamani
Tentative
Ruling: The Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted
as to the first, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth,
and nineteenth causes of action.
Background
In this employment case, Yazdan
Hajizamani (Plaintiff) sues Peraton, Inc. (“Peraton”), Oscar Escobedo
(Escobedo), William Curtis, Sonny Giroux, and Leslee Jelfs (collectively
Defendants) for twenty causes of action: age discrimination, age harassment,
race discrimination, race harassment, national origin discrimination, national
origin harassment, disability discrimination, disability harassment, failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process,
associational discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination,
wrongful termination, Labor Code violations, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
course of discriminatory and harassing conduct began in January 2018, when Escobedo
became his supervisor. Escobedo
allegedly harassed and singled out Plaintiff on numerous occasions. He prevented Plaintiff from working more than
12 hours a day and denied his request to begin work at 5:00 AM, despite company
policy to the contrary. This resulted in
several warnings when Plaintiff did not notify Escobedo of working more than 12
hours.
In December 2018, Plaintiff was
scheduled for vacation and requested his wife pick him up from work at 4:00 PM
to go to Las Vegas; however, Escobedo required Plaintiff to drive to an offsite
location several hours away due to an emergency. Plaintiff argued that the technicians
understood how to resolve the issue, but Defendants insisted Plaintiff oversee
the job anyways. This impacted his planned
vacation.
Upon receiving warnings from
Escobedo, Plaintiff was assigned “smart goals,” a series of tasks designated to
an employee. Plaintiff alleges that
Escobedo randomly added new tasks to overwhelm him and that even after finishing
the goals, Plaintiff was falsely accused of incompletion. In February 2019, Plaintiff was placed on a
Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). He
alleges that prior to the PIP review hearing, Escobedo expressed his
satisfaction with Plaintiff’s performance; however, Escobedo later denied this
conversation with human resources. When
Plaintiff confronted Escobedo about lying, Escobedo allegedly stated that he
had never been happy working with Plaintiff and did not like “you guys.”
In July 2019, Plaintiff was placed
on disability leave because of his depression, anxiety, nervousness, and
sleeping issues. He returned to work in August
2020 and was allegedly assigned new duties.
In October 2020, Plaintiff filed a
hostile work environment complaint and in February 2021, filed a harassment
report. Three days after filing the
harassment report, he received a telephone call from human resources informing
him of his termination.
Peraton now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant
filed a reply.
Evidentiary
Objections
Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Danielle Armostrong.
The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Rudy Bryan. The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED: 7
OVERRULED:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Plaintiff objects to the declaration
of Oscar Excobedo. The Court rules as
follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54.
Plaintiff objects to the declaration
of Henry Giroux. The Court rules as
follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Leslee Jelf. The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39
Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Elizabeth Tapia. The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED:
1
Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Curtis Williams. The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED:
None
OVERRULED: 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
Peraton objects to the declaration of Yazdan
Hajizamanij. The Court rules as follows:
SUSTAINED: None
OVERRULED: 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Summary
of Plaintiff’s Facts
Plaintiff, a highly educated Iranian-American mechanical
engineer, began working for Peraton, Inc. in 2017. Initially, he received
praise for his performance, but this changed after he began reporting to a new
supervisor, Oscar Escobedo, in mid-2018. Plaintiff states that Escobedo targeted him
with harsh criticism, particularly focusing on his English skills and
expressing prejudice against Persians. (Plaintiff’s
Additional Material Facts “PAMF” 15-20.) Despite Plaintiff’s efforts to improve and his
success in his role, he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) in
February 2019. (PAMF 22.)
After taking medical leave in 2019 due to anxiety and
depression caused by Escobedo’s treatment, Peraton retaliated against him by
denying a merit increase, replacing him with a younger, less experienced
engineer, and assigning him less important duties upon his return. (PAMF 49-58.) Plaintiff was micro-managed and subjected to
unfair criticism, leading him to file complaints about discrimination and
retaliation. (PAMF 59-72.) Shortly after filing these complaints, Peraton
terminated his employment on February 23, 2021. (PAMF 78.) The investigation into his complaints was
flawed, with key individuals not interviewed and evidence of discrimination and
retaliation ignored. (PAMF 79-8.4.) Plaintiff’s termination was directly linked to
his complaints and his medical leave. (PMF
74-77.)
Legal
Standard
“The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden
of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in
favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof. (Ibid.)
“When deciding whether to grant
summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the
papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well
as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v.
Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467;
Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).)
Discussion
First
Cause of Action: Discrimination on the Basis of Age in Violation of FEHA
In a claim for discrimination,
plaintiff must establish “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was
qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the
position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as
termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other
circumstances suggest discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) “Adapting
this framework to the associational discrimination context, the ‘disability’
from which the plaintiff suffers is his or her association with a disabled
person. Respecting the third element, the disability must be a substantial
factor motivating the employer’s adverse employment action.” (Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway
Express, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1037.)
For age discrimination, a plaintiff
must allege that he “(1) is over the age of 40; (2) suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) was performing satisfactorily at the time of the adverse
action; and (4) suffered the adverse action under circumstances that give rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., evidence that the plaintiff
was replaced by someone significantly younger than the plaintiff.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 297, 321.)
Peraton argues that Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim
under the FEHA is baseless because he cannot provide sufficient evidence to
prove that his age was a substantial motivating factor in his termination or
any other adverse employment action. To
succeed in his claim, Plaintiff must show that he was over 40, suffered an
adverse employment action, and that his age was a significant reason for this
action. (Cal. Gov’t Code §12940(a); Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at 358.) On
summary judgment or summary adjudication, California employs the
burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973)
411 U.S. 792. This is laid out in Wills
v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160, where: (1) the defendant
has the initial responsibility to either disprove a key element of the
plaintiff’s discrimination claim or provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the plaintiff’s termination; (2) if the employer succeeds in doing
this, the burden then shifts to the employee to present substantial evidence
showing that the employer’s stated reason is false or pretextual, or that the
employer acted with discriminatory intent, and the employee must provide enough
evidence to convince a reasonable jury that the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination to avoid summary judgment.
Here, Peraton asserts that it had legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s disciplinary actions and eventual
termination, including Plaintiff’s repeated failure to participate in team
meetings, not working during scheduled hours, insubordination, and producing
substandard work. Peraton also notes that these issues were well-documented,
and Plaintiff’s age had no bearing on these decisions. (Escobedo Decl., ¶¶45-66; Jelfs Decl., ¶59.) Moreover, Peraton argues that Plaintiff cannot
produce evidence of discriminatory animus to rebut its legitimate reasons. The only potential evidence Plaintiff offers
are two alleged comments made by his supervisor, Escobedo, in 2018, suggesting
that Plaintiff should retire due to his age. However, these comments occurred nearly three
years before his termination, weakening any claim of age-based motivation. (Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden
(2001) 532 U.S. 268, 273-74.) Peraton
further supports its argument by pointing out that during the time leading up
to Plaintiff’s termination, Escobedo supervised other employees who were as old
or older than Plaintiff, none of whom faced similar adverse actions, which undermines
the claim that Escobedo or other decision-makers were biased against older
employees. (Escobedo Decl., ¶74.) Based on this, Peraton contends that no
reasonable jury could find that age discrimination was a factor in Plaintiff’s termination,
and therefore, they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine
dispute of fact regarding his age discrimination claim, making summary judgment
inappropriate. He contends that under the burden-shifting framework established
in McDonnell Douglas Corp., once he establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to Peraton to show that their actions were
motivated by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. If Peraton meets this burden, Plaintiff must
then demonstrate that these reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff claims there is direct evidence of
discriminatory animus, which he argues eliminates the need for burden-shifting.
He points to a statement by his
supervisor, Escobedo, who allegedly said that the company would benefit more by
investing in a younger worker. This
statement, according to Plaintiff, clearly reflects age bias. (PAMF 65.)
To establish his prima facie case, Plaintiff highlights that he was over
forty years old at the time of his termination (PAMF 1), was qualified for his
position given his advanced degrees and prior positive performance reviews (PAMF
2, 4, 10, 16), and was subjected to adverse employment actions, including
termination. Moreover, he asserts that
he was replaced by a significantly younger and less experienced employee,
Hunter Bercow, who took over his projects and job duties while he was on
medical leave. (PAMF 49-50, 65, 68, 86).
Plaintiff further argues that
Peraton’s stated reasons for these adverse actions were mere pretext for age
discrimination. He points to evidence of
disparate treatment, discriminatory remarks, and Peraton’s failure to properly
investigate his complaints as indicators that the real motive behind his
termination was his age, rather than legitimate business reasons. Given these arguments, Plaintiffcontends that
there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his age discrimination
claim, which should preclude summary judgment in favor of Peraton.
In reply, Peraton argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet
the burden of production required to support his first and fourteenth claims
for age discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA. The evidence Plaintiff offers is a single
alleged comment by Escobedo, stating that a younger engineer would provide more
benefits to the company than Plaintiff. Peraton contends that this isolated comment,
which occurred months before Plaintiff’s termination, is insufficient to create
a triable issue of age discrimination. Peraton
emphasizes that, in a summary judgment context, the plaintiff must produce
substantial evidence to show that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse
action is a pretext for discrimination.
Peraton highlights that, during the same period, Escobedo hired another
engineer, Jamil Iddi, who was significantly older than Plaintiff, which
undermines the claim of age-based animus. The company has provided extensive documentary
evidence to support its neutral and non-discriminatory reasons for disciplining
and ultimately terminating Plaintiff. Peraton
argues that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to prove intentional
discrimination, and therefore, Peraton is entitled to summary judgment on both
the age discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination claims.
The Court finds that Peraton has met
its burden of providing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse
employment actions taken against the Plaintiff.
These include Plaintiff’s consistent failure to meet job expectations,
including his inadequate participation in team activities, refusal to adhere to
management’s directives, and production of subpar work, collectively justify
the disciplinary actions and eventual termination by Peraton. These documented instances of misconduct align
with Peraton’s policies and the job requirements for Plaintiff’s position. (Escobedo Decl., ¶¶45-66, Exs. “R” through “Z”
and “AA” through “HH”; Jelfs Decl., ¶59.)
Moreover, Plaintiff’s attempt to establish pretext through the isolated
comment made by Escobedo, indicating a preference for investing in a younger
engineer, fails to create a triable issue of fact regarding age discrimination.
The comment, while potentially
problematic on its own, does not override the substantial evidence
demonstrating that the adverse actions were based on legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons. Thus,
Plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden in showing a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Peraton’s motion for summary
adjudication as to the first cause of action.
Fourteenth
Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation
in Violation of FEHA
Peraton argues that the failure to prevent discrimination
under the FEHA claim cannot succeed if the underlying age discrimination claim
fails. To establish a claim for failure
to prevent discrimination, the Plaintiff must prove that he was subjected to
discrimination, that Peraton failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it, and
that this failure caused him harm. (Cal.
Gov’t Code §12940(k).) However, because
Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim fails, the failure- to-prevent claim also
lacks merit.
The Court agrees and finds that without a valid underlying
claim of discrimination, there is no basis for a failure to prevent
discrimination claim. Since Plaintiff
has not produced sufficient evidence to support his age discrimination claim,
it follows that his failure to prevent discrimination claim must also fail.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Peraton’s motion for summary
adjudication as to the fourteenth cause of action.
Ninth
and Tenth Causes of Action: (9) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in
Violation of FEHA; (10) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process
An employer’s failure to make
reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an
applicant or employee is an unlawful employment practice. (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (m).) “The elements of a failure to accommodate
claim are ‘(1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff
is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.’ ” (Swanson
v. Morongo Unified School District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969.)
Peraton argues that the ninth cause of action for failure to
provide reasonable accommodation under FEHA is flawed for several reasons. First, it contends that Plaintiff was not disabled.
His claim of anxiety resulting from
working under his supervisor, Escobedo, does not constitute a mental disability
under California law. (Higgins-Williams
v. Sutter Medical Foundation (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 78, 85.) Since he was not disabled, his claim for
failure to accommodate cannot stand.
However, even if Plaintiff were considered disabled, Peraton asserts
that they provided the only reasonable accommodation he requested: medical
leave, which he admitted he received in full. His other request—to not report to Escobedo—is
not a reasonable accommodation under the law, as the inability to work with a
specific supervisor does not qualify as a disability accommodation. (Roberts v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2017) 690 Fed.Appx. 535, 536.) Furthermore, Peraton argues that accommodating
this request would impose an undue hardship on their operations, particularly
given the highly technical and interdependent nature of the companty’s program,
which requires all mechanical engineers to report to Escobedo. (Williams Decl., ¶24.) Thus, Peraton concludes that they were not
obligated to grant such an accommodation, and Plaintiff’s claim should fail.
Similarly, Peraton argues that the tenth cause of action for
failure to engage in the interactive process under FEHA cannot succeed because
Plaintiff only requested medical leave after his anxiety attack in July 2019,
which Peraton fully provided, granting him 13 months of leave. His other request—to not report to his
supervisor, Escobedo—was not a reasonable accommodation under the law, and
therefore does not support his claim. California
law requires that for a failure to engage in the interactive process claim to
succeed, the employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that could have
been made at the time. (Shirvanyan v.
Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 96.) Since Hajizamani received the only reasonable
accommodation he requested, and his other request was unreasonable, he cannot
prove that a valid accommodation was denied. Consequently, Peraton argues that Hajizamani's
tenth cause of action should fail.
Plaintiff does not discuss the ninth or tenth causes of
action in his opposition.
In reply, Peraton argues that Plaintiff has effectively
abandoned his ninth and tenth causes of action, which pertain to failure to
accommodate a disability and failure to engage in the interactive process. Peraton points out that in both the Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s responses, it was clarified that Plaintiff’s
only requested accommodation was medical leave from July 2019 to September
2020. Plaintiff admitted that he was
provided with the full leave he requested and did not request any further
accommodations upon his return in September 2020. Peraton contends that these admissions
undermine Plaintiff’s claims, as they show that he was not denied the
accommodation he requested, which is a necessary element for his ninth cause of
action. Similarly, for the tenth cause
of action, Peraton argues that since Plaintiffadmitted he had no restrictions
and did not request any accommodation upon his return, he cannot establish the
essential elements of a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process. Moreover, Peraton notes that Plaintiff’s opposition
fails to address these two causes of action, which they argue constitutes a
waiver of these claims.
The Court agrees with Peraton that Plaintiff’s failure to
address the ninth and tenth causes of action constitute waiver of the
claims.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Peraton’s motion for summary
adjudication as to the ninth and tenth causes of action.
Thirteenth,
Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Nineteenth Causes of Action: (13) Retaliation for
Engaging in a Protected Activity in Violation of FEHA; (15) Retaliation for
Reporting a Work Place Injury and Filing Workers’ Compensation Claim in
Violation of Labor Code § 6310; (16) Wrongful Termination of Employment in
Violation of Public Policy; (19) Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5
FEHA
Retaliation
To state a cause of action for
retaliation under FEHA, Plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) that he
engaged in a protected activity, (2) his employer subjected him to adverse
employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected
activity and the employer's action.” (Yanowitz
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Protected activity can take many forms and
includes opposition to “any practices forbidden under this part or because the
person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under
this part.” (Gov. Code § 12940(h).) “Although an
employee need not formally file a charge in order to qualify as being engaged
in protected opposing activity, such activity must oppose activity the employee
reasonably believes constitutes unlawful discrimination, and complaints about
personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an employer
on notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to
establish protected conduct. . . .¶ It is not difficult to envision
circumstances in which a subordinate employee may wish to avoid directly
confronting a supervisor with a charge of discrimination and the employee
engages in subtler or more indirect means in order to avoid furthering or
engaging in discriminatory conduct.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1047.)
Peraton argues that their actions toward Plaintiff,
including the February 25, 2019, Performance Improvement Plan, the July 9,
2019, final written warning, and the February 21, 2021, termination, were
solely motivated by Plaintiff’s job performance and conduct with his supervisor
and co-workers. (Escobedo Decl., ¶¶67,
70-76; Williams Decl., ¶¶25-27; Jelfs Decl., ¶¶65-67; Giroux Decl., ¶12.) It asserts that Plaintiff has no evidence to
suggest otherwise, and mere speculation is not sufficient to create a triable
issue of fact. (Dollinger DeAnza
Associates v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1132,
1144-45; Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1718, 1735.) Peraton
contends that it fully accommodated Plaintiff’s request for medical leave,
providing ten months more leave than required by law, and then returned him to
his previous position with the same seniority and salary. Therefore, it is unreasonable to suggest that it
was motivated by retaliatory animus to terminate Plaintiff five months after
his return. Furthermore, Peraton argues
that while Plaintiff did submit a complaint of discrimination on February 17,
2021, six days before his termination, the key decision-makers (Escobedo,
Jelfs, Williams, and Giroux) were unaware of the complaint until weeks later. (Escobedo Decl., ¶71; Jelfs Decl., ¶¶64-65;
Williams Decl., ¶¶25-26; Giroux Decl., ¶¶15-16.) Thus, they could not have been motivated by a
complaint they did not know about.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has established a
prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA by demonstrating that he engaged
in protected activities, suffered adverse employment actions, and that there is
a causal link between the two. Specifically,
Plaintiff asserts that he engaged in protected activities by taking medical
leave for his disability, filing a workers’ compensation claim, and repeatedly
complaining about discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff contends that after engaging in
these activities, Peraton subjected him to adverse actions, such as refusing to
extend his PIP, issuing a final written warning, replacing him with a younger
employee, denying him a merit increase, changing his job duties, and ultimately
terminating his employment. Plaintiff
argues that the timing of these adverse actions in close proximity to his
protected activities suggests a causal link and supports a finding of pretext. He further contends that discriminatory
remarks made by his supervisors, along with Peraton’s failure to properly
investigate his complaints, reinforce the pretextual nature of Peraton’s
actions. For example, Plaintiff points
to a comment by his supervisor, Escobedo, stating that the company would
benefit more from investing in a younger employee, as well as an email from HR
Manager Jelfs downplaying his disability.
Plaintiff also highlights that the investigation into his complaints was
flawed, as key individuals were not interviewed, and the investigation report
contained inaccuracies.
In reply, Peraton argues that Plaintiff has not produced
sufficient evidence to show that his termination or any other adverse actions
were motivated by his medical leave, workers’ compensation claim, or February
2021 complaints. While Plaintiff claims
that these activities were protected under various statutes and that they led
to retaliatory actions, Peraton contends that there is no evidence linking
these activities to the adverse employment actions taken between September 2020
and February 2021. Peraton acknowledges
that temporal proximity might be enough to shift the burden to the employer to
provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, but it is not
sufficient to satisfy the employee's burden of proving pretext or retaliatory
motive. Peraton has provided ample
evidence of neutral, job-related reasons for Plaintiff’s criticism and eventual
termination after his return from a 13-month leave, arguing that the Plaintiff
has failed to provide specific, substantial evidence to counter these reasons
or to prove that they were a pretext for retaliation.
The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has not met the
required burden of proof to show that Peraton’s reasons were pretextual. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s reliance on
temporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a triable issue, especially
in light of the comprehensive documentation provided by Peraton regarding job
performance and conduct issues that justified the adverse actions. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not provided enough evidence to support his claims of retaliation and that
Peraton is entitled to summary adjudication on these claims.
Thus, the Court GRANTS Peraton’s motion for summary
adjudication as to the thirteenth cause of action.
Labor
Code § 6310
A cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code section 6310,
for reporting a health or safety complaint, requires the following: (1)
plaintiff was an employee of defendant; (2) plaintiff, on his own behalf or on
behalf of others, made an oral or written complaint to an entity regarding
unsafe/unhealthy working conditions or initiated a proceeding relating to his
or another’s rights to workplace health or safety; (3) defendant engaged in
adverse employment action against plaintiff; (4) plaintiff's complaint was a
substantial motivating reason for defendant's adverse employment action; (5)
plaintiff was harmed; and (6) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
causing plaintiff's harm. (CACI 4605; See Lab. Code, §6310, subds. (a), (c).)
Peraton argues that the fifteenth cause of action for retaliation
under Labor Code §6310 for reporting a workplace injury and filing a workers’ compensation
claim, fails because Plaintiff cannot establish a causal link between these
actions and his termination. While it is
undisputed that Plaintiff reported a slip-and-fall in January 2018 and filed a
workers’ compensation claim for an anxiety attack in July 2019, Peraton
contends that Plaintiff lacks evidence to connect these actions to his
termination in February 2021. Peraton
asserts that the decision-makers involved in Plaintiff’s termination have
testified that the termination was based on Plaintiff’s poor job performance
and behavior after returning from leave, which violated company policies. (Escobedo Decl., ¶¶67, 72, 75; Jelfs Decl.,
¶66; Williams Decl., ¶¶20, 27.) Since
Plaintiff has not provided evidence to rebut these legitimate, nonretaliatory
reasons, Peraton argues that he cannot meet the burden required to survive
summary judgment.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that it is undisputed that
he reported workplace injuries and filed a workers’ compensation claim before
his termination. Plaintiff asserts that
his supervisors were aware of his workers’ compensation claim and that the
timing of the adverse actions taken against him, along with comments made by HR
Manager Jelfs—who suggested denying his claim and implied that he reported
injuries when he didn’t get his way—demonstrates animus. These amount to speculative theories, not
evidence.
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable
issue of fact to support his claim of retaliation under Labor Code section
6310. Thus, the Court GRANTS Peraton’s motion for summary adjudication as to
the fifteenth cause of action.
Sixteenth
and Nineteenth Causes of Action
The sixteenth cause of action if for
wrongful discharge. “ ‘The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the
employer terminated the plaintiffs employment, (3) the termination was
substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge
caused the plaintiff harm.’ ” (Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical
Center (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1234-35.)
“A discharge is actionable as
against public policy if it violates a policy that is: ‘(1) delineated in
either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) “public” in the sense that
it “inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving merely the interests
of the individual; (3) well established at the time of discharge; and (4)
“substantial” and “fundamental.” ’ ”
(Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922,
929.) “It is well established that a
termination premised on an employee's refusal to violate either a statute or an
administrative regulation may support a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.” (Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical
Center, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)
Labor
Code section 1102.5 retaliation
To support a claim for whistleblower retaliation, plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by Labor
Code section 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action
against the employee.
Under Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b), protected activity is defined as “disclosing information, or
[when] the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose
information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with
authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for
providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an
investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to
believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute,
or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
employee's job duties.”
Peraton argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s sixteenth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy and the nineteenth cause of action for violation of Labor Code
§1102.5 because these claims are closely related and should be evaluated
together. Peraton asserts that if the
Labor Code §1102.5 claim fails, the common law wrongful termination claim must
also fail. It contends that Plaintiff’s
statutory whistleblower retaliation claim is flawed for the same reasons as his
FEHA retaliation claim. Specifically,
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his termination was motivated by his February
17, 2021, complaint to Peraton’s web-based hotline because all relevant
decision-makers testified that they were unaware of the complaint until weeks
after the termination. (Escobedo Decl.,
¶71; Jelfs Decl., ¶¶64-65; Williams Decl., ¶¶25-26; Giroux Decl., ¶¶15-16.) Peraton argues that a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action cannot be established without evidence that the
decision-makers were aware of the complaint at the time of the termination.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that
his whistleblower retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 should be
evaluated using the standard set forth in Labor Code section 1102.6, as
clarified by Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12
Cal.5th 703. Under this statute, Plaintiff
only needs to demonstrate that retaliation was a contributing factor in the
adverse employment action. Once this is
established by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the same action would
have been taken for legitimate, independent reasons, even without the protected
activity. Plaintiff contends that he
engaged in protected activities, including requesting accommodations for his
disability, taking medical leave, and reporting discriminatory and retaliatory
behavior by his supervisors. Following these activities, he was terminated. He argues that he has met his burden of
showing that his protected activities were a contributing factor in the
disciplinary actions and his termination. Plaintiff further asserts that Peraton has not
and cannot provide clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
same actions for independent reasons, and therefore, summary adjudication on
this issue should be denied.
Regarding his sixteenth cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, Plaintiff argues that this claim,
along with his claim for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation, is based on his allegations of discrimination and retaliation
under Labor Code §§ 1102.5, 6310(a), and Government Code § 12940. Since his claims for discrimination and
retaliation are viable, Plaintiff contends that his claims for wrongful
termination and failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation are also
valid.
The Court finds that the statutory whistleblower retaliation
claim is flawed for the same reasons as the FEHA retaliation claim. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above,
Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was a
wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy and a
violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.
Thus, the Court grants Peraton’s motion for summary
adjudication as to the sixteenth and nineteenth causes of action.
Conclusion
Peraton’s motion for summary
judgment is denied. Peraton’s motion for
summary adjudication is granted as to the first, ninth, tenth, thirteenth,
fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and nineteenth causes of action.