Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 22STCV26843 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is sustained with leave to amend.

This is an action brought under the Song-Beverly Act by Plaintiffs Aaron Caver (Caver) and Tynisha Knox (Knox) against Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) and DOES 1-10. Plaintiffs are co-owners of a 2016 Kia Soul (Vehicle). Initially, Knox leased the Vehicle by herself in December 2015 from Kia of Downtown. Then, in January 2020, Knox and Caver purchased the Vehicle together from Car Pros Kia Glendale.

The First Amended Complaint alleges claims for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d), (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3), (4) breach of express written warranty, and (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

Kia requests that the court take judicial notice of the Declaration of Aaron Caver in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on November 22, 2022. Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452(d) and 453, as this pertains to a record of the court, Kia’s request is granted.

Defendant’s counsel contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 14, 2023 to meet and confer regarding Defendant’s problems with the FAC. (Motion, Declaration of Corinne Orquiola, ¶ 2.) Despite good faith efforts on both sides, counsel for the respective parties were not able to agree on a resolution. (Ibid.) The court finds the efforts of Defendant’s counsel sufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirement.

Kia demurs to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint on the ground of uncertainty. Kia contends that Plaintiffs improperly plead mixed causes of action because according to the pleadings, the same five claims are based on two separate contractual events that vary significantly in terms of the type of contract, the parties involved, and the status of the subject vehicle.

Kia contends that the elements for breach of implied warranty change depending on whether there was a lease or a purchase. There is a one-year implied warranty for new vehicles and a three-month implied warranty for used vehicles. Kia also contends that the statute of limitations and damages differ depending on whether there was a breach of warranty for a lease or a purchase.

Kia relies on a recent ruling, Rodriguez v. FCA, LLC, which holds that “a previously owned vehicle sold with some balance remaining on one of the manufacturer’s express warranties does not qualify as a ‘new motor vehicle’ under the [SBA].” (Rodriguez v. FCA, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 216.) Review of the case has been granted; it may be relied on as persuasive authority, but not controlling authority.

Kia also contends that given the mixed pleadings, the court cannot rule on Kia’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication because, for instance, while Kia may be entitled to summary judgment under the lease agreement, it may not be under the purchase agreement, and the court cannot issue a summary judgment/adjudication on only part of a cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and the FAC is well-pleaded because it sufficiently states the nature, source, and extent of the causes of action.

Under the Song-Beverly Act, a lessee is entitled to relief for breach of warranty obligations during the lease period just as a purchaser is entitled to relief for breach of warranty after a sale. (Civ. Code § 1795.4.) Here, Knox leased the Vehicle on her own in 2015. (FAC ¶ 6.) Therefore, she is potentially covered by any warranty accompanying the 2015 lease agreement. In 2020, Knox and Caver together bought out the lease on the Vehicle. (Ibid.) The complaint does not expressly specify what warranties were included with the purchase. The FAC’s descriptions of problems with the car appear to have arisen after the purchase, not during the lease period. The complaint is uncertain whether any warranty that arose from the lease is alleged to cover any of the alleged defects.

The FAC describes in general terms the different warranties extended to Plaintiffs but does not specify when those warranties were extended or whether they were in connection with the lease or the purchase agreement. (FAC ¶ 7, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs provide specific dates that they experienced problems with the Vehicle after the purchase agreement, but the FAC does not set forth what warranties are alleged to cover any particular incident.[1] Another reason the causes of action must be more clearly delineated is that Ms. Knox was a party to the lease, but Mr. Caver was not.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer for uncertainty is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs must plead separate causes of action for the appropriate plaintiff, for both express warranty and implied warranty, arising from both the lease agreement and the purchase agreement.

[1] The FAC contains too much and not enough. It includes considerable improper matter, including allegations having nothing to do with the subject vehicle, and extensive legal argument. This unnecessary material violates Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, which requires that the complaint contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” At the same time, the FAC omits essential detail of what duties Defendant is alleged to have breached on what theory and when.